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JOWO – The Joint Ontology Workshops
These proceedings include the papers presented at JOWO 2018, the Joint Ontol-
ogy Workshops, together with papers from satellite events of the 10th Interna-
tional Conference on Formal Ontology and Information Systems (FOIS 2018) in
Cape Town, with which it was collocated. JOWO 2018 was the fourth edition of
the ‘Joint Ontology Workshops’, which comprised a confederation of five ontology
workshops and an early career symposium. Previous editions of the JOWO series
have been:
• The first JOWO edition was ‘Episode 1: The Argentine Winter of Ontology’,
held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in co-location with the 24th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015). The proceedings of
JOWO 2015 appeared as volume 1517 of CEUR.1
• The second JOWO edition was ‘Episode 2: The French Summer of Ontology’,
held in Annecy, France, in co-location with the 9th International Conference
on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS 2016). The proceedings of
JOWO 2016 appeared as volume 1660 of CEUR.2.
• The third JOWO edition was ‘Episode 3: The Tyrolean Autumn’, hosted by
the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano in Bolzano, Italy, from September 21–23,
2017. The proceedings of JOWO 2017 appeared as volume 2050 of CEUR.3.
JOWO’s mission is to provide a platform for the diverse communities interested
in building, reasoning with, and applying formalised ontologies in the wide spec-
trum of Information Systems, Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Linguistics and
Cognitive Science, both in theory and applications.
The 2018 edition of JOWO served as a platform for satellite events for FOIS 2018.
It collocated workshops that cover a broad spectrum of contemporary applied on-
tology research, including its methodological foundations and quality evaluation
(BOG), the application of ontologies in particular domains, such as economics
(Ontology of Economics) or conceptual modeling (Onto.Com), the role of ontol-
ogy in related research areas like cognition (CAOS-CEX), and the epistemolog-
ical stance in formal ontology (EPINON II). A total of twenty-five papers were
submitted to the workshops of which fifteen were accepted.
These proceedings document five JOWO 2018 workshops, the FOIS Early Career






• BOG International Workshop on BadOntoloGy4
• CAOS-CEX International Workshop on Cognition and Ontologies & Compre-
hensibility and Explanation in AI and ML5
• EPINON II 2nd International Workshop on Epistemology in Ontologies6
• Onto.Com 6th Int. Workshop on Ontologies and Conceptual Modelling7
• Ontology of Economics International Workshop on Ontology of Economics8
• Early Career The Early Career Symposium9
• Conceptual Ontology Engineering Tutorial on Conceptual Ontology Engineer-
ing10
• Referring Expressions in Ontologies and Query Answering Tutorial on Refer-
ring Expressions in Ontologies and Query Answering11
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International Workshop on Bad OntoloGy
Programme Chairs
Giancarlo Guizzardi Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Oliver Kutz Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Rafael Pen˜aloza Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Nicolas Troquard Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Programme Committee
Claudia d’Amato University of Bari, Italy
Mathieu d’Aquin Insight Centre for Data Analytics, National University of Ireland
Galway, Ireland
Joa˜o Paulo Almeida Federal University of Espirito Santo, Brazil
Werner Ceusters SUNY at Bu↵alo, USA
Oscar Corcho Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid, Spain
Ricardo A. Falbo Federal University of Espirito Santo, Brazil
Aldo Gangemi University of Bologna & CNR-ISTC, Italy
Andreas Herzig IRIT-CNRS, Italy
Adila A. Krisnadhi Wright State University & Universitas Indonesia, USA & Indonesia
Frank Loebe University of Leipzig, Austria
Fabian Neuhaus University of Magdeburg, Germany
Bijan Parsia The University of Manchester, UK
Mar´ıa Poveda-Villalo´n Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid, Spain
Catherine Roussey Irstea, France
Ulrike Sattler The University of Manchester, UK
Claudia Schon University Koblenz-Landau, Germany
Stefan Schulz Institute of Medical Informatics, Statistics and Documentation,
Graz General Hospital and University Clinics, Austria
Amanda Vizedom Cre´dit Suisse, USA
As ontologies are adopted by new practitioners and as they grow in size, bad
ontologies become an increasingly common reality. Bad ontologies may be in-
consistent, have unwanted consequences, be ridden with anti-patterns. In gen-
eral, bad ontologies present design mistakes that make their use and maintenance
problematic or impossible.
Programming engineers have had access for some time to debuggers to help iden-
tify unwanted results and linters to identify stylistic errors and suspicious con-
structs. Ontology practitioners also need similar tools to aid them correcting bad
ontologies. Researchers in ontology engineering have actively been working on
engineering methods to assist in the repair of erroneous ontologies: diagnostic,
explanation, anti-pattern detection, etc. The workshop welcomed original contri-
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butions about all topics related to bad ontologies, including the cataloguing of
ontology symptoms, symptoms detection, ontology quality measures, diagnostic
methods to explain the symptoms, principled methods for building bad ontologies,
or benchmarks of bad ontologies for evaluating repairing methods.
The workshop accepted two submissions. In The Role of Foundational Ontologies
for Preventing Bad Ontology Design, Stefan Schulz reports on a method to use
upper-level domain ontologies and Description Logic classifiers for the detection
of modelling mistakes. Several prototypical and generalisable modelling mistakes
are used to demonstrate the method. In Applying evaluation criteria to ontology
modules, Zubeida Casmod Khan presents a set of evaluation criteria for ontology
modules. They are all structured into categories and illustrated through a series
of examples. The evaluation criteria are then used to experimentally evaluate the
modules automatically generated by a modularisation tool.
CAOS-CEX 2018
Third International Workshop on Cognition and Ontologies &
Workshop on Comprehensibility and Explanation in AI and ML (CAOS-CEX)
Programme Chairs
Maria M. Hedblom Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Tarek R. Besold City University London, UK
Oliver Kutz Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Programme Committee
Derek Doran Wright State University, USA
Scott Friedman SIFT, USA
Dagmar Gromann TU Dresden, Germany
Jamie Macbeth Fairfield University, USA
Fabian Neuhaus Otto-von-Guericke University, Germany
Alessandro Oltramari Bosch Research and Technology Center in Pittsburgh, USA
Sarah Schulz University of Stuttgart, Germany
Gem Stapleton University of Brighton, UK
Serge Thill University of Skovde, Sweden
Carlos Zednik Otto-von-Guericke University, Germany
CAOS is a workshop devoted to bringing together research findings from areas in
cognitive science with research on formal ontology. The workshop addresses the
di cult question of how key cognitive phenomena and concepts (and the involved
terminology) can be found across languages, psychology and reasoning and how
this can be formally and ontologically understood, analysed and represented. The
workshop devotes itself to investigations to model, simulate and represent a range
of cognitive abilities, with the further aim to contribute with these findings to
cognitive artificial intelligence.
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This includes formal modeling of cognitive building blocks such as a↵ordances
and image schemas, the relationship between thought, language and representa-
tion, the formal simulation of cognitive abilities such as language acquisition and
concept invention as well as formal modeling of socio-cognitive behaviors.
This year, CAOS runs its third edition and is joined by the workshop ”Com-
prehensibility and Explanation in AI and ML” (CEX) which focuses on largely
overlapping topics but from a more applied direction. The workshop gathered
three papers of relevant topics for the research field: In “Ontology Of Social Ser-
vice Needs: Perspective of a Cognitive Agent” Bart Gajderowicz, Mark Fox and
Michael Gruninger introduce the first ontology of social services from a client’s
perspective; In “Modelling A↵ordances with Dispositions” Fumiaki Toyoshima
investigates the formal realisation of a↵ordances by comparing them to the state
of the art in ontology representation, and Antony Galton contributes to the mere-
ological debate of part-whole relationships in “Yet Another Taxonomy of Part-
Whole Relations”. We particularly thank our invited keynote speaker Alessandro
Oltramari for his contribution to the success of the workshop.
EPINON II 2018
Second International Workshop on Epistemology in Ontologies (EPINON II)
Programme Chairs
Daniele Porello Free University of Bolzano-Bozen, Italy
Claudio Masolo Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC-CNR),
Trento, Italy
Simon Scheider Utrecht University, Netherlands
Programme Committee
Massimiliano Carrara University of Padua, Italy
Roberta Ferrario Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC-CNR), Italy
Maria Hedblom Otto-von-Guericke University, Germany
Heinrich Herre University of Leipzig, Germany
Gilles Kassel Universite´ de Picardie - Jules Vernes, France
Adila Alfa Krisnadhi Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia
Nicolas Troquard Free University of Bolzano-Bozen, Italy
Achille Varzi Columbia University, USA
Laure Vieu Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT-CNRS),
France
Formal ontologies and knowledge representation mainly focus on characterising
how a given domain is structured, i.e., they identify a set of concepts, entities, and
relations together with the constraints that hold for this domain. The structure of
the characterisation is usually intended to reflect the point of view of significant
experts or a realist view of how things about a particular domain are in reality.
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The aim of this workshop is to explore an epistemological stance in formal ontol-
ogy and knowledge representation and focus on the assessment of the modelling
provided by the ontology designer. In particular, we are interested in fostering two
intertwined research directions. Firstly, we are interested in promoting discussions
about the epistemological foundations of formal ontologies and of knowledge rep-
resentation. A number of timely important problems are related to this point, for
instance: the investigations of cognitively adequate ontological representations,
the investigations on the provenance of data, the problem of the reliability of the
source of information (both human and artificial, e.g. sensors), the problem of the
epistemic reliability of the classification provided by ontology users, the problem
of finding epistemically and cognitively well-founded rationales for the integra-
tion of ontological representations with other representational formats (e.g. deep
neural networks, vector space models etc.). Secondly, we are interested in formal
and ontological approaches to the definitions of the concepts that are relevant
to the assessment of the perspective of the ontology designer. Problems related
to this direction include: ontology of general epistemological concepts (e.g. proof,
argument, explanation, epistemic reliability, trust), ontology of cognitive concepts
(perception, reasoning, sensations), ontology of data and measurements.
We aim to address to an interdisciplinary audience, by inviting scholars in phi-
losophy, computer science, logic, conceptual modelling, knowledge representation,
and cognitive science to contribute to the discussion.
Onto.Com 2018
Sixth International Workshop on Ontologies and Conceptual Modeling
Programme Chairs
Frederik Gailly Ghent University, Belgium
Giancarlo Guizzardi Federal University of Espirito Santo, Brazil
Mark Lycett Royal Holloway, University of London, UK
Chris Partridge BORO Solutions Ltd., UK
Oscar Pastor Universitat Politecnica de Valencia, Spain, Spain
Sergio de Cesare University of Westminster, UK
Programme Committee
Frederik Gailly Ghent University, Belgium
Giancarlo Guizzardi Federal University of Espirito Santo, Brazil
Mark Lycett Royal Holloway, University of London, UK
Chris Partridge BORO Solutions Ltd., UK
Oscar Pastor Universitat Politecnica de Valencia, Spain, Spain
Sergio de Cesare University of Westminster, UK
The role of formal ontology in Conceptual Modeling (CM) is increasingly being
recognized as fundamental by both the research and practitioner communities.
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Formal ontology, whose theoretical underpinnings are grounded in disciplines such
as Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences and Linguistics, has led to the development of
theoretical foundations for conceptual modeling. In particular, a number of onto-
logical theories such as BORO, BWW, DOLCE, GFO and UFO have been suc-
cessfully applied to the evaluation of conceptual modeling languages, frameworks
and standards (e.g., UML, ORM, ER, REA, TROPOS, ARIS, BPMN, RM-ODP,
Archimate, OWL and ISO 15926), and to the development of information sys-
tems engineering tools (e.g., methodological guidelines, modeling profiles, design
patterns) that contribute to the theory and practice of conceptual modeling.
The objective of the OntoCom Workshop is to provide an international forum for
exchanging ideas on the latest developments in the emerging area of Ontology-
Driven Conceptual Modeling and to address specific questions of relevance to the
body of knowledge of this emerging discipline.
The workshop received 7 submissions, from which the Program Chairs selected 6
high quality papers. The 18th of September 2018 the 6 papers will be presented
in two separate sessions. The first session will focus on the metaphysical char-
acteristics of some well-known foundational ontologies. The second session will
focus on the application of ontology-driven conceptual modeling. We would like
to express our gratitude to the authors for considering OntoCom as a forum to
publish their research and the FOIS 2018 organizers for all their support.
Ontology of Economics 2018
First International Workshop on Ontology of Economics
Programme Chairs
Daniele Porello Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Nicola Guarino ISTC-CNR, Italy
Giancarlo Guizzardi Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Programme Committee
Ulle Endriss University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
Paul Johannesson Royal Institute of Technology
Oliver Massin University of Zurich, Switzerland
William Mccarthy Michigan State University, USA
Georgios Papadopoulos Research Institute for Art and Technology, Austria
Tiago Prince Sales University of Trento, Italy
Emma Tie↵enbach University of Geneva, Switzerland
Hans Weigand Tilburg University, Netherlands
Gloria Zuniga Ashford University, USA
Understanding the ontological nature of economic concepts and institutions is
crucial for providing principled modelling in many important domains such as
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enterprise modelling, business processes, and social ontology. A significant number
of fundamental concepts that are ubiquitous in economics have only recently been
approached from an ontological perspective.
For instance: value, risk, preference, utility, capability, good, service, exchange,
transaction, competition. We o↵er a venue to gather the recent contributions to
this important topic. We propose contributions from di↵erent areas such as (phi-
losophy of) economics, decision theory, social choice theory, business, finance, ac-
counting, economic sociology, and enterprise modelling, to promote the discussion
on the ontological foundation of fundamental concepts in economics.
We aim to foster the discussion on both theoretical and methodological issues in
the use of ontologies for modelling economic concepts and institutions, as well as
the approaches presenting concrete use of ontologies in application to economic
domains.
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Other FOIS 2018 Satellite Events
FOIS 2018 Early Career Symposium
Programme Chairs
Maria M. Hedblom Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Emilio Sanfilippo French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), France
Zubeida Khan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), South Africa
For any conference, the Early Career Symposium (ECS) represents the invest-
ment done by the current generation of researchers into the future generations
of the field. Arguably, while established researchers contribute to strengthen the
fundamentals of the research field, it is often the young generation that provides
innovation and groundbreaking ideas. In order to foster the state of art in on-
tology research, the ECS at FOIS welcomes early stage researchers working on
innovative and novel research topics for presentation at the conference. The sym-
posium encourages mentorship among established and emerging researchers to-
wards constructive discussions surrounding novel research. As the future remains
unwritten, the ECS accepts a wide variety of research topics focused on ontolo-
gies and knowledge representation. In particular, because of its contextualization
within FOIS, it welcomes research addressed in an interdisciplinary way with
an open-minded aptitude towards philosophical ontology, cognitive science, and
linguistics. We wish to thank the PC members for their constructive feedback.
Tutorial on Conceptual Ontology Engineering
Organiser
Mike Bennett Hypercube Limited, UK & EDM Council, UK
Conceptual modeling as defined within the discipline of software development
is the exercise of creating computationally independent model artifacts against
which to develop and validate logical and physical model design artifacts. The art
of conceptual modeling is one that requires a clear understanding of the notion of
a concept and an appreciation of the nature of concepts as distinct from words,
labels or database element names. One powerful type of conceptual model is
the ‘ontology’ where ontology is understood to be a formal specification of a
conceptualization. The word ‘ontology’ is broadly used to cover a number of such
specifications. The goal of this tutorial is to present a formal framework within
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which to understand these distinctions and to introduce techniques by which
attendees may be able to develop ontologies that may serve as conceptual models,
focusing on the less technical (and often overlooked) aspects of such ontology
development, specifically the ability to appreciate concepts and to model these
within the logical formalisms used in ontology development.
Tutorial on Referring Expressions in Ontologies and Query
Answering
Organisers
David Toman University of Waterloo, Canada
Grant Weddell University of Waterloo, Canada
How individuals are identified when cooperating agents need to communicate is
an inherent issue faced by the designers of information systems. Solutions to this
problem range from insisting on global often opaque identifiers, such as URIs,
to application specific ways of externally identifying individuals, such as primary
keys in relational systems. The goal of this tutorial is to introduce a flexible




The Role of Foundational Ontologies for 
Preventing Bad Ontology Design 
Stefan SCHULZ a,b,1   
 
a Institute for Medical Informatics, Statistics and Documentation,  
Medical University of Graz, Austria 
b AVERBIS GmbH, Freiburg, Germany 
 
Abstract. Ontology engineering is error-prone, and many published ontologies 
suffer from quality problems. This paper initiates a discussion about how 
axiomatically rich foundational ontologies can contribute to prevent and to detect 
bad ontology design. Examples T-boxes are presented, and it is demonstrated how 
typical design errors can be detected by upper-level axioms, in particular disjoint 
class axioms, existential and value restrictions. However, debugging large domain 
ontologies under an expressive top level raises scalability issues. During domain 
ontology design this can be mitigated by using small random ontology modules for 
debugging. For reasoning in applications, however, less expressive variants of such 
foundational ontologies are necessary.   
Keywords. Foundational ontologies, description logics, quality assurance 
1. Introduction 
Constructing domain ontologies is a demanding endeavour. The formalization of basic 
regularities of a domain requires not only familiarity with the domain but also 
understanding of the basic principles of logic and formal ontology. This is especially the 
case if ontology engineering is understood not as building (closed-world) models limited 
to the support of well-delineated reasoning use cases in restricted domains, but as 
providing interoperable and re-usable (open world) representations of the domain itself.  
This is a basic principle stressed not only by the defenders of so-called realist 
ontologies [1,2] but also by some (moderate) critics [3], which documents an increasing 
consensus on how to represent those areas of knowledge where people tend to agree on 
an observer-independent reality and benefit from standardised terms, such as in natural 
science and technology domains. An important tenet of these ontologies is collaborative 
ontology development and interoperability. Principles for this kind of ontology 
development have been formulated by the OBO Foundry consortium [4] and within the 
Good Ontology Design (GoodOD) guidelines [5]. Both propagate a concise foundational 
upper-level as a mainstay for interoperability, and there is also some evidence that 
foundational ontologies – domain-independent top-level or domain-related upper-level 
ontologies – speed up ontology development and improve quality [6].   
                                                          
1 Corresponding Author: Stefan Schulz, Institute for Medical Informatics, Statistics and Documentation, 
Medical University of Graz, Auenbruggerplatz 2/V, 8036 Graz, Austria, E-mail: steschu@gmail.com 
  
This paper is intended to initiate a discussion on how foundational ontologies can 
help prevent typical errors in domain ontologies. This is also the reason why prototypical, 
partly made-up but easily understandable examples are used.  
2. Materials and Methods 
The work is based on BioTopLite (BTL2), an upper-level ontology [7], linked to BFO 
[8], using description logics [9] with OWL-DL expressiveness [10]. BTL2 has been 
designed with the intent to provide a rich set of constraining axioms to enforce the 
consistency of ontologies modelled thereunder. Although BTL2 is, in principle, domain-
independent, its content is geared to the domains of health care and biomedical research. 
This explains, e.g., the provision of more fine-grained classes for chemical and biological 
entities (e.g. ‘mono molecular entity’, organism, cell, population) as well as the 
disjunctive class condition, created in order to deal with the ontological heterogeneity of 
key medical concepts like diseases, signs, and symptoms. Fig. 1 provides Protégé 
screenshots of the class and relation hierarchies, together with sample axioms.     
 
Figure 1. Classes, relations (object properties) and selected axioms in BioTopLite2 (BTL2)[7] 
In order to test and demonstrate how BTL2 axioms are useful for preventing 
ontology design errors, T-boxes with typical examples of bad modelling will be 
presented in order to challenge the underlying foundational ontology. Some of these 
examples are formulated very abstractly due to their high level of generality; others use 
terms from a specific domain but are still understandable for a broader public.  
BTL2 Classes BTL2 Relations        BTL Axioms (examples)
  
Each T-box is modelled as an extension of BTL2. The HermIT [11] reasoner was 
used to detect inconsistencies. The explanation of inconsistencies follows Protégé’s 
OWL entailment explanation feature [12]. The examples are provided together with their 
results in the following section. The presentation of the original OWL expressions, the 
entailments and their justifications is done in the following order: 
x SRC – Axioms from ontology source (known satisfiable). 
x CHA – New axioms added that challenge the satisfiability of SRC. Cases 
in which an axiom is only transiently added, are marked by CHA-T. 
x INF – Inference, in particular the detection of classes that are unsatisfiable 
w.r.t. the T-box constituted by SRC and CHA.  
x EXP – Explanations of INF, with axioms collected from the explanation 
plug-in [12]. 
3. Results 
Reasoning examples under BTL2 are presented, in which deliberately erroneous axioms 
lead to an incoherent ontology, i.e., where one or more named classes turn out to be 
unsatisfiable, i.e. necessarily empty w.r.t. the T-box. This is expected to be detected by 
a DL classifier. In the following, a distinction is made between five error types, viz. (1) 
simple category errors, (2) value restrictions and transitive role errors, (3) complex 
domain/range constraint errors, (4) physical granularity errors, and (5) errors regarding 
unrealized realisables and non-referring information entities.  
3.1. Simple category errors 
A category error occurs whenever a class is a taxonomic descendent of upper-level 
classes that are modelled as mutually exclusive (Disjoint Classes in OWL). Such errors 
typically occur when ontology mapping and alignment is guided by lexical criteria. For 
instance, when mapping content of the clinical ontology SNOMED CT [13] (namespace 
sct:) to the foundational ontology BTL2 (namespace btl2:) one might be tempted to 
equate sct:Process with btl2:process and place ‘sct: Qualifier Value (qualifier value)’ 
under ‘btl2:quality’: 
 
SRC ‘sct:Process (qualifier value)’  SubClassOf  
                                                   ‘sct:Qualifier Value (qualifier value)’ 
(1a) 
NEW  ‘sct:Qualifier Value (qualifier value)’ SubClassOf btl2:quality (1b) 
NEW ‘sct:Process (qualifier value)’ EquivalentTo btl2:process (1c) 
INF ‘sct:Process (qualifier value)’  EquivalentTo owl:Nothing (1d) 
EXP btl2:quality DisjointWith btl2:process (1e) 
 
The origin of such category errors may be manifold. A common cause is misleading 
class labelling. Ontology labels should be context-independent and self-explanatory, and 
they should avoid ambiguous terms [14]. A more severe problem – like here – arises 
where the ontologies to be aligned fundamentally differ in upper level assumptions. In 
SNOMED CT, e.g., the subhierarchy ‘sct:Qualifier Value (qualifier value)’ is currently 
  
a badly organized reservoir for the most diverse terms, and the reason why hierarchies 
of pathological and physiological processes are placed therein remains unclear2.   
3.2. Value restrictions and transitive roles 
Value restrictions (universal constraints expressed by “only” in OWL Manchester 
syntax) restrict the range of allowed role fillers. It is tempting to use value restrictions 
together with mereological statements, e.g. stating that all members of a class have only 
parts of a certain kind, like in the following example:  
 
SRC btl2:cell SubClassOf btl2:compound (2a) 
SRC ‘cell culture’ SubClassOf ‘btl2:material object’ (2b) 
CHA ‘cell culture’ SubClassOf and (‘btl2:has part’ some btl2:cell)  
                                            and (‘btl2:has part’ only btl2:cell)  
(2c) 
INF ‘cell culture’ EquivalentTo owl:Nothing (2d) 
EXP ‘btl2:material object’ SubClassOf ‘btl2:has part’ some               
                                                        ‘btl2:subatomic particle’ 
(2e) 
EXP btl2:compound DisjointWith ‘btl2:subatomic particle’ (2f) 
 
Axiom like (2c) may fulfil their purpose in domain ontologies in which cells are the 
smallest objects, but as soon as smaller objects are allowed, the expression is inadequate 
– assuming 'has part' being transitive. BTL2 obviates such a granularity restriction by 
stating that all material objects have subatomic particles as (transitive) parts.    
3.3. Complex domain / range restrictions 
Domain / range restrictions are a suitable means to avoid ontology errors. However, in 
ontologies that use a small number of object properties like BTL2, this resource may be 
not expressive enough. For instance, if the relations ‘btl2:is part of’ and ‘btl2:has part’ 
are valid for material objects, immaterial objects, as well as for processes and information 
objects, formulating just domain / range restrictions at the level of these relations would 
still be compatible with an (unintended) model in which an object is part of a process or 
vice versa. This is why BTL2 encodes these restrictions using axioms like the one in (3f).  
 
SRC Object_A SubClassOf ‘btl2:material object’ (3a) 
SRC Process_A SubClassOf btl2:process (3b) 
CHA Object_A SubClassOf ‘btl2:is part of’ some Process_A (3c) 
INF Object_A EquivalentTo owl:Nothing (3d) 
EXP ‘btl2:has part’ InverseOf ‘btl2:is part of’ (3e) 
EXP btl2:process SubClassOf ‘btl2:has part’ only btl2:process        (3f) 
EXP btl2:process DisjointWith ‘btl2:material object’ (3g) 
 
                                                          
2 Processes, like all kinds of entities, may play the role of values in information models, e.g., “Infectious 
process”. Their confusion with their referents, i.e. domain entities proper (an infectious process in a patient) is 
a classic case of use-mention confusion, which still haunts many domain ontologies [15], especially those 
deriving from frames, thesauri and other knowledge organization systems. 
  
A similar example is typical for medical ontologies, where domain experts are 
tempted to use “diagnosis” and “disease” interchangeably, and where signs and 
symptoms are referred to, in colloquial discourse, as being “parts” of diagnoses: 
 
SRC Diagnosis_A SubClassOf Diagnosis (3h) 
SRC Diagnosis SubClassOf ‘btl2:information object’ (3i) 
SRC Symptom_A SubClassOf Symptom (3j) 
SRC Symptom SubClassOf btl2:condition (3k) 
CHA Diagnosis_A SubClassOf ‘btl2:has part’ some Symptom_A (3l) 
INF Diagnosis_A EquivalentTo owl:Nothing (3m) 
EXP ‘btl2:information object’ SubClassOf  
                                    ‘btl2:has part’ only ‘btl2:information object’ 
(3n) 
EXP btl2:condition EquivalentTo btl2:function or btl2:disposition or   
                                             ‘btl2:material object’ or btl2:process 
(3o) 
EXP DisjointClasses: ‘btl2:material object’, btl2:process, btl2:function or 
btl2:disposition, ‘btl2:information object’, ‘btl2:immaterial object’, 
btl2:role, btl2:quality, ‘btl2:temporal region’, ‘btl2:value region’ 
(3p) 
3.4. Physical granularity 
Ontologies for natural sciences and technology deal largely with physical objects of 
several degrees of granularity. Levels of material granularity obey certain mereological 
constraints, e.g. that biological cells can be parts of organisms but not vice versa, or that 
polymolecular entities can never be part of single molecules. BTL2 incorporates such 
constraints. They help detect modelling errors like the following one. 
 
SRC Chromosome SubClassOf ‘btl2:poly molecular composite entity’ (4a) 
SRC ProteinMolecule SubClassOf ‘btl2:mono molecular entity’ (4b) 
CHA Chromosome SubClassOf ‘btl2:is part of’ some ProteinMolecule (4c) 
INF Chromosome EquivalentTo owl:Nothing (4d) 
EXP ‘btl2:poly molecular composite entity’ and  (‘btl2:is part of’ some  
              (btl2:atom or ‘btl2:mono molecular entity’ or   
              ‘btl2:subatomic particle’)) SubClassOf owl:Nothing 
(4e) 
3.5. Unrealised realisables and non-referring information entities 
Realisable entities like functions and dispositions [16] depend on material entities and 
are realised in processes. However, the existence of realisables does not imply their 
realisation: The function of a screwdriver is to drive screws, and the disposition of a glass 
is to break under certain circumstances, but as there are screwdrivers that are never used 
and glasses that are never thrown to the floor. Because for all types of functions and 
dispositions there are instances that have never been realised, ontologies have to deal 
with unrealised realisables, which could be, e.g., expressed by (5a).  
 
SRC Unrealized_Function EquivalentTo btl2:function and not  




In order not to preclude the possibility that dispositions and functions happen to be 
never realised, ontologies under BTL2 should define them using the value restriction 
constructor: 
SRC btl2:function SubClassOf  ‘btl2:has realization’ only  btl2:process (5b) 
SRC Function_A EquivalentTo btl2:function and  
                                           (‘btl2:has realization’ only  Process_A) 
(5c) 
 
Nevertheless, BTL2 does not reject a definition using an existential quantifier like in the 
following definition: 
 
CHA Function_A EquivalentTo btl2:function and  
                                            (‘btl2:has realization’ some Process_A) 
(5d) 
 
Function_A would then exclude all unrealised function instances. Such a class (which 
might be considered anti-rigid [17] if assuming that realisable entities are always 
unrealised when they come into existence) is most likely not intended by the modeller. 
The detection of these errors requires checking consistency after transiently adding 
axiom (5e). 
 
CHA-T btl2:function EquivalentTo Unrealized_Function (5e) 
INF btl2:function EquivalentTo owl:Nothing (5f) 
 
The explanation is given by the conjunction of axioms (5a), (5d), and (5e).  
The axiomatization of non-referring information entities follows the same pattern. 
Information entities can be referring and non-referring [18]. A typical example is medical 
diagnosis [19]. BTL2 here uses the relation represents. This relation connects 
information entities with domain entity they correctly characterise. This allows to 
distinguish wrong diagnoses from correct diagnoses.     
 
SRC Diagnosis SubClassOf  ‘btl2:information object (5g) 
SRC False_diagnosis SubClassOf Diagnosis and  
                                   (not btl2:represents some btl2:condition) 
(5h) 
SRC Cancer_Diagnosis EquivalentTo Diagnosis and btl2:represents  
                                                   only (Cancer or not btl2:condition) 
(5i) 
CHA Cancer_diagnosis EquivalentTo Diagnosis and btl2:represents                        
                                                    some Cancer 
(5j)
  
Challenged by the axiom (5k) the T-box becomes incoherent. 
 
CHA-T Diagnosis EquivalentTo False_Diagnosis   (5k) 
INF Cancer_Diagnosis EquivalentTo owl:Nothing  
The explanation is given by the conjunction of axioms (5h), (5i), and (5k).   
  
4. Discussion and Further Work 
It was shown how a highly axiomatised foundational ontology like BioTopLite (BTL2) 
can incorporate constraints that reject bad modelling decisions that lead to unsatisfiable 
classes. A distinction was made between those cases in which the upper level axioms 
suffice for detecting such inconsistencies and those in which additional “challenges”, i.e. 
transiently added axioms are necessary.  
Most of the former cases capitalise on disjoint class axioms present in the upper 
level ontology. This comes near to the so-called logical anti-patterns introduced by [20], 
all of which require disjoint class axioms in order to detect inconsistencies. In contrast 
to the work presented, anti-patterns are very abstract logical expressions and independent 
of foundational ontologies. OntoClean [17] was presented as a methodology for detecting 
improper subclass axioms based on philosophically inspired, domain-independent 
properties of classes, the metaproperties unity, identity and rigidity. Although DL 
reasoners do not support meta-level reasoning, it has to be investigated whether certain 
elements from OntoClean could also included in DL-based foundational ontologies, e.g. 
by reifying them in terms of additional top-level classes3.     
Several limitations of this work have to be highlighted:  
x The typology presented is certainly non-exhaustive. It is primarily motivated by 
the author’s experience and not yet by the relevance of those types of problems 
in ontologies employed in real-world applications. It could further be related to 
existing work in ontology evaluation, e.g., the OQuaRE framework [21]. 
x The proposed approach will probably fail if application ontologies bypass the 
partition of upper categories of the foundational ontology or introduce new 
object properties that are not subproperties of the existing ones. The BTL2 
authors claim that their inventory of object properties is close to sufficient and 
recommend to introduce predicates required by the domain (e.g., in the 
biomedical domain: treats, prevents, diagnoses, interacts, binds) not as object 
properties but as subclasses of btl2:process.  
x Important causes of bad ontology design cannot be prevented or remedied by a 
foundational ontology. This includes erroneous representation of individuals as 
classes or vice versa (a typical error would be an A-Box OWL expression like 
“SodiumAtom Type btl2:atom), bad naming and insufficient documentation, as 
well as constraints on a meta-class level like in OntoClean.  
x Constraining axioms similar to the proposed ones can be added to domain 
ontologies, e.g. to assure mereotopological non-overlapping [22].  
x Although BTL2 was used as a testbed, the proposed approach would lend itself 
to other ontologies as well. Especially BFO would benefit from a stronger 
axiomatization, as the most popular version, which is the umbrella of most OBO 
ontologies lacks axioms beyond subclass and disjoint class axioms. This 
deficiency has been addressed by the 2.0 version, which is, however, not fully 
available in OWL due to its use of ternary relations. 
x The fact that BTL2 uses the whole range of constructors allowed by OWL-DL 
has a negative impact on reasoning performance. This makes debugging of large 
ontologies intractable. This was the case when aligning SNOMED CT with 
BTL2 [23]. The solution was to use small modules created from random 
                                                          
3 Which would be orthogonal to the existing ones, e.g. ‘rigid entity’‚ ‘anti-rigid entity’, ‘whole’   
  
signatures as described in [24]. As a solution a two-step approach was proposed: 
(i) at design time using the rich foundational ontology for debugging random 
modules of a (large) domain ontology under construction, and (ii) at runtime 
placing the final domain ontology under a light version of the same foundational 
ontology for enabling efficient reasoning.  
 References 
[1] I. Johansson, Bioinformatics and biological reality. J. Biomed Inform 39 (2006), 274–287  
[2] B. Smith, W. Ceusters, Ontological realism: A methodology for coordinated evolution of scientific 
ontologies. Applied Ontology 5 (2010) 139–188.  
[3] P. Lord and R. Stevens. Adding a little reality to building ontologies for biology. PLoS one 5.9 (2010), 
e12258.  
[4] M. Ashburner, C. Rosse, J. Bard, W. Bug, W. Ceusters, L.J. Goldberg, K. Eilbeck, A. Ireland, C.J. 
Mungall, the OBI Consortium, N. Leontis, P. Rocca-Serra, A. Ruttenberg, S. A. Sansone, R.H.  
Scheuermann, N. Shah, P.L. Whetzel, S. Lewis, The OBO Foundry: coordinated evolution of ontologies 
to support biomedical data integration, Nature Biotechnology 25 (2007), 1251.  
[5] S. Schulz, D. Seddig-Raufie, N. Grewe, J. Röhl, D. Schober, M. Boeker, L. Jansen, Guideline on 
Developing Good Ontologies in the Biomedical Domain with Description Logics, 
http://www.purl.org/goodod/guideline , 2012. 
[6] C. M. Keet. The use of foundational ontologies in ontology development: an empirical assessment. 
Extended Semantic Web Conference. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2011) 321-335.  
[7] S. Schulz. M. Boeker, C. Martinez-Costa, The BioTop family of upper level ontological resources for 
biomedicine, Stud Health Technol Inform. 235 (2017), 441–445.  
[8] R. Arp, B. Smith, A. Spear, Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology, MIT Press, 2015.  
[9] F. Baader (ed.), The Description Logic Handbook, Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
[10] W3C, OWL2 Web Ontology Language http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/ , 2012. 
[11] B. Glimm et al. HermiT: an OWL 2 reasoner. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 3 (2014), 245–269.  
[12] M. Horridge, B. Parsia and U. Sattler. Explanation of OWL entailments in Protégé 4. Proceedings of the 
Poster and Demonstration Session at the 7th International Semantic Web Conference. CEUR-WS. org, 
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-401/iswc2008pd_submission_47.pdf , 2008.  
[13] SNOMED international. SNOMED CT , https://www.snomed.org/snomed-ct , 2018 
[14] D. Schober, B. Smith, S.E. Lewis, W. Kusnierczyk, J. Lomax, C. Mungall, C.F. Taylor, P. Rocca-Serra, 
S.A. Sansone, Survey-based naming conventions for use in OBO Foundry ontology development, BMC 
Bioinformatics 10.1 (2009), 125.  
[15] B. Smith, Against idiosyncrasy in ontology development. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and 
Applications 150 (2006), 15.  
[16] J. Röhl, L. Jansen, Why functions are not special dispositions: an improved classification of realizables 
for top-level ontologies. Journal of biomedical semantics 5.1 (2014), 27.  
[17] N. Guarino, C.A. Welty. An overview of OntoClean. In Handbook on ontologies, 151–171, Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004.  
[18] S. Schulz, M. Brochhausen, R. Hoehndorf, Higgs bosons, Mars missions, and unicorn delusions: How to 
deal with terms of dubious reference in scientific ontologies. Proc. of ICBO 2011. CEUR-WS 833 
(2011), http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-833/paper24.pdf .  
[19] S. Schulz, C. Martínez-Costa, D. Karlsson, R. Cornet, M. Brochhausen, A.L. Rector, An ontological 
analysis of reference in health record statements. Formal Ontology in Inf. Systems (2014), 289–302.  
[20] C. Roussey, O. Corcho, L. M. Vilches-Blázquez. A catalogue of OWL ontology antipatterns, 
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Knowledge capture. ACM, 2009.  
[21] A. Duque-Ramos J.T. Fernández-Breis, R. Stevens, N. Aussenac-Gilles, OQuaRE: A SQuaRE-based 
approach for evaluating the quality of ontologies. Journal of Research and Practice in Information 
Technology 43.2 (2011), 159. 
[22] M. Boeker, J. Hastings, D. Schober, S. Schulz (2011). A T-Box generator for testing scalability of OWL 
mereotopological patterns. OWLED 2011 – OWL Experiences and Directions. Eight International 
Workshop, San Francisco, California, USA, June 5-6, 2011.  
[23] S. Schulz, C. Martínez-Costa, Harmonizing SNOMED CT with BioTopLite: An Exercise in Principled 
Ontology Alignment. Stud Health Technol Inform. 216 (2015), 832–836.  
[24] P. López-García, S. Schulz, Can SNOMED CT be squeezed without losing its shape? J Biomed 
Semantics 7 (2016), 56. 
Applying Evaluation Criteria to Ontology
Modules
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Abstract.Modularity has been increasingly used as a solution to assist with the use
and maintenance of large ontologies. However, there is lack of evaluation methods
available for determining the quality of an ontology module. While initial work
has been done on producing a comprehensive list of evaluation characteristics that
can be used to check the quality of a module, certain aspects are still unclear. For
instance, the initial list has not been structured into different groups for different
types of evaluation criteria. It is also unclear on how to apply these characteris-
tics to a particular module, and the metrics have not been experimentally validated
for some types of ontology modules. In this paper, we structure the comprehensive
evaluation criteria into groups, provide practical examples on how to use the evalu-
ation characteristics to assess a module, and validate the evaluation characteristics
with a set of ontology modules.
Keywords. ontology evaluation, ontology metrics, ontology modules, ontology
modularisation
1. Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been a growth in using modularity to assist with main-
taining and using large ontologies. The general concept of modularity refers to dividing
and separating the components of a large system such that modules can be recombined.
Modularity is used to simplify and downsize an ontology for the task at hand; to mod-
ularise a large ontology into smaller manageable ontologies. Modularity has been suc-
cessfully applied to a number of different ontologies to improve usability and assist with
complexity. Examples include the myExperiment ontology [16], which is a collaborative
environment where scientists publish and share their work-flows and experiment plans
among groups, the Semantic Sensor Net ontology where there are various modules to
describe sensors and observations [9], and BioTop ontologies for life sciences in which
the principle of modularisation have been applied [22].
An issue concerning ontology modules is the lack of evaluation metrics. The existing
works on evaluation metrics focus on only some metrics that suit the modularisation
technique [20,21,26], and there is not always a quantitative approach to calculate them.
Overall, the metrics are not comprehensive enough to apply to a variety of modules. It is
therefore not clear on how to determine whether a module is of good quality.
1Correspondance address: Zubeida Casmod Khan, Department of Computer Science, University of
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We have already published initial work done on determining whether a module is
a good or bad module with evaluation metrics [10]. The initial study [10] revealed 13
criteria from the literature, and 3 new ones, some of which were short of a metric for
quantitative evaluation that have now been devised. In this work, we categorise the 16
criteria into 5 broader categories to structure them so that ontology developers can easily
identify which ones to use for an application. We also demonstrate usage of the criteria
with practical examples. Lastly, we perform an experimentation evaluation on a set of
ontology modules using the evaluation criteria revealing how the modules measure in
terms of quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss related works in Sec-
tion 2. This is followed by a section on the evaluation criteria in Section 3. In Section 4
we discuss the types of modules we are going to evaluate. The experimental evaluation
using the evaluation metrics is performed in Section 5. Finally we conclude in Section 6.
2. Related Works
d’Aquin et. al [3] present some criteria for evaluating ontology modules including logical
criteria, e.g., local correctness, structural criteria e.g., size of module, and intra-module
distance, software criteria, e.g., encapsulation, and independence, quality criteria, e.g.,
module cohesion, and relational criteria, e.g., connectedness, and inter-module distance.
The study [3] also revealed that existing criteria for ontology modularisation evaluation
is not sufficient, and that not all the proposed criteria can be used on all ontology mod-
ules. In other work, Loebe [14], proposed a number of requirements for logical modules,
such as logical correctness and completeness. Loebe also acknowledges that the require-
ments do not hold for all applications and that specialised methods should be applied for
different applications.
Tartir et. al [23] propose richness criteria to measure the quality of ontologies. This
criteria is based on how rich the ontology is with regard to attributes and subclasses.
For cohesion metrics, Yao et. al propose metrics such as the number of root classes,
number of leaf classes, and average depth of inheritance tree of all leaf node [26]. These
metrics, however, does not reveal how the entities are related in a module as compared
to the original ontology. The work done by Oh et. al on cohesion metrics, however,
does measure the strength of the relations in a module [18]. To measure the coupling
of an ontology, researchers propose metrics based on the number of externally defined
referenced concepts [19]. This, however, does not take into account external links that
different modules share. Oh and Ahn [17] have improved on this to consider the external
links between different modules based on whether the link is hierarchical or relational.
However, their metric is simply a sum value of the number of each type of links between
modules, which does not measure the complete interdependence of a module since it
only considers one type of variable in the module.
3. Evaluation Metrics for Modules
In previous work, we already defined a list of evaluation criteria alongside their mathe-
matical metrics for modularity [10]. We now group them into categories of criteria, and
provide some examples demonstrating how to use them. For the set of criteria, let O be
an ontology with a corresponding set of axioms, Axioms(O), and M be a module with a
corresponding set of axioms, Axioms(M). Let i, j be arbitrary entities in an ontology.
3.1. Structural Criteria
Structural criteria are calculated based on the structural and hierarchical properties of
the module. These criteria are calculated by inspecting the syntax of the ontology. It is
usually based on counting components of the ontology such as axioms, entities, etc., and
is a numerical value. Calculating structural criteria involves evaluating the size, relations,
and placement of entities within a module. We now list the structural criteria, alongside
practical examples.
Size: Size is the number of entities in a module (the number of classes, object properties,
data properties, and individuals in a module) [2,3,18,21,20].
Relative size: The relative size is the size of the module, i.e., the number of entities in a




Example 1 The GFO-Basic ontology [8] module contains 47 classes, 0 individu-
als, 41 object properties, and 0 data properties. The source ontology, GFO, con-
tains 78 classes, 0 individuals, 67 object properties, and 0 data properties. Hence
the relative size is 47+0+41+078+0+67+0 = 0.61.
Appropriateness: Appropriateness is measured by mapping the size of an ontology mod-











where x is the number of axioms in the module. The authors propose the function
with 250 axioms as it is based on the fact that the optimal size of software lines in
a code is 200-300 lines [21].
Example 2 The Temporal Relations module of the DOLCE-ExtendedDnS descrip-
tions and situations ontology [15] has 435 axioms. Therefore, based on the equa-
tion for calculating appropriateness, the value is 12   12cos(435. p250 ) = 0.16.
Atomic size: The atomic size of a module is the average size of a group of inter-
dependent axioms in a module. This is based on the notion of atoms in modules,
which are defined as a group of axioms with dependencies between each other




Example 3 Consider the example in Figure 1 of an atomic decomposition [25].
The number of atoms in the example is 6 and there are 7 axioms in total. The
atomic size is hence 76 = 1.17. This tells us that there is an average of 1.17 axioms
per atom for the example.
Figure 1. An ontology’s atomic decomposition. See example 3 for details. Source: [25].
Intra-module distance: The intra-module distance in a module is the distance between
entities in a module [3]. To measure it, Freeman’s farness equation is used to mea-






Relative Intra-module distance: The relative intra-module distance is the difference be-





Example 4 Consider the example of a source ontology O and a module M shown
in Figure 2, and the farness values in Table 1. Using the farness values in the intra-
module distance equation, we calculated the intra-module distance of the source
ontology O to be 32 and of the module M to be 16. The relative intra-module
distance is 3216 = 2, hence the module entities are twice as close as the original
ontology.
Figure 2. A source ontology and corresponding module for which we calculate intra-module distance. The
arrows between the entities indicate the shortest-path relation between them.
Cohesion: Cohesion refers to the extent to which entities in a module are related to
each other. [5,18,17,26]. To measure it, we use Oh et. al’s equation [18]; the full
equation is in [12].
Table 1. The farness values for the source ontology and corresponding module alongside inverse farness values
the corresponding module.
Farness, O Farness, M 1/farness,M
A B C D E Â A B C D E Â A B C D E Â












C 1 0 - 0 0 1 1 0 - 0 0 1 11 0 - 0 0 1
D 4 3 0 - 0 7 2 1 0 - 0 3 12
1
1 0 - 0
3
2
E 4 3 0 0 - 7 2 1 0 0 - 3 12
1
1 0 0 -
3
2




|M|(|M| 1) i f |M|> 1
1 otherwise
(6)
Example 5 Consider module M, from Figure 2. The sum of all the 1/farness values
is 10 as shown in Table 1. The number of entities in M is 5. Hence the cohesion
value is as follows: Cohesion = 105(4) = 0.5.
3.2. Logical Criteria
By definition, an ontology is: “a logical theory accounting for the intended meaning of
a formal vocabulary, i.e. its ontological commitment to a particular conceptualisation of
the world” [7]. As such, it is possible to evaluate ontology modules by the logical criteria
that they hold. We now list the logical criteria, alongside practical examples.
Correctness: This states that every axiom that exists in the module also exists in the
source ontology and that nothing new should be added to the module [14,1,3,20].
Correctness(M) =
(
true i f Axioms(M)✓ Axioms(O)
f alse otherwise
(7)
Example 6 The GFO-Abstract-Top ontology is a subset of the GFO ontology [8].
No new axioms have been added to the GFO-Abstract-Top ontology; it only con-
tains those axioms which exist in the GFO ontology. Thus, the GFO-Abstract-Top
ontology is logically correct. The GFO-Basic ontology, however, is a smaller mod-
ule based on the GFO ontology but it also contains new axioms that do not exist in
the GFO ontology. For instance, the entity Processual Structure exists in the GFO-
Basic module but not in the source ontology, GFO. Thus, the logical correctness
property does not hold for the GFO-Basic module.
Completeness: Completeness is when the meaning of every entity in a module is pre-









Example 7 Consider a source ontology, DOLCE-Lite [15], where the endurant
entity is defined as follows:
⇤ endurant v 8 part.endurant
⇤ endurant v spatio-temporal-particular
⇤ endurant v 9 participant-in.perdurant
⇤ endurant v 8 specific-constant-constituent.endurant
⇤ endurant v ¬ quality
⇤ endurant v ¬ perdurant
⇤ endurant v ¬ abstract
If DOLCE were to be modularised to create a branch module, containing only the
branch of Endurant entities, with the removal of perdurant entities called DOLCE-
endurants, then the endurant entity is defined as follows:
⇤ endurant v 8 part.endurant
⇤ endurant v spatio-temporal-particular
⇤ endurant v 9 participant-in.perdurant
The meaning of the endurant entity was not preserved in the module since the ax-
iom endurant v 8 specific-constant-constituent.endurant existed in the original
ontology but not in the module. Therefore the DOLCE-endurants module has a
false value for the completeness metric.
3.3. Relational Criteria
Relational criteria deal with the relations and behaviour that modules exhibit with other
modules in a system of interrelated modules. We now list the relational criteria, alongside
practical examples.
Inter-module distance: The inter-module distance in a set of modules has been described
as the number of modules that have to be considered to relate two entities [2,3].
This is measured by calculating the sum of modules that have to be considered





|(Mi,..,Mn)|(|(Mi,..,Mn)| 1) |(Mi, ..,Mn)|> 1
1 otherwise
(9)
where NM(Ei,Ej) is the number of modules to consider to relate entities i and j.
The product of |(Mi, ..,Mn)|(|(Mi, ..,Mn)|  1) represents the number of possible
relations between entities in a set of modulesMi, .,Mn.
Example 8 Consider the set of inter-related modules in Figure 3. For each en-
tity pair, we have the number of modules, NM, that have to be considered to re-
late them in Table 2. The sum of NM is 126. The number of entities is 9, hence
the |(Mi, ..,Mn)|(|(Mi, ..,Mn)| 1) value = 9(8). Thus the inter-module distance is
112
9(8) = 1.75. For the set, it takes 1.75 modules to relate two entities in the set.
Coupling: A measure of the degree of interdependence of a module [5,18,17,19]. To
measure the coupling of a module, we calculate a ratio of the number of external
links between a modules to every possible external link between modules.
Table 2. The number of modules, NM, that have to be considered to relate two entities in the set of modules.
A B C D E F G H I Sum
A - 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 14
B 1 - 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 14
C 2 2 - 2 2 2 2 1 1 14
D 2 2 2 - 1 2 1 2 2 14
E 2 2 2 1 - 2 1 2 2 14
F 1 1 2 2 2 - 2 2 2 14
G 2 2 2 1 1 2 - 2 2 14
H 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 - 1 14
I 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 - 14
NM(Ei,Ej) 126
Figure 3. A set of modules with inter-related links. The plain arrow links between entities denote relations












|Mi||Mj | NELMi,Mj > 0
0 otherwise
(10)
where |Mi| is the number of entities in the current module and |Mj| is the number
of entities in a related module in the set of n modules.
Example 9 Consider module M1 from the set of inter-related modules in Fig-
ure 3. The number of external links that have to be considered to relate M1 to
other modules in the set, is 2. The number of possible external link between
a module M1 and the other modules in the system is calculated as follows:
|M1|(|M2|)+ |M1|(|M3|) = 18. Hence the coupling(M1) = 218 = 0.11 which indi-
cates a low interdependence toward other modules in the system.
Redundancy: Redundancy is the duplication of axioms within a set of ontology modules
[21]. To measure redundancy in a set of modules, we calculate the fraction of
duplicated axioms.

















ni is the total number of axioms and n is the number of distinct axioms
in a module. The resulting fraction is a value of redundancy.
Example 10 Consider the class declarations and axioms in the set of modules with
no inter-related links that have been partitioned from a food ontology as shown in
Figure 4. There are 3 ontology modules: Fruit, Vegetable, and Meat. Axioms that
have been repeated more than once (redundant axioms) are shown in blocks. From
the three modules, there is a total of 21 axioms, i.e., the Axt value is 21. There are
15 distinct axioms that exist in the set of modules (these axioms exist at most once
and are those that are not blocks), hence Axd is 15. The redundancy of the set of
partitioned modules is thus 21 1521 = 0.29. Hence, 29% of the axioms in the set of
modules are redundant.
3.4. Information Hiding Criteria
Ontology modules sometimes deal with hiding aspects of the source ontology from the
module for privacy and simplification reasons. Information hiding within modules as-
sesses whether the module encapsulates all the information in the module such that the
privacy is preserved for each module. We now list the information hiding criteria, along-
side practical examples.
Encapsulation: Encapsulation is a metric that holds when “a module can be easily ex-
changed for another, or internally modified, without side-effects on the application
can be a good indication of the quality of the module” [3]. It is measured using
the number of axioms in the given module and the number of axioms that occur in









Example 11 Consider the 3 ontology modules Fruit, Vegetable, and Meat, from
Example 10. We calculate the encapsulation of the Fruit module as follows. There
are 7 axioms in the Fruit module, i.e., the Axi = 7. In the Vegetable module, there
are 3 overlapping axioms, i.e., they also exist in the Fruit module. In the Meat mod-
ule, there are 2 overlapping axioms, i.e., they also exist in the Fruit module. Hence,
the Encapsulation(Fruit) is calculated as 1  37+ 273 = 0.76. Thus, 0.76 (76%), or a
large amount of the domain knowledge is encapsulated in the Fruit module but the
complete privacy of the Fruit module is not preserved.
Independence: Independence evaluates whether a module is self-contained and can be
updated and reused separately [3]. A module is independent if it has an encapsu-
lation value of 1 and a coupling value of 0.
Ind(M i) =
(
true Encapsulation(Mi) = 1 andCoupling(Mi) = 0
f alse otherwise
(13)
where |Mi| is the number of entities in the current module and |Mj| is the number
of entities in a related module in the set of n modules.
Example 12 Consider the 3 ontology modules in Example 10. We have already
worked out the encapsulation value for the Fruit module in Example 11 as 0.76.
There are no inter-related links between the modules hence the coupling value is
0. Since the encapsulation value is not 1, the conditions for independence do not
hold for the Fruit module hence it is not independent.
3.5. Richness Criteria
The richness or amount of information in an ontology is designed as one aspect to mea-
sure the quality of an ontology. For modules, this is important to measure in cases where
abstraction is employed to compare the granularity of the source ontology to that of the
module. Tartir et al. [23] propose measurable richness schema metrics. We now list the
richness criteria, alongside practical examples.





where att is measured by the number of data properties in the module |DP| and
|C| is the number of classes in the module. In an ontology, an attribute is used to
describe an entity and each attribute, or data type, has a name and value.
Example 13 The pizza ontology has no data properties (attributes) defined. The
AR value is 0, therefore there is no attribute richness in the pizza ontology.
Inheritance richness: Inheritance richness is defined as the number of subclasses per






where |HC(C1,Ci)| is the number of subclasses per class and |C| is the total number
of classes in the ontology.
Example 14 Refer back to ontology O and module M from Figure 2. For module
M, the entities which have subclasses are entity A with 2 subclasses, and entity
B with 2 subclasses. Hence the sum of these subclasses is 2+ 2 = 4. There are 5
classes in total in M. The inheritance richness value for M is thus 45 = 0.8. Using
the same method we work out the inheritance richness value for ontology O, which
is 67 = 0.85.
To assist with the lack of evaluation metrics and corresponding formulae in ontology
modules, we presented a comprehensive list of evaluation criteria for modules together
with examples on how to operationalise them for ontology modules. To put context to
the values for the metrics, experimentation was performed in other work stating which
values are appropriate for the metrics for particular module types [12]. In Section 5, we
show how each metric is used and what some expected values are.
4. Types of Modules for Evaluation
In this work, we focus on evaluating certain types of ontology modules, i.e., those that are
lacking from an existing ontology modularisation framework and experiment [11]. The
modules were generated using the NOMSA modularisation tool 2. We briefly describe
each module type here with its corresponding abbreviation which we will use to describe
them in the remainder of the paper.
• Axiom abstraction (AxAbs): This is a module containing hierarchical relations
between entities, i.e., other relations are removed resulting in a bare taxonomy.
• Vocabulary abstraction (VocAbs): This is a module where certain types of entities
are removed, for instance, the object properties or data properties of an ontology.
• High-level abstraction (HLAbs): This is a module where entities at a higher level
in the hierarchy have precedence over the others.
• Weighted abstraction (WeiAbs): This is a module where weighting is assigned to
entities that are referenced by axioms more than others.
• Feature expressiveness (FeatExp): This is a module where some axioms of the
ontology are removed based on its language features.
5. Experimental Evaluation
In order to uncover information about how evaluation metrics relate to ontology modules,
we use the Tool for Ontology Modularity Metrics (TOMM) software tool [12] which
encompasses all the evaluation metrics described in Section 3. In this experiment, we
evaluate the module types from Section 4, in terms of its quality.
5.1. Materials and Methods
The method for the experiment is as follows:
2http://www.thezfiles.co.za/modularisation/
1. Take a set of modules.
2. Run the TOMM metrics tool [12] for the modules to acquire module metrics.
3. Conduct an analysis from the metrics for each module.
The materials used for the experiment were as follows: TOMM metrics tool [12],
and a set of 128 ontologies that had been modularised using NOMSA ontology modu-
larisation tool 2 but derived from the set of ontologies described elsewhere [6,13]. Our
tests were carried out on a 3.00 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo PC with 4 GB of memory running
Windows 7 Enterprise. All the test files are available at http://www.thezfiles.co.
za/modularisation/testfiles_NOMSA.zip.
5.2. Results
Each of the modules were evaluated using the metrics that were implemented in the
TOMM tool and the results for the numerical metrics are shown in Table 3. The atomic
sizes of the modules indicates that there are on average between 2.34- 3.80 axioms that
are grouped together in an atom for the modules. The appropriateness, which maps the
size of the ontology module to a function is less than 0.3 for all the modules. Seeing
that 1.0 is the optimal value for appropriateness, all the modules perform poorly for
this metric. For a module to have an optimal value, it must have a value close to 250
axioms. The intra-module distance values which indicate the distance between entities
in a module differ considerably, with the HLAbs modules having the lowest value of 142
698.4 and the AxAbs having the highest value of 866 354.60. The cohesion of a module
indicates how closely related its entities are to each other, with higher values having a
large number of relations among entities. The cohesion is small for all the modules in
the set (less than 0.07). Most of the modules in this set do not contain attributes, as the
attribute richness is less than 1 for all the modules. The number of subclasses per class
is between 2.72 to 4.84 as indicated by the inheritance richness for the modules. In this
set, all the modules were considerably smaller than the original ontologies, as indicated
by relative size values that are less than 1. WeiAbs modules are the smallest at 0.26
(26% the size of the original ontology) while VocAbs modules are 0.85 (85% the size
of the original ontology). It is also important to determine whether the entities in the
modules have moved closer to each other in a module compared to the original ontology.
AxAbs modules, VocAbs modules, and FeatExp modules have values less than 1 for the
relative intra-module distance, which indicate that their entities are further in relation
to the entities of the original ontology. While in HLAbs and WeiAbs the intra-module
distance is larger, indicating that for these modules, the entities have moved closer as
compared to the original ontology.
We have discussed the evaluation metric values for the set of ontology modules
in isolation, i.e., without an indication of whether the modules in question appear to
be good or of poor quality. To check if the modules are of good quality we refer to
an existing benchmark dependency between the proposed ontology metrics and various
types of ontology modules. The notion here is that for each module type, there is a pattern
or dependencies between type and some set of metrics. This is shown in Table 4 with
expected values for each type of module. The values that are underlined were not met
for this experiment. For instance, reading Table 4, it states that for WeiAbs modules
the cohesion value of range 0-0.25 and the relative size value of range 0.26-0.5 is met.
However, for AxAbs, the cohesion value is met but the correctness value is not met.
Table 3. The average values for the metrics for all the generated modules; app. = appropriateness, cohes =














238.04 2.34 0.19 866345.6 0.06 0.49 4.84 0.71 0.68
VocAbs
modules
443.38 3.24 0.19 848372.2 0.06 0.45 4.78 0.85 0.79
HLAbs
modules
202.77 3.48 0.24 166797.1 0.03 0.47 4.86 0.67 18.66
WeiAbs
modules
138.58 3.40 0.30 142698.4 0.07 0.39 2.72 0.26 3.96
FeatExp
modules
291.89 2.44 0.18 757305.1 0.06 0.25 4.80 0.72 0.70
Original
ontologies
464.67 3.80 0.15 1866430 0.04 1.04 4.78 - -
Table 4. The benchmark metrics and values for each module type. The metrics that are underlined are ones
that fail for the set of modules that were evaluated.
Cohesion Correctness Appropriateness Relative size
AxAbs modules 0.00-0.25 true - -
VocAbs modules 0.00-0.25 true 0.75-1.00 -
HLAbs modules 0.00-0.25 - 0.75-1.00 -
WeiAbs modules 0.00-0.25 - - 0.26-0.50
FeatExp modules 0.00-0.25 - - -
We now examine the failed metrics. For appropriateness, it appears that the number
of axioms in a module need to be between 167- 333 to have a value of between 0.75-
1. In some cases, the original ontologies were already less than 167 axioms in size, so
there could never reach an appropriate value. For the case of ontology modules, which
by definition are a reduction of an ontology, this appropriateness metric needs to be re-
designed to include modules that are less than 167 axioms. The next failed metric is the
correctness value, which needs to be true, but tested false for some modules, meaning that
some new axioms were added to the modules, i.e., axioms that were not from the original
ontology. An inspection of the log files for the metrics revealed that OWL enumeration
was used to declare individuals in an original ontology. In resulting modules, when the
collection of individuals were broken up, they were re-represented as named instances
using class identifiers. This means that new knowledge was not added to the module, but
because of language syntax, it appears so. The ontology metrics tool therefore needs to
recognise that this is not a new axiom to measure the correctness value accurately.
5.3. Discussion
The evaluation criteria for ontology modules were already presented in previous work
[10]. However, there was limited support for operationalising these metrics. In this paper,
we provide practical examples on how the metrics can be applied to an ontology module
to measure them. We also structured and grouped together the list of evaluation criteria to
various higher level categories to differentiate those that examine, say structural aspects
of a module (structural criteria) to those that examine how well the modules hide certain
information of the source ontology (information hiding criteria). This could aid ontology
developers in selecting the relevant evaluation criteria for their use-case.
We performed an experiment using various types of modules that were generated
using NOMSA modularisation tool. The modules were evaluated with TOMM to reveal
their metrics. The metrics indicate important information such as, the rate at which enti-
ties in a module move closer to each other (using the relative intra-module distance met-
rics), whether a module is rich with attributes, at what rate the size of the module differs
as compared to the source ontology. These metrics are important for gauging how well
the modules would fare with visualisation and comprehension tools or if there would be
some performance issues due to redundancy, among other cases.
6. Conclusion
Initial work on evaluation criteria was refined by grouping the evaluation criteria list into
categories to structure them to aid ontology developers. We summarised the list of eval-
uation criteria, together with practical examples on how to use them. An experimental
evaluation revealed how the metrics can be used to evaluate modules and uncover in-
formation about how well certain modules fare for certain applications. We also identi-
fied a problem with the appropriateness value, which cannot be applied in some cases
if a module has a small axiom size which needs to be changed. Another problem that
was identified is that some knowledge is recognised as new knowledge by the evaluation
metrics tool due to OWL representation issues.
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Abstract.We propose a taxonomy of part-types based on the manner of attachment
of a part to the rest of its parent whole, its degree of dependence on that whole or
on external factors, and the temporal relation between its being a part and its being
described as such.
Keywords. part-whole relations, dependent and independent parts, attachment
1. Introduction
Amongst existing classifications of parts and wholes we may distinguish two broad ap-
proaches. On the one hand there are formal mereologies, which typically embrace un-
restricted summations and subdivisions, operating with a generalised notion of parthood
which does not commit to any distinctions between kinds of parts other than proper vs
improper parts and, in some systems, atomic vs non-atomic parts. On the other hand we
find more nuanced approaches, typically motivated by cognitive or linguistic considera-
tions, in which distinctions are drawn amongst an apparently disparate range of relations
to which the term ‘part’ has been applied. Such approaches may distinguish, for exam-
ple, between, inter alia, functional and spatial parts [3], or between components and por-
tions [7]. Often included here is membership of a collection, and this is notable in that
typically the members of a collection are spatially separated, whereas, for example, the
components of an artefact are usually spatially contiguous. It is this aspect—the nature
and extent of the spatial connections amongst the parts of some whole—on which the
new taxonomy proposed here focuses; this constitutes a dimension of variation amongst
different kinds of parts that has been comparatively neglected, yet is one that is clearly
of considerable significance in our day-to-day deployment of the parthood concept. The
closest existing work I have found to this approach is that of [6], though whereas that
paper is concerned exclusively with parts of artefacts, my taxonomy is intended to be
more broadly applicable.
The taxonomy proposed here is more narrowly focused than many, being concerned
only with material objects and their material parts; and concerned with the latter primar-
ily in respect of the nature of their attachment to the whole of which they are parts, and
their degree of dependence thereon: but these aspects are considered in perhaps greater
detail than is usually found in existing taxonomies.
2. Motivating discussion
Our starting point is the notion of a unitary whole, which consists of some (possibly
variable, possibly heterogeneous) quantity of matter configured in such a way that, at an
“everyday” (mesoscopic) level of granularity, it occupies a connected region of space, is
bounded by a complete closed surface, and ‘hangs together’, i.e., retains these properties
continuously over a sufficiently extended period of time. Examples include the computer
on which I am typing these words, the table it is resting on, the chair I am sitting on,
my bicycle and, indeed, me myself.1 A complex comprises two or more unitary wholes
which somehow “belong together” without necessarily together forming such a whole.
An independent whole is either a unitary whole or a complex. For brevity I shall often
abbreviate this to ‘whole’ except where it is important to stress its independent nature.
An independent whole may have various kinds of parts, which may or may not be
independent wholes in their own right. I call the whole of which a part is a part its parent
whole, where ‘parent’ is not, of course, to be understood in a generational sense. In the
taxonomy we distinguish between dependent and independent parts. Many artefacts are
brought into existence by assembling together, in a particular way, some collection of
independent parts: such artefacts are assemblies. A bicycle, for example, is assembled
from a definite number of independent parts; these are organised hierarchically, in that
some subcollections of the parts form subassemblies—themselves independent parts—
such as each of the wheels, whose parts include rim, spokes, hub, tyre, and inner tube.
The truism that “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”, properly interpreted,
means that the properties of the whole do not depend solely on the properties of its
individual parts, but also on how they are put together to form the whole.2 Independent
parts retain their character as wholes even in the context of the composite whole of which
they are part. Assemblies can typically be disassembled, without severing connections,
and put together again; hence independent parts are generally replaceable.3
Many wholes do not have independent parts. This is necessarily true of the smallest
independent parts of an assembly: a single spoke of a bicycle wheel is just a long thin
cylinder of metal, all one piece. It is also very nearly true of most living organisms—
indeed, an important difference between organisms and artefacts is that the parts of the
former are typically dependent, those of the latter very often independent. None of my
internal organs or external appendages is an independent whole. Both head and heart are
joined seamlessly to the rest of the body, neither of them bounded by a closed surface.
Since they are not independent parts of the body, but are evidently parts, we call them de-
pendent parts. And since they are distinguished by means of rather natural, non-arbitrary
criteria—which may relate to, amongst other things, geometry, material, or function—
we call them intrinsic dependent parts. Living organisms typically have many intrinsic
dependent parts, but some wholes have no such parts. A uniform metal sphere offers no
intrinsic inhomogeneities for any distinction of parts to gain purchase.
1The term integral object has often been used in the literature—but depending on the author, this term may
or may not refer to the same thing as what is here called a unitary whole. The difficulties inherent in pinning
down these concepts are explored in Chapter 9 of [5].
2If one regards this structure or configuration as a part in its own right (but not, of course, a material part),
then the whole is precisely the sum of its parts; this is a view that has been advocated by Koslicki [4], but I
shall not follow it here.
3Simons and Dement [6] provide an insightful analysis of the mereology of artefacts.
As already suggested above, there are several different ways of distinguishing de-
pendent parts, for example:
• Geometrical. If a strip of metal is bent in two to form a right angle, then the two
“arms” thereby formed are distinguished dependent parts of the resulting whole.
• Material. A fingernail is distinguished from the rest of the finger by its different
material composition. Note that it is not an independent part: the only way of
removing the fingernail is by severing connections to form new surfaces.
• Functional. A wine glass has three functionally defined distinguished dependent
parts: the bowl (for containing the wine), the stem (for holding the glass), and the
base (for resting it on the table or other flat surface).4
As already hinted in the footnote, these criteria often work together: functional distinc-
tions typically depend on geometrical or material distinctions.
Sometimes we want to refer to a part of some whole even when there exists no “nat-
ural” basis for distinguishing it from the remainder of the whole. This is what happens if
I trace an outline on a pane of glass and refer to the part of the pane enclosed by the out-
line. That “part” only exists, as an object, insofar as I have designated it. Such parts will
be called designated parts. They are extrinsic because they depend for their existence on
some external means of designating them. A part may be retrospectively designated by
being detached from its parent whole, thereby becoming a whole in its own right. Refer-
ring to the time before separation, we might now say that it was a part then, even though
the designation on which it depended had not yet occurred. Retrospectively designated
parts have only a tenuous claim to existence.
Michaelangelo is famously reported to have said that “every block of stone has a
statue inside it and it is the task of the sculptor to discover it”.5 But from a commonsense
point of view, before Michaelangelo began carving the David, the matter which later
constituted the David did not constitute any object. Note that this flies in the face of
the principle of unrestricted mereological fusion embraced by most formal mereologies,
according to which the existence at the earlier time of the atoms that would subsequently
make up theDavid implies the existence of an object composed precisely of those atoms,
namely their mereological sum. As has often been pointed out, this leads to a highly
profligate ontology which requires the existence of innumerable entities that not only do
we never refer to, but we never can refer to.6
3. The Proposed Taxonomy
The taxonomy is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. For expository purposes it is con-
venient to begin the discussion at the second division of the hierarchy rather than the
first.
1. Independent part. A part which is itself an independent whole, such as the frame
or a wheel of a bicycle. Types of independent parts are
4Of course, these parts can also be distinguished geometrically, but their raison d’eˆtre is primarily functional.
5Ogni blocco di pietra ha una statua dentro di se´ ed e´ compito dello scultore scoprirla. Although widely
cited, I have been unable to find the original source of this.
6Think of all the other possible sculptures, good, bad, or indifferent, which could have been carved from the
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Figure 1. Taxonomy of part-types
(a) Unattached independent part. An independent part which is not attached
to any other part of its parent whole. E.g., any of the pieces of a multi-piece
object, such as the lid and body of a saucepan, the mattress and base of a bed,
the top and bottom of a bikini. Unattached independent parts may or may not
be in contact with the rest of their parent whole; in the case of a saucepan, it
is an essential part of its functioning that the lid can both be separated from
the body of the pan and sit tight over the opening.
(b) Attached independent part. An independent part which is attached to at
least one other part of its parent whole. We distinguish two cases, depending
on the nature of the attachment:
i. Linked independent part, in which the attachment is by contact, with-
out adhesion, e.g., all the independent parts of a bicycle. This kind of at-
tachment is typically accomplished by some kind of interlocking, e.g., the
screw top of a jar or bottle, or by means of a connector such as a screw or
nail. Typically, a linked independent part can easily be detached, thereby
becoming an unattached part (as when the bottle-top is unscrewed).
ii. Adherent independent part, in which the attachment is by some form of
reversible (non-disruptive) adhesion, as with many forms of glue. The part
retains its full surface, part of which adheres to the rest of the parent whole
by means of the bonding agent. In principle the part can be unattached
without damaging it (e.g., by dissolving the glue).
(c) Formerly-dependent independent part. An originally dependent part
which has become independent by the severing of connections with the rest
of its parent whole, while remaining part of that whole. This is a somewhat
recherche´ catgory, but there are some reasonably commonplace examples:
• A human club hair—this is a hair in the telogen phase, when it has stopped
growing, the blood vessels connecting it to the follicle having atrophied and
a new surface formed at the base; it remains linked to the body because the
club-shaped base is held in place by the narrow aperture of the follicle.7
• Blood cells, which originate as dependent parts of the bone marrow; they
remain joined to the rest of the body via the blood plasma, which being
liquid allows the cells free movement while remaining parts of the body.
• The blocks of stone formed by erosion of a granite tor, which remain in
place as parts of the tor even though no longer attached to each other.8
This subcategory cuts across the other subcategories of independent part: any
formerly-dependent independent part must already belong to one of the other
subcategories. A club hair, for example, is a linked independent part; the
stones in the tor are unattached parts.
2. Dependent part. A part which is not an independent whole, its matter being
continuous with that of the rest of its parent whole and therefore lacking a com-
plete closed surface of its own. The boundary of a dependent part, where it does
not coincide with a surface or other physical discontinuity, is typically somewhat
indeterminate in location. Types of dependent parts are:
(a) Intrinsic dependent part. A part distinguished by any (or several) of a vari-
ety of intrinsic factors such as geometry, material, texture, or function. From a
cognitive point of view, some combination of such factors often results in the
part so distinguished possessing a characteristic affordance. Types of intrinsic
dependent part include:
i. Integrated, or formerly-independent, dependent part, arising when an
independent whole becomes integrated with other parts making up the par-
ent whole by an irreversible process of fusion involving the destruction of
part of the surfaces where they are joined (as for example in welding or
brazing). Examples include the pieces of metal tubing that make up the
frame of a bicycle; and the handle, spout, and body of an earthenware
teapot.
ii. Original dependent part, formed at the same time as the parent whole as
a salient feature of it, e.g., the teeth of a comb, or the head of a statue that
is cast in one piece or carved from a single block of stone.
iii. Differentiated dependent part, formed during the growth of the parent
whole: these are the body parts of living organisms, e.g., limbs, bones,
internal organs, claws, horns, branches, leaves, etc., so long as these remain
in situ. (These could also be called organic parts.)
(b) Extrinsic dependent part, existing as a part by virtue of some relation or
interaction between the parent whole and its environment. We distinguish:
7Eventually the hair will be shed, either by being pulled out, e.g., during brushing, or by being pushed out
by the growth of a new hair once the follicle resumes its activity (at the anagen phase).
8There are many examples of such tors on Dartmoor, in Devon, UK.
i. Designated part. A part which exists only through being designated as
such, typically by an act of human cognition, expressed verbally or by
ostention, e.g., when someone traces an outline with their finger and says
“this part”; or most geopolitical regions. In some cases nature itself can
provide the designation, e.g., the part of an iceberg above the water.
ii. Retrospectively designated dependent part. A part which only exists as
a part by virtue of its subsequently becoming an independent object, e.g.,
that part of a certain block of marble comprising all the matter that later
constituted Michaelangelo’s David. Retrospectively designated parts can
only be referred to after they have ceased to be parts.
Extrinsic dependent parts in general do not have so strong a claim to being
“real” parts as intrinsic or independent parts. We can say that an extrinsic
dependent part is part of its parent whole, but not that it is a part of it.9
Independent and dependent parts may be called present parts, meaning that they are
parts at the time they are so described. This constitutes one of the top-level divisions of
the taxonomy. Sometimes, though, we refer to things as parts even though they are no
longer, or are yet to become, parts of the parent wholes to which they are referred. These
provide two more top-level categories for our taxonomy, as follows:
3. Detached part. An independent object that is not part of anything but which
arose from the separation of a part from some parent whole. We distinguish:
(a) Detached independent part, e.g., a hub-cap from a car, found lying by the
side of the road.
(b) Detached intrinsic part, e.g., hairs, teeth, bits of skin, leaves, fruit, pollen,
etc, shed by a living organism. These originate as intrinsic dependent parts;
but in some cases become independent parts before becoming detached.
(c) Detached extrinsic part. This covers bits broken or cut off something, e.g.,
a chip from a ceramic plate, a shard of glass from a shattered window pane,
a branch sawn off a tree, a piece of hair cut from a human head, a slice of
bread,10 a piece of cake. In many such cases, the parts that they formerly
were are only retrospectively designated through the fact of their having been
removed from their parent whole. Detached extrinsic parts are often called
pieces,11 though this word may also be used for unattached parts such as the
9Cf. Simons [5, p.235] — “the front half of a car, forward of some imaginary plane, is part of, but not a part
of, the car”. Note that this distinction works in English, but I am informed by one of the reviewers that it is
lacking in other languages such as German.
10Sometimes bread is sold ready sliced, the slices held together in a packet. In this case, rather than call-
ing the slices detached parts of an originally intact loaf, one might rather describe them as unattached parts
(specifically, members) of a collection of formerly-dependent independent slices.
11“Suppose I take a hacksaw and cut a typewriter into two. Are the pieces I obtain ‘parts’ of the typewriter
in the normal sense? Clearly not. In fact, the situation neatly differentiates the meanings of piece and part.” [1]
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle;12 other words for detached parts include bit, frag-
ment, and slice.13
4. Prospective part. An independent whole that is destined or intended to become a
part of something, e.g., a handlebar for a bicycle or a heating element for an elec-
tric kettle, prior to installation. This applies to manufactured components before
assembly into some artefact, and also to “spare parts”. In the case of prospective
parts we typically speak of a part for something rather than of it; and whereas
an actual part is always a part of some specific individual object, a prospective
part is usually a part for a generic type of object (though in special cases a part
may be manufactured for a specific “one-off” object, e.g., components produced
as parts for some artwork). A prospective part may become either an independent
part or a dependent part, depending on how it is incorporated into the whole. Be-
cause of the intentionality involved in characterising something as “destined” or
“intended” to be a part, prospective parts do not occur in the natural world.14
4. Conclusion
The taxonomy proposed here is organised along rather different lines from most exist-
ing part-whole taxonomies, although many of the considerations advanced here have
been previously noted. This taxonomy is advocated not as a replacement for any exist-
ing taxonomies but as providing a useful alternative perspective. In common with most
cognitively-inspired taxonomies, the parthood relations discussed here may depart con-
siderably from those found in typical formal mereologies, especially those which em-
brace unrestricted summations and subdivisions.
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Abstract. This paper proposes an ontology of social service needs for the evalu-
ation of social service providers. Existing ontologies in the social service domain
define metrics to evaluate the efficient use of resources by service providers. The
ontology presented here represents service provisioning from the perspective of a
cognitive and goal-driven client to evaluate services based on how well they remove
a client’s constraints and meet client needs. This ontology is grounded in real-life
requests made by participants of a Housing First intervention program, resulting
in 57 different goal types. Each goal is mapped to one or more basic human need
defined by Maslow’s Hierarchy, as inferred from the goal’s type, the motivation
behind it, and the client’s demographics. Finally, as clients interact with service
providers, three different types of goal orderings are required to capture goal rank-
ing during the planning and execution phases. These include the client’s preferred
order, Maslow’s hierarchy order, and the practical order imposed by the logistical
constraints of service providers.
Keywords. goals, agent-based simulation, cognition, ontology, human behaviour
1. Introduction
This paper proposes an ontology of needs for human-like agents that interact with a social
service provisioning system. The ontology is based on data about the types of requests
made by social service clients in a real-life intervention program. Existing ontologies
focus on the process of service delivery, categorizing services and resources to ensure an
efficient provisioning to incoming clients [1,15,11]. In the work proposed here, an ontol-
ogy is created that allows for the evaluation of service provisioning from the client’s per-
spective. By identifying goals of clients and the services that satisfy them, it is possible
to create a high-fidelity client emulation model for the purpose of social service evalua-
tion [3]. Towards such a model, the ontology presented here provides competencies not
yet provided elsewhere. The ontology is used to identify relationships between clients
and service providers, including client needs, constraints, and motivations. The ontology
also differentiates service-side concepts like resources, programs, and a metric for client
outcomes. To support a cognitive agent, the ontology makes a destination between three
different goal ranking used for goal reasoning and planning [3]. First, the ontology can
be used to infer correct needs associated with Maslow’s hierarchy, by providing a set of
1Corresponding Author: Bart Gajderowicz, Mechanical and Industrial Engineering Department, University
of Toronto, 5 King’s College Rd, Toronto, ON M5S 3G8; E-mail: bartg@mie.utoronto.ca.
domain-specific mappings between data provided by services and the hierarchy based
on theoretical analysis of needs [10]. Second, a client’s own preferred ranking can be
identified based on order requests are made on questionnaires and service request forms.
Third, the practical ranking represents the order goals were actually satisfied in by ser-
vices, as captured by service-side data, and takes into account environmental constraints
imposed on the service provider.
Generally, human needs are difficult to capture. There are several theories that de-
fine motivation as “drives”, but these are too vague and inflexible to construct a com-
putational model of a cognitive agent’s motivations and preferences [9]. Instead, goals
are provided a priori and influence a goal-driven agent’s behaviour [3]. By evaluating
the social service delivery process through data provided by participants in a real-life
intervention program, an ontology is developed that captures the relation between client
goals and the services they use.
There are several ontologies that capture social service provisioning from the
provider’s perspective [1,15,11]. However, no ontology exists that focuses on client
needs and motivations from the client’s perspective. At the same time, human motiva-
tions have long been credited with influencing decision making in the social service
domain [2]. To assess a client’s current state, questionnaires such as the “Service Pri-
oritization Decision Assistance Tool” (SPDAT) capture past and current needs. Once a
client’s state and outstanding needs have been identified, techniques like Motivational
Interviewing and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy are used to facilitate change in
their behaviour that aligns with the clients motivating factors [2].
The proposed ontology provides an ontological representation for four aspects of
social service client needs missing today. First, client needs made up of 763 requests
found in the data are categorized into 57 different goal types. Each type is defined by
the agent’s motivations, constraints, resources needed, and the services offering those re-
sources. Second, the relation between a client and a service provider is based on the con-
straints faced by clients, not services. Third, each goal type has a homeless-specific map-
ping to one or more levels of Maslow’s hierarchy. Such mappings are not trivial, and the
ontology infers appropriate mappings based on request types and client characteristics.
Fourth, three goal orderings are identified for different phases of a client’s interaction
with the provider. These include client preferences during the planning phase, Maslow’s
order during plan execution phase, and practical ordering based on logistical constraints
placed on the service provider.
2. Method
To capture how a service provider satisfies goals of clients, this paper develops the Ontol-
ogy of Social Service Needs (OSSN). The ontology is developed using the ontology engi-
neering method. Ontology engineering is a systemic way of constructing and evaluating
an ontological representation of a domain [6]. First, motivating scenarios are identified to
define the scope and objectives the ontology is meant to resolve. Second, a set of informal
competency questions are defined which the ontology should answer. Third, an ontology
is constructed that represents knowledge required to answer identified competency ques-
tions. Finally, the informal competency questions are translated into formal competency
questions using the terminology and formal language that allows for the automation of
querying identified questions. The work presented here represents the ontology in OWL




Has your family situation changed since the last follow-up was completed?      Yes     No      Don’t know      Declined to answer 
Which of the following best describes your current family situation?                 
 Single      Couple      Single parent family      Head of two-parent family      Other parent in two-parent family      
 Don’t know         Declined to answer 
Are you pregnant?  Yes      No      Don’t know      Declined to answer 
How many dependents (under 18) do you have? (only include those also enrolled in the program) ________           
BASIC NEEDS ASSISTANCE 
What basic needs assistance have you received during the last 3 months? 
 Child care      Clothing      Debt reduction      Disability support     Further education      Employment training      Food     
 Furniture      Housing supplement      Identification      Medication      Rent arrears      Rent shortfall/subsidy      Security deposit      
 Tenant insurance support      Transportation      Utility arrears      None     Other ___________________                                         
 Don’t know      Declined to answer 
SERVICE REFERRALS 
What service referrals have you received during the last 3 months?  
 Aboriginal agencies      Addictions service      Child support service      Counseling      Financial service      
 Health service (non-hospital)      Hospital      Immigrant serving agencies      Legal service      Police service      None                    
 Other ___________________      Don’t know      Declined to answer      
CASE WORKER CONTACT 
How often does your case worker visit or contact you each month? 
 1-10 times      11-20 times      21-30 times      31 times or more      Don’t know      Declined to answer      
EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
Have you gained paid employment within the past 3 months? 
 Yes - Full-time      Yes – Part-time      Yes - Casual/Contract      Yes - Seasonal      No - Unable to work      No                                                                                                                                         
 Don’t know      Declined to answer 
Are you currently attending employment related training?    Yes - Full-time    Yes – Part-time     No     Don’t know     Declined to 
answer   
Have you completed an employment related training program within the past 3 months?    Yes     No     Don’t know     Declined to 
answer   
Are you currently attending further education classes?   Yes - Full-time    Yes – Part-time     No     Don’t know     Declined to answer   
INCOME 
What are your current sources of monthly 
income (before tax)? (Check all that apply and 
indicate amount)  
 Aboriginal Funding $________     
 Alberta Works/Income Support $________ 
 Assured Income for the Severely 
Handicapped (AISH) $________                    
 Binning/Recycling/Bottle Picking  $________      
 Canada Pension Plan Benefits  $________  
Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefits 
$________           
 Child Support/Alimony $________     
 Child Tax Credit $________      
 Employment Insurance (EI) $________      
 Full-time Employment $________                    
 Guaranteed Income Supplement or 
Survivor’s Allowance $________      
 Housing Supplements $________      
 Long-term Disability (private) $________      
 Old Age Security Pension (OAS) $________  
 Other Tax Credits $________  
 Panhandling $________      
 Part-time Employment $________          
 Retirement pensions, superannuation & 
annuities $________                                    
 Self Employed  $________    
 Student Funding $________    
 War Veterans Allowance/Veterans Benefits  
$________ 
 Workers’ Compensation Benefit  
$________ 
No Income 
 Other _______________  $________ 
Don’t know      
 Declined to answer 
Figure 1. CHF version of SPDAT section for capturing requests for basic needs made by clients.
syntax. The SPARQL query language is used to represent formal competency questions,
with a complete evaluation in Gajderowicz et al. [5].
2.1. Homeless Data
The Calgary Homeless Foundation (CHF) 2 has provided a dataset that captured informa-
tion about clients as they participate in a “Housing First” (HF) intervention program ad-
ministered by CHF. The CHF-HF dataset contains information on approximately 4,000
unique clients that participated in the HF program in Calgary, Canada from 2009 to 2015.
The inform tio was collected using SPDAT questionnaires. A c mplete d scription of
the data and analysis is provided in [5]. Based on the data, the ontology categorizes
clients according to fifteen key demog aphics. SPDAT also captures different client re-
quests for basic needs, as per Figure 1. P rticipants were surveyed at program intake
with follow-up interviews every three months until exiting the program. By grouping 763
unique requests captured, 57 need categories represent goal types in the ontology.
2.2. Motivating Scenarios
Motivating scenarios for the OSSN focus on the evaluation of social service policy from
the perspective of clients that use them. These include:
• How to evaluate intervention programs in the social service space?
• How to monitor client progress?
• How to monitor service delivery performance?
The general approach to evaluating a program is to identify the percentage of clients who
were successful [4]. The criteria for eligibility int a p ogram i the probability a partic-
ipant will be successful based on their information at intake. With the HF program, it is
not clear which cohorts will be successful [14]. Since simply relying on demographics is
not sufficient, the motivating scenarios arise from the need to understand the interaction
between clients and services as they participate in the program to meet their needs.
2.3. Competency Questions
The focus of the competency questions for OSSN is to answer queries about the rela-
tionship between client needs and service providers captured by SPDAT questionnaires.
Client questions address the three main concepts captured about clients, their needs, con-
straints, and demographics. For the complete list of questions see [5].
Q-1 Which demographic is asking for MH need X most?
Q-2 Does client X ask for goals in the same order as client Y?
2The Calgary Homeless Foundation: http://calgaryhomeless.com/.
Q-3 What constraints clients with demographic X?
Q-4 Are wrong conditional goals assigned to any client?
Q-5 What services are needed together to address “childcare goals”?
Q-6 What resources and service are needed to address a client’s security level needs?
Q-7 How well do programs address physiological and security needs of clients?
Q-8 Are resources available when needed?
The first group is a sample of questions (Q-1 to Q-4) that examine the ontology’s ability
to represent data provided in the CHF-HF SPDAT dataset. Focus is placed on the requests
made by clients. This includes mapping the requests to Maslow’s hierarchy, capturing
the order of requests, and associating them with possible motivations and constraints that
prompted the requests. Using the provided demographics, OSSN infers the correct MH
level to map participant requests to. The second group is a sample of questions (Q-5
to Q-8) that evaluate the ontology’s ability to capture services available to clients. By
associating services with client constraints, the objective is to answer questions about
service provisioning from the perspective of the client.
3. Engineering the Ontology of Social Service Needs
To engineer our ontology of needs, we first analyze how Maslow’s hierarchy can be
applied to this domain to create a domain-specific mapping. We then identify high-level
concepts required to categorize requests and present axioms included in the ontology.
3.1. Maslow’s Needs for Homeless Clients
While basic motivation for human needs is ill-defined [9], there is some consensus that
behaviour models can rely on theories like Maslow’s hierarchy (MH) for grounding goals
in basic human needs [10]. A need can be considered as a “master” goal, an innate
requirement for an agent without a triggering activity. Such needs always exist with
varying degrees of urgency. All other goals or sub-goals are regarded as tangible states
that can be achieved and satisfied through a series of activities. MH categorizes tangible
goals into five categories of basic human needs. While there is mostly consensus on the
categories, there is less consensus on the correct order of MH levels and whether it can
be applied universally across populations and cultures [13,7]. Generally, the first group
of needs are short-term needs important to our survival. The second group includes long-
term needs that serve to improve our life and society at large.
The mapping of goals to MH level needs is especially problematic for the homeless
population. Mappings are conditional on a combination of demographics, goal types,
and previously satisfied goals [12,7]. For example, housing (long term) and housing
temp(orary) is only a physiological level need for absolutely homeless, and a security
need for relatively homeless. Also, family needs are not necessarily a social level need.
For example, when providing for a child’s needs, the goal is mapped based on the needs
of the child. However, any motivations and constraints are those of the agent. Also, not
all mappings are direct, one-to-one mappings between a need and an MH level, as dis-
cussed in section 4. Some span multiple levels at once, while others are spread across
multiple levels to be satisfied in a sequence over an extended period of time. For exam-
ple, requesting laundry services impacts a client’s self esteem, ability to socialize, and
Table 1. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs mapped to SPDAT requests according to [5].
MH Need SPDAT Request
None None, declined to answer
Self-
actualization
Addiction support, case management, child care, education, employment training, fam-
ily support, goods misc, life skills, referral, social
Esteem Computer, counseling, debt reduction, disability support (for relatively homeless), edu-
cation, employment training, family support, forms, goods family, goods infant, goods
misc, hygiene, identification, laundry, life skills, money family, money planning, money
social, phone (for non-elderly), referral, tenant insurance support, transportation
Social Aboriginal, child care, computer, counseling, disability support (for relatively home-
less), education, forms, health support, hygiene, immigrant services, laundry, life skills,
miscellaneous support, money family, money social, phone (for non-elderly), referral,
social, social family, transportation, utility arrears
Security Advocacy help, advocacy legal, child care, clothing, counseling, disability support (for
absolutely homeless), don’t know, forms, goods infant, goods misc, health support, hous-
ing (for relatively homeless), housing goods, housing maintenance, housing safety, hous-
ing supplement, housing temp (for relatively homeless), hygiene, identification, immi-
grant services, income, laundry, medication, mental issues, money goods, money health,
moving, phone (for elderly), referral, rent arrears, rent shortfall/subsidy, security, secu-
rity deposit, tenant insurance support, transportation, utility arrears
Physiological Addiction support, food, furniture, home goods, housing (for absolutely homeless),
housing temp (for absolutely homeless), mental issues
prevents violence from others, hence is spans the esteem, social, and security levels. The
final mappings for 57 goal types consolidated from the 18 request types captured by the
SPDAT questionnaire section in Figure 1, including 745 entered by clients in the “other”
fields, are provided in Table 1 with a complete analysis in [5].
3.2. Ontology of Social Service Needs
Based on the client requests captured in the CHF-HF dataset and directly, conditionally
or unconditionally mapped to MH levels, the following ontological entities are repre-
sented. An agent’s relation to their goals and the services they use is represented by the
Ontology of Social Service Needs (OSSN). This relation is comprised of its Maslow
need and order ranking, followed by a concrete goal requested by a participant, per-
sonal motivation for that goal, and constraints preventing goals from being satisfied.
The agent’s need is mapped to an MH level.Motivation is a description of why an agent
might want to pursue this goal. It provides additional information for mapping a goal to
the appropriate MH level. For example, “childcare” is a broad category of needs asso-
ciated with the agent’s child’s needs. The motivation to keep a child out of harm’s way
would associate a goal with the physiological level, as it prevents physical harm. This
may include a request for emergency childcare and contacting child protective services.
Child care may also be motivated by wanting to raise well-adjusted and social children
and mapped to the agent’s esteem level.
The service provider is represented with resources and services that relieve an
agent’s constraints. A constraint is a high-level summary of unsatisfied preconditions
preventing an agent from achieving their goals. The preconditions are satisfied by social
services that provide resources. For example, the constraint preventing an agent from
































Figure 2. Ontology of Social Service Needs knowledge graph.
knowing about available activities (i.e. lack of information). The service represents the
service provider, program, or department that makes the resource available to the agent.
3.3. OSSN: Formal Definitions
This section provides the formal definitions for OSSN, represented in OWL syntax [8].
The OWL (Web Ontology Language) was chosen since it is one of the most common
ontology languages on the Semantic Web. Main OSSN classes and properties are repre-
sented in Figure 2. Agents and Goals Clients are represented as human-like and goal-
driven agents. Hence, the property hasGoal defines the Agent class as one that has at least
one Goal state, as per Axiom 1. Axiom 2 defines the Goal class as a state triggered by
some underlying MH need, but constrained from being true. TheMotivationDescription
class captures the agent’s expressed motivation for requesting a goal, as per Axiom 3.
Agent v9hasGoal.Goal (1)
Goalv Stateu 9triggeredBy.MHGoal u 9constrainedBy.Constraint (2)
MotivationDescriptionv9describedMotiveFor.Goal u 9expressedBy.Agent (3)
Goal Constraints A goal state is constrained by the Constraint class, a state that sum-
marizes unmet preconditions that prevent the goal state from being true. For example,
an agent cannot buy food from a store if they do not have money. Having money is
a precondition state that must be true before purchasing food. The state lackO fMoney
is a Constraint that prevents the Goal class moneyForFood from becoming true. For a
state to be a constraint, it must also be resolvable by a resource. A non-resolvable con-
straint identifies an incorrect goal or action. For example, requesting legal advocacy from
a housing worker describes an incorrect action if the goal is to find housing. Hence a
Constraint class is a State class that requires a Resource class (requiredBy .Resource)
and is actively constraining a Goal class (constrainedBy .Goal), as defined in Axiom 4.
Constraint v Stateu 9requiredBy .Resourceu constrainedBy .Goal (4)
MH Goals And Interim Goals Requests made by agents to satisfy expressed goals are
triggered by an underlying MH level need associated with it.MHGoal represents such a
need that triggers the requested goal. EachMHGoal is mapped to one or moreMH levels.
For example, while moneyForFood is a Goal, notBeHungry is the MHGoal state that
triggers it. notBeHungry is then mapped to the “physiological” MH level. In OSSN, the
triggeredBy property captures the relation between a requested Goal and its underlying
MHGoal. The mappedTo property captures the relation between the MHGoal and its
underlying MH level class MHNeed. These classes are defined in Axioms 5 and 6.
MHGoalv9triggeredBy .Goal u 9mappedTo.MHNeed (5)
MHNeed ⌘ 9mappedTo .MHGoal u {physiological t securityt (6)
social t esteemt sel f Actualization}
InterimGoalv Goal u ¬8mappedTo.MHNeed (7)
Finally, interim goals are sub-goals required to satisfy preconditions of actions that sat-
isfy existing goals. For example, walking to the store to buy food is an interim goal. The
InterimGoal class is defined as a subclass of Goal that is not mapped directly to an MH
level, as defined by Axiom 7.
Agent Demographics An agent’s demographics are used to automatically infer condi-
tional mapping. A conditional goal is a type of MHGoal class mapped to an MH level
based on an agent’s Demographic class. For example, consider the examples in section
3.1. The goal of temporary shelter for agents in the “absolutely homeless” demographic
is mapped to the physiological MH level. For agents in the “relatively homeless” it is
mapped to the security MH level. ADemographic is a subclass of State class that defines
the state of an agent, as per Axiom 8.
Demographicv State (8)
>v 8homelessState.{abs,rel} (9)
AbsHomeless⌘ Demographicu homelessState : abs (10)
RelHomeless⌘ Demographicu homelessState : rel (11)
AbsHomelessAgent v Agent u AbsHomeless (12)
RelHomelessAgent ⌘ Agent u RelHomeless (13)
?v AbsHomelessu RelHomeless (14)
Demographic properties define the actual “demographic” state true for the agent. For
example, the following axioms define how to identify an agent as either absolutely
or relatively homeless. First, the property homelessState in Axiom 9 has a range
of “abs” and “rel” to represent an absolutely and relatively homeless status, respec-
tively. Next, Axiom 10 defines the AbsHomelessState class as the intersection of the
Demographic class and a class for which homelessState=abs. Similarly, Axiom 11 de-
fines the RelHomelessState class as the intersection of the Demographic class and a
class for which homelessState=rel.
Next, to assert that an agent is absolutely homeless, AbsHomelessAgent is the sub-
class of the intersection between the Agent and AbsHomeless classes, as defined in Ax-
iom 12. For some agent A the assertion AbsHomelessAgent(A) categorizes A as an abso-
lutely homeless agent. Its relatively homeless counterpart is defined in Axiom 13. Since
absolutely and relatively homeless types are disjoint sets, having the same agent classi-
fied as both produced an inconsistent ontology, as per Axiom 14.
Service Provider and Resources The service provider is represented by the Service
class. A service is something that can be accessed by an agent and creates resources,
as defined in Axiom 15. For example, a “social worker” is a multi-functional service
offered by a shelter. A social worker can provide a variety of resources, such as booking
a bed, information about childcare, or finding a suitable mentor. It follows then, that
the Resource class is defined as something a service creates and that is required by a
Constraint class, as defined by Axiom 16.
Servicev9accessedBy.Agent u 9createdBy .Resource (15)
Resourcev9createdBy.Serviceu 9requiredBy.Constraint (16)
Program and Agent Outcome The last set of main classes OSSN supports are those
that capture an agent’s outcome in a program that offers multiple services. An agent can
access a service, but their outcome is evaluated in the context of the program. Hence, a
Program class is defined as the intersection of classes that offer a Service and have an
Outcome, as per Axiom 17. The Outcome class relates an agent’s status to a program, as
per Axiom 18, with possible statuses as success, f ail, missing, or active.
Program⌘ 9o f f ers.Serviceu 9 f orProgram .Outcome (17)
Outcome⌘ 9 f orProgram.Programu 9hasOutcome .Agent (18)
3.4. Ranked Goals
Ranking goals allows a cognitive agent to reason about goals in terms of their importance
to the agent [3]. A goal state can be preferred over another. If a preference is assigned
to a goal it is considered a subclass of the RankedGoal class, with a unique ordering
relation. A RankedGoal is any goal that has an integer preference assigned to it with the
pre f data property, as defined by Axiom 19. However, goals can be ranked based on one
of three order relations.
RankedGoalv Goal u 9pre f : xsd : integer (19)
AgentRankedGoalv RankedGoal u 9hasGoal .Agent u 9pre f Agent : xsd : integer
(20)
MHRankedGoalv RankedGoal u 9pre fMH : xsd : integer (21)
PracticalRankedGoalv RankedGoal u 9pre f Practical : xsd : integer (22)
First, during the planning phase, the agent uses their own preferred goal order to cal-
culate the utility of each plan. The agent’s preferred ranking is represented by the
AgentRankedGoal class as defined in Axiom 20. It is a subclass of the intersection be-
tween a RankedGoal, and a class with both pre f Agent and hasGoal relations. For exam-
ple, given Goal states si and s j along with the assertions hasGoal(A,si), hasGoal(A,s j),
pre f Agent(si,1), and pre f Agent(s j,2), the goal state si is preferred by agent A over s j.
During the plan execution phase, Maslow’s classical order is used to calculate the
utility of goal state as actions to satisfy them are executed. The MH order is represented
by the property pre fMH. A goal ranked by MH is an MHRankedGoal class as defined
in Axiom 21. It is a subclass of the intersection between a RankedGoal and a class
with pre fMH relation to an integer value. For example, the goal Food is an MHGoal
mapped to the physiological MHNeed. The assertion pre fMH(Food,1) would specify
that the physiological level Food is mapped to is the most important. For each MH level,
a specific ranking class that relates prefMH to the type ofMHGoal it is triggered by:
GoalPhysiologicalv pre fMH :1u 9triggeredBy.MHGoalPhysiological (23a)
GoalSecurityv pre fMH :2u 9triggeredBy.MHGoalSecurity (23b)
GoalSocialv pre fMH :3u 9triggeredBy.MHGoalSocial (23c)
GoalEsteemv pre fMH :4u 9triggeredBy.MHGoalEsteem (23d)
GoalSel f Actualizationv pre fMH : 5u 9triggeredBy.MHGoalSel f Actualization
(23e)
Finally, the practical ranking of goals represents the order in which goals were satisfied
during plan execution. This order is observed in the outcome of a plan following its
execution. The data property pre f Practical captures this relation, as defined in Axiom
22. The practical rank is captured by logging the execution of a plan. For example, the
goals si and s j ranked by agent A above can be satisfied in reverse order. The assertions
pre f Practical(si,2) and pre f Practical(s j,1) capture this order.
4. Mapping CHF-HF Data to OSSN
An application of OSSN is to infer the mapping of requests captured by CHF-HF data in
using an ontological representation. All recorded requests were combined into 57 basic
needs associated with one or more levels of Maslow’s hierarchy. A sixth level was added
for non-answers like “Don’t know”. The entire mapping between CHF-HF basic needs
and MH levels is provided in [5]. The following sections provide ontological definitions
required to map goals directly, conditionally, or to multiple MH levels.
4.1. Mapping Direct Goals In OSSN
Direct-mapping goals are those directly associated with a single MH level. Consider the
following OWL examples of clothing and advocacy needs. A request made for an article
of clothing is directly mapped to the security level, as defined by Maslow [10], hence
a request for clothing is the expressed goal and MH goal mapped to the security MH
need. The agent’s motivation for clothing is simply to “be clothed.” The concrete goal
requested is to get “help with buying or receiving clothing.” The constraint faced by an
agent is “lack of money.” The resource where an agent can receive information about
obtaining clothing without money is a “charity.” Finally, the service offered by the char-
ity that provides clothing is a “donation centre.” As a direct mapping, any goals of type
GoalClothing are mapped to the same security level. Hence, any MHGoal triggered by
a GoalClothing type is equivalent to a security class, with no other properties required,
as per Axiom 24.
MHGoalClothing⌘MHGoalSecurityu 9triggeredBy .GoalClothing (24)
4.2. Mapping Conditional Goals In OSSN
Conditional goal-mapping requires some agent specific condition to identify which MH
level a requested need is mapped to. Unlike the directly mapped goals for clothing, con-
ditional mappings are inferred from the intersection of an agent’s demographic and their
specific need. Consider a request for “temporary housing” at some shelter. Such requests
homeless it is a physiologicalMH need, while for the relatively homeless it is a security
MH need. In OSSN an agent’s homeless state is a demographic defined by Axioms 12
and 13 for absolutely and relatively homeless respectively. For both types of homeless
agents, the MH goal is to find “temp housing shelter” motivated by wanting “tempo-
rary housing for a short time.” The requested goal is “get help to find temp housing.”
The constraint faced by the agent is not knowing which beds are available and in which
shelters. The resource is a temporary bed available at a shelter. The service is a social
worker that provides information about the bed. Mapping the MH goal to an MH level is









First, an absolutely homeless goal class GoalForAbsHomeless is any goal that is re-
quested by an absolutely homeless agent, as per Axiom 25. Second, a request for tempo-
rary housing, say getTempHousing2, is asserted asGoalTempHousing(getTempHousing).
Mapping this goal to the physiological MH level is conditional on the agent being ab-
solutely homeless as per Axiom 26. The MHGoalTempHousingPhysiological class, as
per Axiom 27, is also defined as the subclass of MHGoalPhysiological. For relatively
homeless agents, temp housing goals are mapped to the security level, as per Axiom
28. Similarly to the physiological goal in Axiom 27, theMHGoalTempHousingSecurity
class is also defined as the subclass ofMHGoalSecurity in Axiom 29.
4.3. Mapping Unconditional Goals In OSSN
Many OSSN needs are mapped to multiple MH levels at once. For example, doing laun-
dry is mapped to security, social, and esteem MH level needs. Laundry is a request that
impacts at multiple MH level needs, mainly security, social, and esteem. Each is mapped
to the same MH goal to “feel safe with others,” as per the assertions in Axioms 30 a to
c. The constraint faced by the agent is that they do not have money to pay for their own
laundry. The resource is the free laundry facility they can access. Finally, the service
provider is a shelter that is offering free laundry service.
MHGoalLaundrySecurity( f eelSa f eWithOthers) (30a)
MHGoalLaundrySocial( f eelSa f eWithOthers) (30b)
MHGoalLaundryEsteem( f eelSa f eWithOthers) (30c)
5. Discussion
The OSSN provides an ontological representation of a client’s motivations, goals, and
different ways goals are ranked. The focus is placed on how the service can relieve con-
straints exhibited by the agent, which resources are required, and which services provide
those resources. The service provisioning is not centred around service efficiency, but on
satisfying the underlying constraints faced by clients. To this end, the CHF-HF dataset
captures client needs as they participate in the housing first intervention program. Since
needs were collected every three months, the data also captures how a client’s needs
change over time. By identifying three different goal orderings, changing order of goals
and their rankings can be represented and used for goal reasoning by a cognitive agent.
Depending on the agent’s demographics, OSSN infers how goals should be mapped to
Maslow’s hierarchy.
Following the ontology engineering method, motivating scenarios proposed in sec-
tion 2.2 identify the scope and focus for the development of OSSN. Competency ques-
tions identify issues that should be addressed and what vocabulary is required to answer
them. For lack of space, the complete results and analysis are presented in [5]. Overall,
the ontology performs well on questions that relate to client and service types. The rela-
tionship between clients and goals is well represented, where SPARQL queries are able
to ask and answer questions about demographics and goals. OSSN is also capable of an-
swering queries about service provisioning. By relying on the Outcome class, OSSN can
answer some queries that relate to the progress participants make in a program. OSSN
has several limitations. Any questions with a temporal dimension are not supported by
OSSN. For example, the rate at which resources are used or when they become unavail-
able cannot be answered by OSSN.
6. Related Work
Several ontologies overlap with the proposed ontology and address some of the compe-
tency questions. These, however, are service-oriented, focusing on modelling processes
and constraints of the service provider rather than the impact on client outcomes. The
Open Eligibility Project (OEP) is a taxonomy of service categories offered to clients [1].
The agent is represented by the “human situations” category. It includes age group, cit-
izenship status, criminal history, disabilities, health, household, and urgency. However,
each term lacks a definition leaving them open to interpretation. For example, emergen-
cies are simply qualified as “In Crisis,” “In Danger,” or “Emergency.” The GCI ontol-
ogy focuses on housing and classifies clients as absolutely or relatively homeless [15].
The resources available to the clients are different types of housing. The competency
questions GCI addresses focus on details about specific households and aggregate in-
formation about city resources and household types. For example, GCI can answer who
the individuals in a particular household are and whether that household is considered
a “slum household.” The INSPIRE ontology captures processes and resources of ser-
vice providers focusing on elderly and adults living with disabilities [11]. Client needs
can be categorized as physical or social, or a combination of the two, along with an ur-
gency indicator. This is used to efficiently identify the appropriate department to transfer
a client. The competency questions INSPIRE can answer focus on service assignment.
Services and internal workflows are well represented, while client needs and underlying
symptoms are not.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Up to now, the client’s perspective of social service policy evaluation has been miss-
ing. The work presented here fills this gap by providing an ontological representation
of a client’s motivations, goals, and different ways goals are ranked. The Ontology of
Social Service Needs (OSSN) identifies the semantic relations between requests made
by a client to a service provider, based on data provided by real-life clients about their
changing needs while participating in a real intervention program. The ontology provides
a goal ranking used by cognitive agents to prioritize goals while planning their actions.
The ontology was evaluated by answering certain competency questions. The questions
that were not answered are the basis for future work. This involves goal reasoning and
planning to simulate a client’s interaction with service providers.
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Modeling Affordances with Dispositions
Fumiaki TOYOSHIMA 1
Graduate School of Advanced Science and Technology, JAIST, Japan
Abstract. Affordance remains obscure conceptually and formally notwithstanding
its paramountcy to the ecological approach to perception, cognition, and action.
This paper aims to offer a preliminary work to a full-fledged formal modeling of
affordance. Characteristic of the approach of the paper is to base M. T. Turvey’s
dispositional theory of affordance upon the formal representation of dispositions
that is elaborated in the existing ontology research. This work will contribute to the
research to which the agent-environment interaction is integral.
Keywords. affordance, disposition, environment, perception, formal modeling
1. Introduction
The term ‘affordance’ was coined by Gibson [1] to pin down precisely the interaction
between animals and the environment: “The affordances of the environment are what it
offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” [1, p. 119]. For
instance, a gap affords hiding when it is of a certain size relative to the size of a person
and a stair affords climbing when it is a certain proportion of a person’s leg length.
The notion of affordance has been since utilized in a number of different do-
mains, ranging from philosophy and cognitive science to engineering fields such as
robotics [2,3]. It would be therefore valuable to axiomatize this cross-disciplinary notion
in order to conceptualize the real world coherently. This would help to provide a general
framework for enhancing the integration of empirical data on agents’ cognition. The on-
tological nature of affordance is nonetheless such a highly controversial subject that one
can nowadays find numerous theories of affordance (e.g., [4,5,6,7]).
In this paper I offer a preliminary formalization of the notion of affordance so that its
full-fledged version will be implementable and available in information systems. I begin
by presenting Turvey’s [8] dispositional account of affordance, which would fit well with
the formal ontological conception of affordance (Section 2). Then I attempt a formal
characterization of the affordance concept (Section 3) and provide a brief, opinionated
survey of related work (Section 4). I conclude the paper with some brief remarks on
future directions of research (Section 5).
0I thank Adrien Barton and all the four reviewers for many valuable comments of the paper.
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Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST), 1-1 Asahidai, Nomi, 923-1292, Japan; E-mail:
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2. Affordances and Dispositions
Turvey [8] offers a dispositional theory of affordance. Here I detail the notion of dispo-
sition for the sake of my future argument. A disposition is an intrinsic property with a
‘causal profile’ [9,10].2 In more detail, it is a property of some object (‘bearer’) which
brings about some state of affairs (‘realization’) when it is stimulated (‘triggered’) by
some state of affairs under some specific circumstances (‘background conditions’). It is
additionally based on some non-dispositional (categorical) property (‘base’) [12].3
Examples include the flammability of a match. The flammability disposition of the
match (bearer) is realized when it is struck against a suitable surface (trigger) in an oxy-
genated environment (background condition), thereby bringing about the production of
fire (realization). It is also based on a particular molecule structure (base) of the match.
Moreover, some dispositions are reciprocal: they are mutually realized when matched
with their ‘partner’ dispositions [14]. For instance, the disposition of salt to dissolve is
realized when met with the disposition of solvent (e.g., water) to dissolve a solid.
Turvey’s fundamental presumption is that one of the key features of animal activity is
its prospective control (PC): “control concerned with future events, usually interpretable
as goals to be realized” [8, p. 174]. To walk across a cluttered room, for instance, an
agent needs to know what (bodily movement) is possible. The ecological approach to
PC therefore requires that affordances be perceivable in such a way that they are closely
linked with the possibilities of the environment with respect to which PC is conducted.
Granted that dispositions essentially carry inside them potency, all these considera-
tions lead to the idea that an affordance is the kind of disposition whose reciprocal dispo-
sition (what Turvey calls ‘effectivity’) has as bearer an organism.4 For instance, the af-
fordance of the stairs is their disposition to move an organism upward. It is based on the
physical structure (i.e. a set of steps) of the stairs and it is realized only when an organism
that has the disposition (effectivity) to move upward locates itself in the vicinity of the
stairs. The affordance disposition of the stairs and the organism’s effectivity disposition
are mutually realized, thereby bringing about the organism’s climbing the stairs.
A dispositional theory of affordance would mesh well with the formal ontologi-
cal treatment of affordance in some respects, although its theoretical validity is a con-
tentious matter (but see Section 4). First, the concept of disposition has been so ex-
tensively exploited in the ontology research (e.g., in the biomedical [15] and engineer-
ing [16] domains) that it would be more acceptable to employ dispositions than to in-
troduce some new concept.5 Second, a formal representation of dispositions has been
investigated [13,18] well enough to enable us to have a rich formalization of affordances
as dispositions in the long run.
2As the standard account goes, a property is intrinsic if an entity’s having that property depends on what the
entity is like and not on anything else outside the object. See e.g., Francescotti [11] for detailed discussions on
intrinsic properties.
3I follow Ro¨hl and Jansen’s [13] terminology for dispositions because it is widely used in formal ontology,
although I myself prefer to use the terms ‘power’ and ‘manifestation’ instead of ‘disposition’ and ‘realization’,
respectively.
4Strictly speaking, there is a subtle but non-trivial difference between Turvey’s [8] own claim that affor-
dances and effectivities are complementary and my reinterpretation of his dispositional view of affordances
based on the notion of reciprocal dispositions. While leaving a close analysis of this point for future work, I
would say that I am making his theory more defensible by softening the claim under consideration.
5Note the noticeable skepticism over dispositions in the context of formal ontology, however (e.g., [17]).
3. Preliminary Formalization
3.1. Basic Assumptions
I provide a preliminary first-order formalization of the dispositional conception of affor-
dance along Turvey’s [8] line of argument. All the variables presented below should be
read as particulars (at the instance level) rather than universals (at the class level).
I commence with the basic categories and relations that are comparatively widespread
in upper ontologies. Concrete individuals fall into two types: continuants (aka endurants)
(CONT) and occurrents (aka perdurants) (OCUR). Generally speaking, continuants ex-
ist in time, whereas occurrents extend through time. One major subcategory of con-
tinuants is objects (OBJ). As for the relations, I introduce the participation-in relation
participates in(x,y, t) where x is an object, y is an occurrent, and t is a time.
As for dispositions (DISP), I use Ro¨hl and Jansen’s [13] formal relations and assume
their axioms (which I omit to present owing to spatial limitations). That is to say, a dis-
position is a property of (inheres in) some object; it can be realized in (has realization)
some occurrent; and it is also triggered by (has triggerD) some occurrent.
I additionally introduce the relation (backcon of) between a background condition
of a disposition and the disposition. I leave open whether the former is a continuant or
an occurrent, partly because of its general conceptual underdevelopment6:
backcon of(x,y)! (CONT(x)_OCUR(x))^DISP(y) (1)
3.2. Formal Characterization
First of all, there exist an organism, or more generally an agent (AGE), and a non-agentive
object such as the stairs. Agents are objects. For the sake of simplicity I introduce the
predicate NAG for a non-agentive object, which is straightforwardly defined as follows:
AGE(x)! OBJ(x) (2)
NAG(x)$ OBJ(x)^¬AGE(x) (3)
Most importantly, affordances (AFOD) are dispositions that inhere in non-agentive
objects and effectivities (EFEC) are dispositions that inhere in agents:
AFOD(x)! DISP(x)^9y(NAG(y)^ inheres in(x,y)) (4)
EFEC(x)! DISP(x)^9y(AGE(y)^ inheres in(x,y)) (5)
Since Turvey focuses mainly on affordances for actions (ACT), which would be inter-
preted as occurrents in which an agent participates, a realization of an affordance is an
action and so is a realization of an effectivity:
ACT(x)!9y(AGE(y)^participates in(y,x)) (6)
AFOD(x)^has realization(x,y)! ACT(y) (7)
6See e.g., Barton, Rovetto andMizoguchi [19] for some thoughts on a background condition of a disposition.
EFEC(x)^has realization(x,y)! ACT(y) (8)
It is rather difficult to specify the reciprocal relationship between affordances and ef-
fectivities within the present framework.7 Here I impose the following constraints on the
relationship between them. The triggering occurrent of an affordance has as participant
a bearer of some effectivity and vice versa. In addition, a realization of an affordance is
also a realization of some effectivity and vice versa:
AFOD(x)^has triggerD(x,y)!9z,w(EFEC(z)^ inheres in(z,w)
^ participates in(w,y)) (9)
EFEC(x)^has triggerD(x,y)!9z,w(AFOD(z)^ inheres in(z,w)
^ participates in(w,y)) (10)
AFOD(x)^has realization(x,y)!9z(EFEC(z)^has realization(z,y)) (11)
EFEC(x)^has realization(x,y)!9z(AFOD(z)^has realization(z,y)) (12)
I finally consider the environment (ENV). From the current perspective, the envi-




When Mary is about to climb the stairs, for instance, her environment contains the avail-
able space between the stairs and her, but not the surface of the planet Mars. This is, on
the present interpretation, because the former (but not the latter) is part of the background
condition of Mary’s effectivity disposition to climb the stairs. Given the systematicity
of a background condition of a disposition, this view of the environment matches the
intuition that the environment is something systematic.8
4. Related Work
As for conceptual work, Reed [4] considers affordances as the resources of the environ-
ment that are encountered by animals.9 His theory would however imply the primacy
7It would be necessary to introduce, for instance, the reciprocal relation between dispositions [20, p. 104],
but a full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of my investigation.
8Built in alignment with the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) [20], for instance, the environ-
mental ontology [21,22] defines the class environmental system (which is synonymous with the environment)
as a ‘system which has the disposition to environ one or more material entities’ where a system is a ‘material
entity (note: the BFO category) consisting of multiple components that are causally integrated’.
9“The fundamental hypothesis of ecological psychology (...) is that affordances and only the relative avail-
ability (or nonavailability) of affordances create selection pressure on the behavior of individual organisms;
hence, behavior is regulated with respect to the affordances of the environment for a given animal.” [4, p. 18]
of the environment over animals in tension with the ecological approach to the animal-
environment interaction. Sanders [5] maintains that “affordances are ideal primitives for
general ontology” [5, p. 103], but this claim is too extreme to fit well with my aim to
give a formal-ontological modeling of affordance. Stoffregen [6] argues that affordances
are properties of the animal-environment system: they are emergent properties that do
not inhere in either the environment or the animal.10 The ontological nature or even the
existence of emergent properties is nonetheless highly debatable (see e.g., [23]).11
As for formal work, Steedman [24] formalizes affordances using the Linear Dy-
namic Event Calculus: a formalism for reasoning about causal relations over events. My
proposal may be said to underlie his model because the triggering occurrent of the affor-
dance disposition bears a causal relation to its realization occurrent (cf. [25]). Galton [26]
formally addresses the question of where a given surface layout of an object determines
and possesses a particular group of affordances. My formalization could be harmonized
with Galton’s in such a way that he investigates the relation between the affordance dis-
position and its physical base from the viewpoint of knowledge representation.
S¸ahin et al. [27] formalize affordances based on three perspectives on them (the sec-
ond of which they take to be central to Turvey’s account): agent perspective, environ-
mental perspective, and observer perspective. Capturing the first perspective in terms of
Turvey’s original idea of the effectivity disposition (which tends to be neglected in the lit-
erature), my formal modeling can be coherently enlarged to accommodate the third one,
together with the auxiliary claim that the capacity disposition (e.g., [28]) of the observer
is necessary for the mutual realization of the affordance and effectivity dispositions.
Ortmann and Kuhn’s [29] extension of their ontology of observations to include Tur-
vey’s view of affordance is fairly close to, but nevertheless differs relevantly from my ap-
proach in the sense of focusing more on the agentive and perceptual facet of affordances
than their ontological (dispositional) one. This may be partly due to their compliance
with the DOLCE [30] upper ontology, which purports to represent the categories with a
clear cognitive bias and which does not explicitly have the disposition category.
5. Conclusion
I have proposed a preliminary formalization of the affordance concept based on Turvey’s
dispositional account of affordances, borrowing a formal representation of dispositions
from the existing ontology research. In the future I will deepen the formal modeling of
affordances, e.g., by having a more expressive formalization of dispositions. Once the
(full) formalization is available, I will apply it to, e.g., the implementation of the robot’s
dynamic interaction with its environment and other agents (including humans) [2,3,27].
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Abstract. This paper presents first steps towards a formalization of beliefs. It 
argues for the multiple nature of beliefs: the term “belief” can refer to a mental 
process of taking something to be the case, or to a disposition realized by such a 
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1. Introduction 
Belief is a central construct in several artificial intelligence models of agency – such as 
the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model [1]; an ontological formalization of beliefs 
would therefore be highly valuable. For example, we might want to formalize patient’s 
beliefs underlying their adherence or non-adherence to medication prescriptions [2] 
(e.g. beliefs about a medication’s efficacy). Currently, the Mental Functioning 
Ontology (MF [3]), an OBO Foundry candidate [4], classifies belief as a Mental 
disposition, without further analysis (but see the recent [13]). This paper will present 
why it makes sense to classify belief as a disposition, and argues that there is also 
another kind of belief, namely occurrent belief. It should also be possible to extend this 
account to other ontological frameworks formalizing dispositions, such as UFO [5] – a 
foundational ontology tailored for general conceptual modeling languages. 
The term “belief” is polysemous. Suppose that Mary believes that amoxicillin 
cures bronchitis. The term “Mary’s belief” may refer to the content of Mary’s belief, or 
it may also refer to an entity in Mary’s mind. The philosophical literature standardly 
takes the former entity to be a proposition, and the latter entity to be a cognitive attitude 
towards this proposition. The ontological nature of propositions is a highly complex 
topic, and we will not delve into it in this paper, building instead in section 3 upon 
information content entities (“ICE”), as defined by the Information Artifact Ontology 
(IAO [6]). As a matter of fact, there are several ontologies based on the theory of ICEs, 
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such as the Prescription of Drugs Ontology (PDRO [2]), where an ontology of belief 
would be useful. We will first show in section 2 that beliefs in the second sense have 
both a dispositional and occurrent nature. We will suggest here first steps in developing 
a formalization in OWL (and point to some insufficiencies of this language to 
formalize beliefs). In the remainder of the paper, universals or classes will be italicized 
and capitalized, and names of particulars will be written in bold. 
2. The Dual Nature of Beliefs 
In the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO [7]), a realizable entity is as an entity that is 
manifested or exhibited during some process, but continues to exist even when it is not 
participating in a process (where a process is a temporally extended entity, whose 
existence depends on at least one material entity). Realizable entities are further 
specialized into dispositions and roles. Dispositions are realizable entities “that exists 
because of certain features of the physical makeup of the independent continuant that is 
its bearer” (such as being flammable), whereas roles exist because the bearer is in 
special physical, social, or institutional circumstances (such as being an employee). 
Given this, we classify beliefs in BFO as a subtype of dispositions. My belief that 
amoxicillin cures bronchitis exists even when sleeping – that is, even when I am not 
consciously thinking it – and exists in virtue of the physical makeup of my neuronal 
system. 
Next let us consider how beliefs (as dispositions) are realized. A proposal [8] is 
that beliefs are dispositions to physically perform certain kinds of actions (that is, 
dispositions to behave in a certain way). My belief that amoxicillin cures bronchitis, 
then, is realized when I perform the action of taking amoxicillin when I have bronchitis. 
This approach, however, does not seem to account for the nature of beliefs. I can 
have a belief that amoxicillin cures bronchitis even if I’m totally paralytic and not able 
to take amoxicillin. To answer this objection, one might argue that beliefs are 
dispositions to act if further conditionalized: my belief that amoxicillin cures bronchitis 
is a disposition to take amoxicillin if I have bronchitis and I am not paralyzed. 
However, this proposal only seems to capture the practical dimension of beliefs (how 
they relate to action), not how they relate to the purely theoretical attitude of taking 
some state of affairs to be the case. Consider the fictional counter-example of a 
supernatural spirit with no power of action at all, who would have many beliefs about 
the world (e.g. that the sea is mostly composed of water, etc.), but no disposition to act. 
Thus, following a classical philosophical distinction [8,9], we hold that 
dispositional beliefs are not realized by physically performing actions, but by some 
occurrent mental process that we call “occurrent belief”, namely the cognitive process 
of taking it to be the case that amoxicillin cures bronchitis. For example, Jones may 
believe that amoxicillin is helpful to cure his bronchitis, but this (dispositional) belief is 
not being continuously activated (or said differently, realized) in his mind. At t1 (see 
figure 1 below), he deliberates whether he should take amoxicillin, and his 
dispositional belief is realized by a process of him taking amoxicillin to be helpful to 
cure his bronchitis. His dispositional belief is then realized a second time at t2 by a 
similar process. Thus, a person may have a dispositional belief that amoxicillin cures 
bronchitis even when sleeping or unconscious. We can then suggest the following 
definitions: 
• Dispositional belief: A disposition that can be realized in an occurrent belief. 
  
• Occurrent belief: A MF:Mental process of taking something to be the case. 
The difficulty here would be to analyze what it means to take something to be the 
case, which might involve a cognitive attitude towards a proposition – two complex 
notions. This will remain out of scope of this paper, which will instead analyze how 
beliefs can be articulated with IAO’s theory of ICEs.  
3. Information Content Entities and Beliefs 
In the following, we will use single quotes such as in ‘amoxicillin’ to refer to an ICE 
instance. ICEs are about something (see [6] and the two senses of aboutness they 
introduce, at the level of reference and the level of compound expression). For example, 
the ICE ‘aspirin’ on a drug product monograph is an ICE that is about the class of 
aspirin drug products. Following Smith and Ceusters [6], an ICE is concretized by one 
or several instances of a specific subclass of BFO:Quality named Information Quality 
Entity (IQE). For example, if Dr. Jones writes the word “amoxicillin” on a white paper, 
the ICE ‘amoxicilin’ that refers to the active ingredient amoxicilin is concretized by 
some qualities inhering in the mereological sum of ink molecules on this paper. Not all 
qualities of the ink are relevant from an informational point of view: for example, 
writing the dot on the “i” slightly more to the left or to the right is not relevant in this 
sense. According to IAO’s theory, ICEs might also be concretized by a neuronal 
configuration. There is an important distinction between ICEs and IQEs. IQEs 
specifically depend on their bearer; that is, an instance of an IQE exists only as long as 
the unique entity it depends on exists. On the other hand, ICEs generically depend on 
their bearer: they can be copied or migrate on another bearer. 
We hypothesize that a belief involves the concretization of an ICE in one’s brain: 
if I believe that amoxicillin cures bronchitis, my brain must carry some associated 
information. For example, let’s define ‘Amoxicillin cures bronchitis’ as ICE1, and 
‘L’amoxicilline soigne les bronchites.’ (the French translation) as ICE2. Thus, if I 
believe that amoxicillin cures bronchitis, my brain may bear ICE1 or ICE22. 
However, having ICE1 (or ICE2) concretized in one’s brain does not imply that the 
person believes that amoxicillin cures bronchitis. Suppose that John holds at t0 the 
belief0 that amoxicillin does not cure bronchitis, but after attending to a conference on 
the topic, holds at t1 the belief1 that amoxicillin does cure bronchitis (note that holding 
belief1 is stronger than simply not holding belief0 anymore). At t0, some ICE such as 
ICE0 ‘Amoxicillin does not cure bronchitis’ is concretized in John’s brain by IQE0, 
and he holds a belief attitude towards it. At t1, ICE0 might still be concretized in his 
brain occasionally (as it was presumably concretized in your brain when you read the 
sentence), but he does not hold a belief attitude towards it. Said differently, a mental 
representation of some information does not imply a belief in the veracity of the 
represented information. I can have a mental representation of the statement ‘the Earth 
is flat’ (and thus, I can have the ICE ‘the Earth is flat’ concretized in my brain), even if 
I do not believe it. 
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Figure 1: Relevant classes and instances (Bronchitis is omitted) 
  
To connect a belief with its informational content, we will compare the qualities 
underlying the former with the qualities underlying the latter. Barton et al. [11] define 
the “categorical basis” of a disposition as the quality (or sum of qualities) in virtue of 
which this disposition obtains (and which therefore inheres in a part of the disposition’s 
bearer named by BFO the “material basis” of this disposition [7]). For example, the 
categorical basis of a glass’ fragility is constituted by some features of its molecular 
structure. Thus, the categorical basis of a belief is a sum of qualities of a brain – 
namely, those qualities in virtue of which this belief exists. The connection between 
belief0 and its informational content ICE0 can be formalized by stating that the quality 
IQE0 concretizing ICE0 in John’s brain is a part at t0 of the categorical basis of his 
belief0. 
Figure 1 illustrates how our formalization can be used to relate a belief to the 
object(s) of this belief. ICE1, for example, is about the class Amoxicillin and the class 
Bronchitis (at the level of reference, cf. [6]). Therefore, belief1 can be connected to the 
classes Amoxicillin and Bronchitis by stating that belief1 has as categorical basis a sum 
of qualities that have as part IQE1, and IQE1 is the concretization of ICE1 that is about 
the class Amoxicillin and about the class of Bronchitis3. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have put forth the beginnings of a theory for representing two 
important ways that we understand beliefs: dispositional beliefs and occurrent beliefs. 
A dispositional belief exists even when we are not actively thinking it, and when we 
are actively thinking about a belief, we engage in an occurrent belief process during 
which we take something to be the case. Dispositional and occurrent beliefs are related 
using BFO’s realized in relation: an instance of a dispositional belief is realized in an 
instance of an occurrent belief. 
                                                            
3 Note that ICE1 is also about the state of affairs of amoxicillin having a disposition to cure bronchitis (in the 
sense of aboutness at the level of compound expression [6]). This is however presently not easily 
formalizable in OWL. Also, relating a particular such as ICE1 with classes such as Amoxicillin and 
Bronchitis is not easily formalizable in OWL, although one could use the inverse relation of is_about to 
solve this difficulty [12]. 
  
Our analysis left open whether a dispositional belief could be causally active even 
if it is not realized. For example, I may believe that (ceteris paribus) massive objects 
accelerate towards the Earth. This belief certainly has a causal influence on some of my 
actions, even when I do not consciously deliberate about it. As a consequence, if one 
endorses a purely dispositional theory of causation, a dispositional belief is realized in 
an occurrent belief whenever it is causally active, even when the person having this 
belief does not consciously deliberate about it. 
To relate our dispositional beliefs to the entities that are targets of our beliefs, we 
incorporate IAO’s theory of ICEs, which enables us to e.g. relate belief0 and belief1 
with the classes Amoxicillin and Bronchitis. A theory of proposition would be helpful 
to proceed further and be able to relate beliefs not only with the entities they concern, 
but also with their substantial content, such as the propositions “Amoxicillin does not 
cure bronchitis” (related to belief0) and “Amoxicillin cures bronchitis” (related to 
belief1) – the former being especially complex to analyze in a realist ontology, as it 
does not describe a state of affairs that obtains. 
Finally, the present account has defined beliefs independently of practical 
rationality, that is, independently of any intention to act on it. However, beliefs do 
frequently play a role in motivating action. Future work should also examine how 
dispositional beliefs can lead to an intention to act, by being realized by an occurrent 
belief that is part of a plan making process, that leads to an OBI:Plan (as formalized by 
the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations [10]). 
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Firstly, there is a need to define the central notion of the paper – economic ontology. 
Philosophically, ontology is a doctrine of the objective reality in whole. But it is only 
one definition; the second one treats ontology as a theoretical construct of the explored 
reality. The first understanding of ontology connected with the notion of substance, while 
the second one implies the role of subject and language in the process of cognition. These 
interpretations are equal for analysis of ontology and ontological problems in any science. 
In economics, also, these two interpretations are also applied. Economic ontology is 
a notion of the part (or aspect) of reality, analyzing by economists, or a notion designating 
economic view on the reality. Besides the view itself, the last aspect of economic 
ontology also includes prerequisites of this view. Both of these aspects are studied in the 
field of philosophy of economics [1]. 
Thus, economic ontology is, in one hand, the picture of economic reality, and, in the 
other hand, subjective and objective prerequisites of this picture. By the way, using the 
notion “picture” nowadays is not quite appropriate for this term reflects the opposition 
of the subject and object, formed in the works of Descartes. But this opposition is more 
specific for the classical science. In our opinion, it is better to use term “theoretical 
construct” to emphasize this aspect of the notion “economic ontology”. 
In modern economic science there are two mainstream ontologies: behavioral and 
institutional. The notion of economic reality can be defined as “the sphere of human 
activity within which the decisions connected with creation and use of the benefits 
satisfying human wants are made and carried out” [2]. This definition is obviously 
behavioral, and to cover other aspects of economic reality it is needed to add into this 
notion nature and society. Staying inside the neoclassical – behavioral – economic 
ontology, we often use models to create “logically possible worlds” [3]. It may move us 
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away from reality, and thus, from fundamental science which observes the economic 
reality as whole. Economic science becomes a mere set of different, and even 
contradictory, theories. This is the other view on economic science, for example the view 
of D. Rodrik [4]. He writes that economic science is in progress when there is a constant 
increment of the various models and theories. This position reminds us the one of P. 
Feyerabend, because he wrote that theories might coexist, and not compete [5], and of 
course can be regarded as interesting way to answer on the question of the nature of 
economics and economic reality. Nevertheless, there is a problem in the relationship 
between theory and practice in economics, and it is still not resolved. We think the 
solution can be found on the border of economics and other sciences. 
Bearing all this in mind, we would like to emphasize the following ontological 
problems of economics. 
 
 
2. Ontological Problems of Economics. 
 
2.1. Ontological Bases of the Scope and Method of Economic Science. 
 
Here, ontological bases are the reality which economics studies. There are several 
questions we should answer in this section: a) ontological status of economic objects, 
whether they exists or not, and why; b) structure of economic actuality, or how the 
objects of economics are connected, and if there is an order of their appearance in 
different economic theories and in economic science at all; c) which is the vision of the 
economic reality in the certain economic theory, and how this vision can influence on 
the way certain scientist studies scientific problems; d) how is the economic reality 
connected with the models economists use in their theories; e) which are the goals of 
economic policy and economic science and how they influence on the ways economists 
achieve them; f) which are the processes taking place in the economic reality, and how 
they are connected with institutes, laws and mores. 
 
2.2. Space and Time in Economic Science. 
 
These are two terms which came in economics from philosophy, and they have specified 
value in economic science. Any kind of reality has its structure, and there is space and 
time structure in economic reality. Which are the elements of this kind of reality? There 
are individuals, companies, multinational corporations, states, i.e. economic agents. Are 
there also institutes, social processes? Is there any sense to study the history of economic 
reality, and if it is, how can it be useful today? What about the future of economic reality, 
what can we say about trends, future problems and risks, and what is the prediction term? 
Or maybe it is not the purpose of economic science, to predict anything? There are also 
less philosophical questions, for example, how to allocate resources effectively, or what 
should we do to make the infrastructure work better? These kinds of questions are usually 
studied by spatial economics, logistics and so on. 
 
 
2.3. The Language of Economic Science. 
 
It may seem it is not the ontological problem at all. But we use language to express our 







objects are tussle and come to compromise. It is significant that the language of economic 
science is not a totally artificial one, but there is a huge influence of natural language. 
The last one is a living tissue of economic science, and the first one helps us to reflect 
especially economic aspects of our reality. In economics, there are also the notions from 
other sciences, for example, from philosophy, law, physics, biology etc. This fact can be 
taken as a condition of possible interdisciplinary correlation between these sciences and 
economics, i.e. of the common ground for future cooperation. 
To be such a fruitful space, economic language should be equal to the following 
requirements: precision and clarity of its notions, forms, and sentences; a balance 
between abstractness and haecceity; ability to change itself when it is necessary, for 
example when the reality has changed. 
At least, we cannot ignore the theory of D. McCloskey, interpreting economic 
science as a complex of rhetoric instruments [6]. If she is right, then we should 
understand which instruments we use, and why. One of the most interesting problems 
here is the question about how these rhetoric instruments can help of block our intention 
to find a truth about economic reality. 
 
2.4. Correlation Between Economic Ontology and Economic Reality. 
 
But what is the economic reality and how it differs from the economic actuality? We can 
define economic reality as a sphere of human activity in which we provide processes of 
production, consumption, exchange, allocation of different resources, goods and service 
activities. While economic actuality is a certain spatiotemporal characteristic of 
economic reality, i.e. concrete conditions of economic processes, its instantiation. Thus, 
we can say, ontology could be viewed as a treatment of both. 
 
2.5. Correlation Between Economic Ontology and Ethics. 
 
Ethical problems of economics in this scope connected with the division of economic 
science in the positive and normative aspects. Positive economics don`t deal with ethical 
questions, studying just what exists, while normative one is about what our economic 
reality should (and could) be like. Usually, normative economics is all about goals of 
economic policy. In neoclassical economics, there is a strong lack of ethical 
understanding of human behavior, though this behavior is in the scope of neoclassical 
economic theory. But today there are more and more researches of ethical aspects of 
human behavior. There are at least three themes of such a study: a) normative aspect of 
economic knowledge; b) ethics of economic publications; c) professional ethics of an 
economist. For example, there is a very interesting research at the Global Priorities 
Institute in London, UK. According to its agenda, scientists of this Institute study 
“theoretical issues that arise for actors who wish to use some of their scarce resources to 
do as much good as possible” [7], i.e. there are prioritization problem, cross-cutting 
considerations, and the problem of effective altruism. As we think, all these themes can 
be understood as a scope of normative economics. 
It is interesting, how T. Lawson defines scientific and philosophical ontology: he 
actually connects scientific ontology and positive economics, and philosophical ontology 
and normative economics. He is also known as one of founders of social ontology, which 
he defines as “1) the study of what is, or what exists, in the social domain; the study of 
social entities or social things; and 2) the study of what all the social entities or things 







an important connection between philosophy and economics, because it gives them a 
chance to find a common ground for the explanation of social processes. Very fruitful 
discussion on these questions can be found in [9]. 
 
2.6. Human Model in Economics. 
 
Human being is the part of reality. Today there are different ways of studying human, 
for example, as a person, or as an individuum, as a completely social being, or as an 
animal. One of the most discussing approach here is sociobiology [10]. Today this 
approach has a lot of in common with neuroeconomics, that is why it again brings up a 
question of the place of human being in reality. In the modern economic science, 
especially in neoclassical economics, individuum is like A and W. But the principle of 
methodological individualism is often called into question today. Aiming to understand 
human behavior, we ought to ask ourselves, which are the limits of economic view on it. 
It is no doubt that economic understanding of human behavior based on the certain 
philosophical views on human nature. We have to reveal these views and realize how 
they influence on the economic way of thinking of human being. Here we can search for 
answer with the help of sociology and, particularly, economic sociology. In our opinion, 
natural sciences can also help us in this question, but we should know they are as positive 
as modern economics tries to be, and what we need to resolve this problem, is to include 
normative topics in our study of human behavior. 
The most prospective scopes of research in this field are: a) neuroeconomics; b) 
economic psychology; c) economic sociology. We believe a lot of new ideas will come 
from the research of artificial intelligence, because it could completely change our 
knowledge about human being. 
Maybe the most important problem here to resolve is the problem of ontological 
prerequisites of new economic approaches to human behavior. 
 
2.7. Philosophical and economic ontologies. 
 
The key difference between the two kinds of ontology is that economic ontology belongs 
to the class of scientific ones, and science deals with physical world, which should be 
accessible to observation. That is why economic study of human behavior in neoclassical 
economics based on behaviorism theory, and that is why economics feels itself so close 
to the neuroscience. 
Philosophical ontologies are less connected to the formalization of our knowledge 




The questions about ontological problems of economics are very important in any time. 
But nowadays, there is a strong need to arise them because of the problematic status of 
the modern economic science itself. Today, mainstream economics make an accent on 
the modeling processes, creating a wide variety of possible situations taking place in 
economy. Nevertheless, the most of these situations are happen just once and are 
reflected in ad hoc models. There is a problem of connecting such models with reality. 
And of course, we need to produce an integrated representation of the economic reality 







Studying of ontological problems of economics could help us to systematize our 
ideas about different aspects of economic reality. And it is important to understand that 
this systematization can be done just with the support of other sciences – both natural 
and social, especially philosophy. Studying economic ontology and its problems assumes 
understanding of how diverse and complex the reality is, including the economic one. 
We believe studying of economic ontology as a very prospective scope in modern 
economic science also because of such new and breathtaking fields of research as 
artificial intelligence, digital economics, neuroeconomics, and bioeconomics. And it is 
obviously an interdisciplinary field of research. Philosophy and methodology of 
economics has an advantage in studying of all these fields, because it allows to provide 
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Economizing on Virtue 
Judith WÜRGLER1 
Department of Philosophy, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland 
Abstract. The paper starts by describing a strong argument in favor of the “self-
interest hypothesis” that we find in economics. This argument argues that any 
realistic political theory should “economize on virtue”. The present paper criticizes 
this argument in two ways: first, supposing that people are exclusively motivated 
by self-interest can have (four) socially bad consequences. Second, the argument 
that realistic political theories need to economize on virtue can be turned against 
the self-interest hypothesis; such hypothesis is (in four ways) not realistic enough. 
The concluding part of the paper then suggests that an appropriate conception of 
political realism does not support the self-interest hypothesis. 
Keywords. Self-interest, feasibility, moral fallacy, unintended consequences,  
1. The Feasibility Argument for Self-Interest  
As Martin Hollis convincingly formulates it, a political theory always offers a recipe 
for a “socializing syrup” that is expected to render a particular human nature apt for 
social life.  
 
Recipes for the Good Society […] have produced many classic dishes in political theory. […] 
[T]he magic formula for the socializing syrup varies with the analysis of human nature. For 
instance, if men are essentially greedy egoists in pursuit of riches, fame and honour, then the 
syrup will be a blend of repression through fear and reward for cooperation. If men are born free, 
equal and good, they need only to be stewed in Enlightened education amid democratic institution. 
If men are by nature the sinful children of God, then a conservative chef will distil his brew from 
notions like law, authority, tradition, property and patriotism, tinged with distrust of reason. [1] 
 
Economics also relies on a specific conception of human nature, namely that 
human beings are exclusively self-interested. This self-interested motivation can be 
described as either indifference to the well-being of others or as containing a necessary 
reference to one’s personal well-being. Most of the time, the considered well-being is 
measured by material possessions.  
Many arguments have been given to justify such a conception of human nature. For 
example, it has been argued that it is a descriptively accurate first approximation of 
human behavior, or that it enables us to achieve a mathematical representation of 
choice [2] or that we can make pretty good predictions based on it [3]. Yet, there is 
another very good normative argument in favor of the self-interest assumption. Such 
argument possesses a long history, but is only seldom directly used in the economic 
literature – surely because normative arguments are not considered as objectively 
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assessable. This argument says that any political theory should respect a “feasibility 
constraint”, that is, its policy recommendations should be based on a realistic 
conception of the world and not on some nice but wishful thinking. Respecting such 
constraint is a moral obligation for a social planner – and a social scientist.  
 
[The] ethical observer who misspecifies the feasible set [of alternatives] will typically make a 
moral mistake.[4] 
 
As a consequence, concerning possible human motivations, a good social planner 
should base his decisions and predictions on a representation of human nature that 
“economize on virtue”, that is, that does not rely on the (utopian) expectation that 
citizens and economic actors will act from some kind of moral motivation or from 
some interest for the public good.  
 
Compliance with morality, even one that the agents regard as ‘true’, simply cannot be taken for 
granted. ‘If men were angels’, the economist is inclined to argue, things might be different; but 
in the real world we must determinedly set aside heroic conceptions of human nature and deal 
with human behavior as it is, warts and all. To do so commits the economist to a particular 
interest in institutions, which, as economists often put it, ‘economize’ on virtue. […][4] 
 
Such an argument argues that a legislator who hopes that people will act as they 
are morally required, even when that implies giving up some personal advantages, is 
committing what we can call a “moralistic fallacy”. As Ingo Pies expresses it 
concerning firms: 
 
A moral fallacy occurs when we expect firms to act differently without having changed 
incentives, rather than to change incentives in a way that makes it imperative (and actually 
attractive) for them to act differently.  The alternative at issue here can be formally formulated: 
change of attitude versus change of conditions. [5]2 
 
A legislator should not wishfully believe that, just because it is morally required 
not to act in a way that damages the public good, economic actors will be motivated not 
to act this way. Such a reasoning derives an “is” (i.e. “economic actors do not act 
against the common good”) from an “ought” (i.e. “economic actors ought not to act 
against the common good”). Such a derivation is logically illegitimate – just as the 
converse “naturalistic fallacy”, deriving an “ought” from an “is”, is logically 
illegitimate. Therefore, governments should never expect agents to behave as they 
morally should. Rather, they need to expect them to be exclusively motivated by their 
personal, private advantage. As a consequence, society should be organized in a way 
that makes individual self-interest serve the public good.  
 
Economics insists on the necessity to make sure that individual objectives are aligned with 
collective objectives. [6]3 
 
Attention is therefore directed toward the question of how arrangements might be made to 
bend private interests to the service of the public interest – to secure benign consequences 
from human interactions, despite the impaired motivations of the participants. [4] 
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The underlying idea is: if a society can work and materially prosper without any 
moral motivation, it is more sustainable than a society that is wholly dependent on 
people’s dispositions to care about the public good.  
 
The rest of the paper is divided into two parts. The first shows that representing 
agents as exclusively self-interested can lead to dangerous consequences for society. 
We will explore four such consequences. We conclude that, given those bad 
consequences, it cannot just be taken for granted that self-interest is a more realistic 
hypothesis than, say, universal moral motivation. Instead, this thesis needs to be proved 
by an argument.  
The second part of the paper shows that, besides its dangerous social consequences, 
the “self-interest hypothesis” fails by its own light – i.e. it is not a very “realistic” (or 
“not-too-optimistic”) hypothesis regarding human motivations. We will consider four 
objections of this second kind. We will then conclude that, since the hypothesis fails by 
its own light, it is very important to look for other plausible motivational basis for a 
viable society.  
2. Some Socially Dangerous Consequences  
Representing citizens and economic actors as motivated solely by self-interest leads to 
four possible dangerous consequences: (a) moral considerations might simply 
disappear from private consciousness, (b) agents might become slowly unable to think 
about the moral dimension of their actions, (c) developing an incentive-based society 
might be connected with high costs, both in in terms of money and in terms of liberty 
and (d) moral responsibility for failures to achieve the common good might move from 
private actors to the State.    
2.1. The Disappearance of Value  
The risk that moral values disappear from individual consciousness arises when one is 
allowed to pay for getting the right to do an immoral action. When a monetary price is 
attached to an immoral action, it can be interpreted as buying the right to perform an 
action that was first morally forbidden. Said differently, the action changes from 
having the property “morally wrong” to having the property “morally permissible” 
when one pays the monetary penalties attached to it.  
The disappearance of moral value has been observed, for example, in a case where 
a nursery decided to introduce a fine for parents being late at the end of the day.  
 
The fine seems to have undermined the parent’s sense of ethical obligation to avoid 
inconveniencing the teachers and led them to think of lateness as just another commodity they 
could purchase. [7] 
 
The existence of a price made the “sense of ethical obligation disappear”. This fact, 
i.e. that paying is considered as providing a right to do an immoral action, is by itself 
problematic. There is however an even more serious reason to worry. Indeed, the risks 
runs that the total number of bad actions increases rather than decreases after the 
introduction of “moral” penalties– contrary to expectations. Once one can buy a “right 
to do wrong”, the wrongness dimension of the action disappears from consciousness 
and people feel comfortable doing bad actions. Consequently, people no longer feel 
any moral pressure not to do the action, and just start doing it or, for those who already 
did it, start doing it more frequently. In the case of the nursery, not only did the number 
of people being late increase, but the time of lateness also increased.4 
We could hope that, after having realized the self-defeating effect of monetary 
incentives, we could come back to the initial state of affairs by suppressing them; if the 
number of cases has increased by introducing fines, then the number of cases should 
decrease by suppressing fines again. Unfortunately, evidences show rather that we can 
expect the number of cases to increase to an even higher point. The fact that taxes have 
made the moral aspects of action disappear from consciousness explains the fact that, 
when such actions become free again, their moral dimension nevertheless remains 
invisible and the number of cases increases again. In other terms, the action had first a 
moral value, then a price, and, at the end neither a moral value nor a price.  
 
Table 1: The evolution of the value of an action and of the number of actions related to the 
introduction of monetary incentives 
 
 






Value of action of 
type  X 
Moral value, no price Price, no moral value No moral value, no price 
Number of 
actions of type X 




The action had therefore become, from a self-interested point of view, very 
attractive. As a conclusion, incentive-based policies that aim at directing self-interest 
toward the public good can be self-defeating and therefore lead to socially bad 
consequences. 
 
2.2. The Disappearance of Moral Capacities  
The risk that people lose their capacities for moral reflection comes from a slightly 
different aspect. When a State does not expect its citizens to be motivated by something 
else than their personal well-being, citizens can legitimately believe that the 
responsibility for moral reflection lies completely in the State’s hands. They know the 
State has the function of making sure incentives provide the correct direction for 
individual actions. They thus come to believe that they can quietly follow their self-
interest, because the State ensures that it serves the common good. Discharged from the 
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responsibility for moral thinking, they do not make use of their moral competences 
anymore. In the end, people become unable to distinguish what is right from what is 
wrong without the help of incentives. 
  
By claiming exclusiveness for his private interest, the economic Subject, in liberal theory, is 
not aware that he damages the interests of other economic subjects. He even knows that it is be 
following his interests as a producer or consumer that he contributes to the general prosperity. 
[9]5 
 
We can even come to a point where following incentives can appear as a duty of 
economic actors. If they fail to maximize their own advantage, they run the risk of 
failing to maximize the public interest too. Maximizing profit – or desire satisfaction – 
is therefore taken also as a moral duty toward society. At the end, economic theory 
might end up justifying morally bad practices.  
 
Economists who analyze the self-interested reasons for cheating and who explore their 
implications while ignoring or dismissing “moral” reasons may, perhaps unintentionally, wind 
up justifying the practice. If there is sufficiently large expected return, then cheating is rational 
from the point of view of an individual concerned only with personal net income. From the 
perspective of such materially self-interested individual, the only thing wrong with cheating is 
the risk of getting caught. On the assumption that everyone is materially self-interested, those 
found evading their taxes are either incautious or unlucky. [10] 
2.3. High Costs  
Monitoring individual behavior in order to make self-interest serve the common good 
can cost to the State more than to let people sometimes act against the common good. 
Indeed, monitoring economic activities in a way that guarantees that everyone always 
respects the rules requires an omniscient and omnipotent State, with the capacity to 
reprimand every wrong action and/or to reward every good action. Besides the high 
implausibility of such a god-like State, this solution can be very costly both in term of 
individual liberty and in term of money.  
 
From the point of view of legal norms, we can already doubt that they will be obeyed only 
through the use of external constraints. Without a minimum of honesty and decency would a 
huge State supervision and tracing apparatus become necessary, to force citizens to comply 
with the law. Such a device would be very costly […] and quite probably little effective. [11]6 
 
Someone might argue that a policy based on rewarding appropriate behaviors 
requires less State control than a policy based on punishing illegal behavior. Indeed, in 
such cases, the burden of proof is attributed entirely to firms, who can decide whether 
they want the State to look at their activities or not. Their independence from the State 
is therefore preserved.  
The problem is that rewards require a lot of money and cannot always be put in 
place. Indeed, rewards have to be sufficiently high to guarantee that doing an illegal 
action ceases to be an option for economic agents. This is very demanding. Moreover, 
many actions cannot be accounted for in terms of “reward” and can only be associated 
with “penalties”. For example, what would it mean to “reward” a corporation for not 
having taken advantage of a monopolistic situation or of informational asymmetries? 
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Would that mean offering to the corporation as much money – or even more – as what 
it would have gained by violating market rules? But if so, that means society has lost at 
least as much money as it would have lost had the corporation violated market rules. It 
becomes, therefore, more costly to reward corporations than to let them violate market 
rules. That means the only solution in these situations is to use penalties rather than 
rewards. But penalties have their own deficiencies. Indeed, even though it might 
happen that punishing bad actions is cheaper than rewarding good actions – this is a 
highly contingent proposition – punishing would require an involvement of the State in 
economic activities that might not be realizable and that is incompatible with a “free-
market” economy.  
In conclusion, rewards might be less intrusive than penalties, but they are costly 
and difficult to put into practice. On the other hand, penalties might be less costly that 
rewards, but they require a very intrusive State control, which appears both implausible 
and undesirable.  
2.4. Responsibility Displacement  
Finally, the “self-interest hypothesis” is associated with the very dangerous 
consequence of making moral responsibility move from economic actors to political 
actors. Indeed, under that assumption, the fact that some individual undertakes a bad 
action can only mean that State incentives were badly organized.  
 
To the degree that economists assume that the only reasons to be sought in explaining the 
firm’s behavior are self-interested reasons […] their analysis will tend to excuse or justify the 
firm’s behavior and to locate responsibility for the pollution not with the firm but entirely with 
the government for failing to set the firm’s incentives properly. [10] 
 
Economic actors can no longer be held responsible for the socially bad 
consequences of their self-interested actions. The State is fully responsible. This 
consequence is more than a logically possible one, but is actually much visible in 
economic writings. For example, Jean Tirole’s book L’Economie du bien commun is 
full of passages where some morally bad behavior on the part of economic actors are 
taken to be nothing more than bad incentive management from on the part of the State.  
 
Relationships between employers and employees are very bad in France…except when they 
agree with one another at the expense of the [State] employment insurance. But, as always, 
economic agents react to the incentives they face. It is therefore our institutions who are guilty 
in this regard, because they encourage concerted manipulations between employers and 
employees within the firm. [6]7 
 
In conclusion, we have seen that the economic conception of human nature may 
lead to some socially undesirable consequences. Such undesirable consequences cannot 
count, by themselves, as reasons to give up the “self-interest hypothesis”, but they offer 
reason to consider seriously the question as to whether relying on people’s moral 
motivations really cannot be a “realistic” or “feasible” option. 
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3. The Feasibility Argument Against Self-Interest 
Consider now a situation where the “self-interested hypothesis” is not associated with 
dangerous social consequences. It would still be possible to raise objections against this 
hypothesis. The objections we are going to study take the “no-optimism” – or 
“feasibility” – argument in favor of self-interest and turn it against itself. We will cover 
four objections of this kind. They all support the conclusion that a motivational 
conception of human nature as exclusively self-interested is, in various respects, still 
much too optimistic. This open the way for an inquiry into more realistic conceptions 
of human motivation – where “realistic” means “corresponding to reality” and does not 
simply mean “pessimistic”.  
3.1. Anti-social and Anti-moral Motivations  
The first way in which self-interest appears as still a too naive conception of human 
nature relates to the fact that human beings are driven by other, much anti-social and 
anti-moral, motivations, such as jealousy, envy, racism, nationalism, sexism, 
domination, power, etc. By ignoring all motivations that are related to the well-being of 
others, “self-interest” as depicted in economics ignores not only positive care for the 
well-being of others, but also negative motivations toward the well-being of others. 8 
Hence, if “being realistic” means “taking men as they could be at worst”, then 
economics should rely on anti-social and anti-moral motivations rather than on a 
“disinterested motivation”.  
There is a ready answer to such worries. It says that self-interest should be 
precisely conceived as the only possible passion capable of opposing or retaining the 
most destructive passions of mankind. The role of the social planner is to find a way to 
restrain the wildest passions and, in this regard, self-interest fares much better than, say, 
moral or impartial considerations or benevolence. As Dennis C. Rasmussen indicates, 
the first economists looked at self-interest as the only passion that could prevent more 
dangerous passions from threatening social life.  
 
Extensive commerce might be incompatible with strict republican virtue,  [Hume and 
Smith]acknowledged, but they also believed that a focus on material self-interest would help to 
replace dangerous and divisive passions such as xenophobia, religious intolerance, and the thirst 
for military glory. Moreover, they argued that commercial society helps to promote the 
“bourgeois” virtues of reliability, decency, cooperativeness, and so on – moral and social good 
that were comparatively lacking in pre-commercial societies. [13]9 
 
3.2. The “Double Standard” Objection 
The second objection against self-interest as a “realistic” hypothesis is the well-
known libertarian objection according to which there exist no principled reasons to 
limit the scope of the self-interest hypothesis to economic agents without extending it 
to political agents. There is no ground to make a motivational distinction between 
                                                          
8 The fact that indifference excludes both benevolent and malevolent motivations is often explicitly 
recognized in economics: “I shall usually assume that people’s preferences are free of both benevolence and 
malevolence. That is, the fact that one person is enjoying the consumption of a good does not in itself 
increase or decrease anyone’s utility” [12].   
9 Translated from French. 
economics and politics; in both spheres self-interest should be considered as being the 
exclusive motive of action. Supposing that political actors are preoccupied by the 
common good just because that is what they ought to be preoccupied with is to commit 
again the “moralistic fallacy”.  
 
An individual’s nature does not change just because he moves from the private to the public 
sector. It is always the same individual with the exact same motivations and concerns, just 
doing another job for another employer. There is no reason to believe that by working for the 
public sector he will cease to be motivated by his self-interest and act only according to the 
public interest, up to the point of neglecting his own interests. [14]10 
 
In this naive conception of reality, we attribute to the government the task of taking care of the 
public good and we presuppose that all its actions will result in an increase of well-being for 
society. We think of the government as a benevolent and omnipotent despot whose actions are 
always dedicated to the public interest. [14] 
 
This objection rightly points to some arbitrary distinction between the moral 
dispositions of private and public actors – private agents having no moral dispositions 
and public agents being moved only by moral considerations. The mere fact that public 
actors ought to care about the common good is taken as a reason to believe that they 
are indeed motivated by the public good. Yet the “feasibility constraint” requires not 
picturing people as if they were naturally disposed to act as they ought to, but rather 
picturing them as self-interested beings. Therefore there is no reason to arbitrary limit 
self-interest to the market and not to extend it to the public sphere.  
3.3. A Stronger Form of Egoism  
The third objection turning the feasibility constraint against the “self-interest 
hypothesis” of economics is slightly different: it considers that the kind of self-interest 
described in economics, that is, as indifference to the well-being of others, is a very 
weak conception of egoism as compared to the real-world egoism of human beings. 
Indeed, the value people take themselves to possess is not appropriately described by 
the “self-interested hypothesis”. The real value that human beings believe to have is 
much greater: they take their own existence to be something of value in the world, or 
even in the universe.11 Yet this incredibly high importance we take to possess cannot be 
described by self-interest. As Thomas Nagel formulates it, the importance we believe 
to have is far bigger than just being able to satisfy our desires. We consider that we 
have value in ourselves and not just for ourselves.  
 
I believe, as did Kant, that what drives us in the direction of universalizability is the difficulty 
each person has in regarding himself as having value only for himself, but not in himself. If 
people are not ends in themselves—that is, impersonally valuable—they have a much lower 
order of worth. Egoism amounts to a devaluation of oneself, along with everyone else. [16] 
 
Egoism in economics means that everyone cares only for his own well-being. This 
means that everyone has value only for himself – but has no value from some 
impersonal point of view. In contrast, real-life egoism contains more: everyone 
considers that he has value in himself. That makes a big difference concerning the kind 
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of world in which one lives: a self-interested individual lives in a world where he can 
pursue his personal advantage but runs the risk of being used in the name of someone 
else’s advantage – or in the name of collective interest. A real-life egoist, on the 
contrary, lives in a world where he is recognized to have intrinsic value. His life gets 
therefore protected by basic rights. He cannot be used to foster either someone else’s 
well-being or some “collective well-being”.  
From the point of view of real-life egoism, we should “distinguish the desirability 
of not being tortured [or murdered] from the desirability of its being impermissible to 
torture [or murder] us”. [16] In the first case, the evil lies in the fact that something bad 
happens to us. In the second case, the evil lies in the fact of “being someone it is not 
wrong to torture”. [16] In other words, a real-life egoist prefers to live in a world where 
it is impermissible to torture him rather than in a world where it is permissible to 
torture, and such preference does not depend on whether his is actually tortured or not. 
As a consequence, the strong version of egoism implies that persons are attributed the 
property of “being inviolable”. Strong egoism contains moral constraints that cannot be 
extracted from the weaker self-interested conception of egoism that we find in 
economics; therefore – quite paradoxically – the stronger form of egoism leads more 
directly to morality than the weaker.  
 
3.4. The Moral Foundation of the Market  
The last objection is also quite common. It points to the fact that the market works only 
if market actors do actually possess some basic moral motivation. Indeed, the market is 
based on one basic moral norm which holds that economic actors ought not to take 
advantage of situations of market deficiencies.  
 
The regulatory framework governing commercial activities is itself very imperfect. It cannot wholly 
correct market deficiencies and thus cannot eliminate the whole set of morally reprehensible practices 
that can emerge in market relations. In this case, market actors have an obligation not to take advantage 
of non-corrected market deficiencies. [17]12 
 
For example, as noted by Kenneth Arrow regarding informational asymmetries 
between firms and consumers or workers, the ideal conditions of market efficiency 
require that consumers and workers are perfectly informed about relevant aspects of 
their decision. Yet in the real world this condition is not realized – i.e. prices do not 
necessarily reflect every relevant piece of information. A free market does not on its 
own provide the whole relevant information for consumers and workers. Therefore it is 
a duty of firms to realize those efficiency conditions by delivering to consumers and 
workers every useful piece of information.  
 
There is clearly an obligation to reveal […] truth, even at the expense of profits, for the market 
will generally do very poorly in sorting out the facts when the buyers are uninformed. […] 
Similarly, the firm knows, by experience, the safety conditions in its plants more than workers 
can. Hence, the conditions that the market works are violated, and moral obligation should take 
its place. [18] 
 
In the real world, firms are better informed about their products and about safety 
conditions on the work place than consumers and workers – and that violates ideal 
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market conditions. Therefore this creates for firms a moral obligation to inform both 
consumers and workers about their products and working conditions, even at the 
expense of profit maximization.  
The market thus works under the assumption that market actors do not violate the 
fundamental market norm of “not taking advantage of market deficiencies”. This 
requires agents on the market to be disposed to respect a moral norm even when that 
implies giving up some possible “easy profit”. That is, market agents need to possess a 
fundamental moral motivation – exactly the kind of motivation that economics was 
supposed to “economize” on. In this sense, economics fails by its own lights, that is, 
fails to meet the “feasibility constraints” that justified the “self-interest hypothesis”.  
The fact that without such basic norm the market in real circumstances – where 
ideal conditions are not satisfied – does not lead to collective prosperity is a well-
recognized fact in economics. [6].If market actors did not respect the “rules of the 
game”, efficiency could not be reached. It is therefore surprising that respect for rules is 
something taken for granted. Indeed, market rules seem often to be treated in 
economics as if they functioned exactly like natural laws. It is as if the mere existence 
of rules could guarantee that agents will follow them.13 Yet such a naive conception of 
rule-following represents exactly the kind of credulity that was supposed to justify a 
self-interested representation of human motivation. 
A possible explanation of why respect for rules is taken for granted might come 
from a kind of misconception of rules in economics, where legal norms are treated as if 
they were laws of nature; both are taken as constraints on choice, among other kinds of 
constraints.14 Such confusion appears quite often, as we can observe in the following 
quotation, where respect for institutional rules is taken for granted:  
 
Individuals pursuing their own self-interest within an institutional setting of property, contract, 
and consent will produce an overall order that, although not in their intention, enhances the 
public good. [20] 
 
In the quotation, property contract and consent seem to operate exactly in the same 
way as do natural constraints. Yet natural constraints – such as scarcity – and legal 
constraints – such as property rights – do not operate in the same way at all. Whereas 
the first cannot – physically – be violated, the second by definition – as norms rather 
than necessities – can be violated, manipulated or modified.15 And to believe that firms 
do not try to violate and manipulate rules, or to modify them by political pressure, 
constitutes a very naive conception of self-interest. 
The moral motivation required in this context – when, for example, firms ought to 
give up an opportunity for “easy profit” – is not a kind of self-abnegation, a 
renunciation of every kind of personal advantage. The motivation here in play is only a 
moral limitation of self-interest in the name of social prosperity. Firms are still allowed 
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to make profit but only within certain limits. And those limits need to be intentionally 
respected. That is, there is a need for market actors to intentionally give up the 
possibility of personal advantage in the name of the public good. This is nothing less 
than a need for a fundamental moral motivation.  The public good cannot emerge as the 
unintended consequence self-interest. 
We believe that the attractiveness of self-interest comes from the idea that the only 
alternative to a system based on self-interest is a system that leaves no room for 
individual pretentions – and communism represents this anti-individualist system.16 In 
other words, self-interest gains his attractiveness from the fear of communism. 
However, such fear is based on a false dichotomy between self-interest and self-
abnegation;  if we allow a mid-way between self-interest maximization and no self-
interest at all, that is, if we allow for a morally constrained self-interest, we can start 
contemplating the possibility of a society based on the moral motivation of its members.   
4. Conclusion  
The appeal of the “self-interest hypothesis” comes from the idea that avoiding a 
misplaced optimism about human nature requires attributing to human beings (morally) 
bad motivations. That is, being “realistic” requires being pessimistic. Yet we see this 
conception of political “realism” as mistaken, as long as one has not provided 
independent support for the idea that moral motivation cannot play the most important 
role in sustaining a viable society. According to us, supporting a realistic conception of 
human nature requires to support a conception of motivation that is both true of human 
nature and that is capable of making society sustainable. It says nothing about whether 
these motivations are good or bad, noble or corrupted. As Bernard Williams expresses 
it, considering the motivations that people have in terrible and unusual conditions as 
being the most representative of human nature is a deeply flawed conception of realism.  
 
If the test of what men are really like is made […] in conditions of great stress, 
deprivation, or scarcity (the test that Hobbes, in this picture of the state of nature, 
imposed), one can only ask again, why should that be the test? Apart from the unclarity 
of its outcome, why it the test even appropriate? Conditions of great stress and 
deprivation are not the conditions for observing the typical behaviour of any animal nor 
for observing other characteristics of human beings. If someone says that if you want to 
see what men are really like, see them after they have been three weeks in a lifeboat, it is 
unclear why that is any better a maxim with regard to their motivations than it is with 
regard to their physical conditions. [22] 
 
The work to be done now consists in exploring arguments showing that some good 
or positive motivations really belong to human nature and are susceptible of making 
life in society viable.  
As a final remark, our presentation only showed two things: that the “self-interest 
hypothesis” can have significant social dangerous consequences and that this 
hypothesis does not completely satisfy its own criterion of “feasibility constraint”. Yet 
the fact that economics might not be able to get rid of moral motivation does not yet 
                                                          
16 “Soviet Union thinkers originally supposed that their system could forgo incentives, which are so 
central in a free economy and take their source in the individual’s egoism. They thought socialist enthusiasm 
and conscience could substitute for them. This conception was soon confronted with the real data about 
human nature, which is far from being guided by some sublime abnegation.” [21] Translated from French. 
prove that such moral motivation really exists and that is can offer the desired support 
for a sustainable and peaceful society. On the contrary, if we cannot prove that a 
society based on moral motivation is viable, then it might be that we really need a very 
strong, omniscient, omnipotent and all-good State. But such a conclusion would appear 
to be nothing more than putting God back into the foundation of morality.  
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Abstract. The Core Ontology for Financial Reporting Information Systems 
(COFRIS) is grounded on Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO). In this paper, 
we build on COFRIS and attempt to detail the concepts of Economic Resources 
and Claims found in accounting frameworks, and to extract their features which 
are common to accounting and reporting standards. Economic Resources (Claims) 
are conceptualized as extensions of Complex Social and Legal Relators of UFO, 
within the consensual transaction-centric model. The application of this 
conceptualization and COFRIS in general aims to assist with standard-setting and 
the development of information systems, to facilitate understandability and reuse. 
The conceptualization is illustrated by examples presented in an ontology-inspired 
Event Table and is used to analyze the revised IASB® Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting.  
Keywords. Accounting Information System, UFO, COFRIS  
1. Introduction  
Recently, even the international accounting and financial reporting standard-setters 
board (IASB®) has acknowledged that massive changes in relation to technology will 
have an impact on accounting and corporate reporting. The standard-setters in their 
efforts need to account for the existence of the computational accounting systems and 
technologies including the shared ledger [e.g., 1] and data analytics [e.g., 2], as well as 
ontology engineering methods and tools, which have proven to cope with difficult 
standardization issues [e.g., 3, 4, 5].   
Information systems were traditionally held inside an enterprise and represented 
the company perspective on economic exchanges. Evidence from the environment, e.g. 
invoices from suppliers, was used by the enterprise’s auditors and considered 
important, but there was no systematic connection between the invoices sent in 
company A with the invoices recorded in company B. The shared ledger concept, with 
immutability and consensus of such transactions and involved resources (claims) with 
the required addition of party-specific asset (liability) information, may provide a 
better foundation for Financial Reporting (FR), than independent reporting by each 
individual participant.  
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Recent versions of international accounting standards which encompass the whole 
life of a contract cannot be implemented by accounting departments alone. 
Accordingly, SAP’s is developing software on revenue standards implementation [6] 
which delegates the main part of recognition to the Sales [Purchase] department, but 
measurement to the Accounting department. Thus, accounting needs to be interpreted 
in a wider than traditional sense and is an important part of an enterprise conceptual 
model, and FR concepts must have enterprise-wide understandability. Presently, in the 
Enterprise Architecture (EA) realm, the shared ledger as well as the FR perspective is 
not always recognized, and the concepts of economic resources (claims), assets 
(liabilities), are often treated differently than within Financial Reporting.  
At the same time, the conceptualization of present FR per se must be much 
broader than the recognized five elements (assets, liabilities, equity, income, and 
expenses) defined by CF required for FR presentation, but as a minimum should 
include intentional, contractual and other “un-recognized” phases of economic 
exchanges and involved resources (claims), required for FR disclosure in the Notes of 
Financial Statements.  
The Core Ontology for Financial Reporting Information Systems (COFRIS) [7,8] 
is grounded on Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) [3]. In this paper, we build on 
COFRIS and attempt to detail the concepts of economic resources and claims found in 
accounting frameworks, as well as to extract their features common to accounting and 
reporting standards. Economic resources (Claims) are conceptualized as extensions of 
Complex Social and Legal relators of UFO, and within the consensual transaction-
centric model. The application of this conceptualization and COFRIS in general aims 
to assist at standard-setting to engineer domain ontologies of particular (more than 80) 
International FR standards (IFRS) [9, 10] (see Fig.1), enterprise policies, and with the 
development of information systems, to facilitate understandability and reuse.  
Accounting and Financial Reporting Standards DOFRIS-xx
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting COFRIS
Theory of Economics and Accounting UFO-ABC, S, L   
Figure 1. Architecture and Foundations of Financial Reporting Ontology Network (based on [11]).  
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the UFO ontologies used and previous works on 
accounting ontology. In Section 3 we introduce the concepts of Economic resources 
(claims) and detail their usage in Economic exchanges. Section 4 illustrates their usage 
through examples and presents an ontology inspired Event Table. Section 5, as a partial 
validation, compares the introduced consensual and correlative multi-level resources 
(claims) with the revised IASB Conceptual Framework for FR.  
2. Background: COFRIS and the UFO Ontology Network  
2.1. OntoUML  
OntoUML [5] is an ontologically well-founded version of UML whose metamodel 
reflects a number of ontological distinctions and axioms put forth by UFO [3, 4]. In 
OntoUML, class constructs stereotyped by «Kind» represent object types that supply a 
uniform principle of identity for their instances. Specializations of classes representing 
kinds are stereotyped as «SubKind», «Role», or «Phase». Instances of «Role» and 
«Phase» types can cease to be instances of these types without ceasing to exist and 
without altering their identity. Instances of «Phase» types are characterized by a change 
of their intrinsic property(s), instances of «Role» types are characterized by a relational 
property(s) acquired in relationships with other entities. «Mixin» types are universals 
that aggregate properties that are common to different Kinds and do not provide a 
uniform principle of identity for their instances; instead, they just classify things that 
share common properties, but which obey different principles of identity. «Category» 
and «RoleMixin» types represent an abstraction of properties that are common to 
multiple «Kind» types and, therefore, do not carry a unique principle of identity for 
their instances.   
A particular mixin object pattern, analogous to [21], combines object types with 
higher-order types (or even generalized to Orderless Class). Such a combination is 
often required in COFRIS to model market participants and the underlying objects of 
resources (claims) and is depicted in Fig. 2. For example, an underlying singular object, 
such as a car, can be type-specified in the agreement phase but identified in the 
fulfillment phase. Another example for market participants is the statement from [10] 
that “It is not necessary to know the identity of the party (or parties) to whom the 
obligation is owed”, but is important, when it is fulfilled. 
 
Figure 2. Mixin object pattern.  
In addition to the object types, OntoUML class elements represent types of 
existentially dependent individuals that can only exist by inhering in other individuals, 
called moments. Those moments that inhere in one single individual are categorized as 
«Mode» or «Quality» types. While (individual) qualities are moments that change in a 
space of possible values (e.g. a color, a temperature, a weight), modes are complex 
individual moments that can have their own qualities that take their respective values 
in multiple independent value dimensions (e.g., a capacity, a complex intention). While 
inhering in a single individual, some modes and qualities can externally depend on 
other individuals that are independent from their bearers. Moments that existentially 
depend on two or more individuals are categorized as «Relator » types.   
Instances of «Event» types [11] are perdurants. Perdurants unfold in time 
accumulating temporal parts. They are defined by the sum of their parts (their 
constituent subevents) and they bear to each other several temporal ordering and 
causality relations. Perdurants are manifestations of dispositional properties of 
moments (qualities, modes, and relators). Finally, perdurants are immutable in all their 
parts and all their properties.   
In a social context, UFO [4] distinguishes between agentive and non-agentive 
substantial individuals. Agentive individuals can bear special kind of moments named 
intentional moments that are further specialized into mental moments (including 
beliefs, desires and intentions) and social moments. Each type of intentional moments 
necessarily has a propositional content, which may be matched by certain situations in 
reality. Among other types of intentional moments, Intentions refer to the desired state 
of affairs to which an agent internally commits at pursuing. For this reason, intentions 
cause the agent to perform actions. Actions are intentional events, with the specific 
purpose of satisfying the propositional content of some intention of an agent. The 
propositional content of an intention is termed a goal. UFO contemplates a relation 
between situations and goals such that a situation may satisfy a goal. Communicative 
acts (special kinds of actions) can create social moments (commitments and claims) 
inhering in the agents involved in these communicative acts. Two or more pairs of 
mutually dependent commitments and claims form a kind of social relationship 
between involved social individuals, termed a social relator. A commitment (internal 
or social) is fulfilled by an agent A if this agent performs an action x such that the post-
state of that action is a situation that satisfies that commitment’s goal. Social 
relationships and interactions are further extended in several UFO grounded core 
ontologies, such as UFO-S [13] and UFO-L [14].  
UFO-S is the core reference ontology on services [13], which characterizes the 
service phenomena as activity by considering service commitments and claims 
established between the service provider and customer along the service life phases: 
offering, negotiation/agreement and delivery.  
Legal aspects of UFO-S contracts are elaborated in [14] within the UFO-L Legal 
ontology, that is based on Hohfeld’s/Alexy’s theory of fundamental legal concepts. 
The legal positions of UFO-L in addition to claims and commitments from UFO-S 
(i.e., right and duty) include pairs of other elements: permission and no-right, power 
and subjection, immunity and disability. All these legal relators originate from two 
classes of entitlement and burden/lack, which we refer to further as rights and 
obligations respectively. The above-mentioned right and obligation pairs form 
correlative associations [14], which are legal foundations for a shared ledger view [1]. 
In the core of UFO-L lays the concept of the Legal Relator as an extension of the 
social relator, which mediates two parties involved in correlative legal positions. In 
Fig. 3, the UFO-L Legal Service Agreement Ontology from [14] is depicted. 
Complementing UFO-S and thus diagram in [14], we regard an agreement (contract) 
not as a relator of four different modes, but as a relator of entitlement and burden/lack 
reciprocal legal relators each containing pairs of legal moments (as added in the Fig. 
3). The exercising of rights and fulfilling obligations advances the phases of legal 
relators. 
In [4], the UFO grounded ontological analysis of a resource was provided in the 
enterprise architecture and ArchiMate® framework context, that defined a resource as 
“a type-level entity, capturing the role of an (agentive or non-agentive) object in a 
particular context of usage”.  
The underlying object type is restricted to an “allowed type”, and the context of 
usage is defined in the scope of a material relation (or in the scope of an event).  
The legal and the holder-specific aspect of the resource as “an asset owned or 
controlled” was also regarded, but given the context, was not revealed to enough level 
of detail required for FR. For example, the employment contract, mentioned in the 
article, in the agreement (executory) phase is usually not regarded as an asset in 
Financial Reporting.  
The economic aspect of a resource, that in an exchange, for a resource transfer or 
use, the right to receive another resource of a certain value is obtained, was outside the 
scope of that article.  
 
Figure 3. Legal Service Agreement Ontology in UFO-L. Adapted from [14]. Legal Relators added.  
2.2. Other Previous Work  
Recently, within the VMBO Workshop (see https://vmbo2018.e3value.com), there was 
a growing interest in the conceptual modeling of accounting, financial reporting, and 
economic resources, using the UFO Foundational Ontology. The models presented 
were largely based on Ijiri’s economic exchange conceptualization [18] and the REA 
Framework [15]. These efforts covered fragments of the existing FR domain, 
represented by IFRS Standards [9] and their Conceptual Framework [10] and (while 
suggesting alternative ways) were sometimes not reasonably compliant with existing 
accounting frameworks.   
To some extent summarizing these efforts, which are closely related to ours, 
Nicola Guarino in [19] admitted that “mapping the REA primitives on the UFO 
primitives was not an easy task, so that different choices were made”. Overall, the role 
aspect of the economic resource was emphasized, that is indeed true for depicting a 
role (e.g., a fuel) that an object (e.g., the oil) plays in a particular usage case (e.g., a 
transportation). However, we view the following as additionally important for FR:  
• possible exchange actions of the resource usage – functionality;  
• permitted exchange actions – rights to transfer and use resource;  
• intended exchange actions – purpose and ability to transfer and use resource;  
• the phases of such exchanges, including the levels and phases of their 
fulfillment;  
• the rights, amount, timing and uncertainty of a party to receive value from a 
counterparty, resulting from such exchanges, that from our view requires a 
complex social relator model of the economic resources (claims).  
REA ontology generally doesn’t regard Economic Resources as rights and views 
Claims as derivable, not ontological objects. Valuation related concepts are not 
explicitly regarded in the REA ontology. In [20] an attempt to bring REA ontology 
closer to accounting concepts was made, under the umbrella of UFO. While several 
choices, such as regarding resource as <<Kind>> were criticized in [19], an important 
conclusion from currency swap accounting was made about the phases: “The 
Economic Resource is typified into Phase classes according to the economic value 
specialization condition for distinguishing between Asset, Liability, Equity and Claim 
whereas this condition is considered as an intrinsic property of the resources” [20].  
However, the economic resource, in this case is the underlying object, but not the 
bundle of rights. Considering that assets are economic resources controlled by an 
enterprise, while liabilities and equity are claims against an enterprise, we introduce 
the concept of an Economic relator that has Economic Resource and/or Claim phases.  
3. Economic Phenomena  
Most accounting frameworks [10, 12] state that the objective of financial reporting is 
to provide financial information about the reporting enterprise that is useful to existing 
and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions relating to 
providing resources to the enterprise, and the assessment of amount, timing and 
uncertainty of returns to be received in exchange for their investments. FR provides 
information about the economic resources of the enterprise, claims against the 
enterprise and changes in those resources and claims. It defines Economic Resources 
as sets of rights that have a potential to produce economic benefits and Claims as 
obligations to transfer Economic Resources.  
3.1. Market Participants and Economic Exchanges  
A Reporting enterprise that operates in an economic market, plays the role of a market 
participant. Mixin market participants are enterprises and physical persons, groups of 
enterprises and physical persons, and society at large, and their high-order types. 
Market participants hold resources (claims) - economic relationships, regulated by 
norms, over underlying objects, and are valuated in a certain currency of particular 
market. Market participants are able to commit and fulfil their commitments to 
exchange use and ownership of resources (claims) they control (indebt). At a macro 
level, as for national accounts, we can depict economic exchanges as valued (money 
mediated) transactions among market participants over a year or other period. More 
specifically for FR we can observe exchanges in which a particular market participant 
is involved. Participant’s exchange efforts or other events provide value inflow and 
outflow of its resources (claims). The smallest exchange disposition inheres in a 
resource (claim). 
The contractual economic exchange process involves two market participants and 
fulfils a contract. Those performed events that cannot be ascribed to a contractual or a 
scheduled (within an enterprise) exchange, are allocated to participant’s exchange with 
society for a period. In [7] we follow UFO-S and treat exchange process as mutual 
provision of services among parties based on an Offering of interaction made by an 
offer from one of two parties, followed by its acceptance (agreement) by the 
counterparty resulting in a Contract (of reciprocal obligations and rights to exchange 
rights and the use of rights over underlying objects, for mutual benefit), that is fulfilled 
through the Exchange process.  
As in [16] exchange can be regarded as a production: “the buyer performs ‘strictly 
an act of production’, by converting stockings, for example, into money”. On the other 
hand, Ijiri [18] has used the term exchange “to mean not only exchanges in the market, 
but also exchanges in production which may be considered exchanges between the 
entity and nature”, that include internal production within an enterprise. Both 
interpretations prompt exchange generalization possibilities used in COFRIS, regarded 
as interactions of two parties. The parties can be non-related, related, or different roles 
of the same market participant.  
3.2. Economic Relators, Resources and Claims  
Economic relationships in COFRIS are represented by Economic Relators as 
extensions of Reciprocal Legal Relators. Generally, economic relationships have legal 
form, but also include constructive obligations and rights [10] built by economic 
necessity when a permitted action is in fact prohibited because of the economic loss 
consequences, nevertheless the obligation/right concept assumes a legal ontology. 
An Economic Relator or Resource (Claim) is a reciprocal legal relator between 
parties whose purpose is to mediate a potential holder’s transfer or use of rights2 over 
an underlying object, and a counterparty’s reciprocal obligation valued in money, that 
is fulfilled and manifests itself through economic exchange events (see Fig. 4).  
 
Figure 4. Economic Relators in green. Market Participants in yellow. 
                                                          
2 Includes ‘Claims to transfer and use rights’ 
Next, we define the fulfillment phases of the Economic Relator: 
• An Economic Resource represents a holder’s [rights over an object that have a 
potential to be transferred or used to the benefit of a counterparty in exchange 
for an] economic claim against a counterparty – the right to receive value 
measured in money.  
• An Economic Claim represents a holder’s obligation to transfer or use rights 
over an object to the benefit of a counterparty. 
• An Economic Resource and Claim represents a holder’s obligation to transfer 
or use rights over an object to the benefit of a counterparty in exchange for an 
economic claim against a counterparty. 
• A Recognized Asset is a present economic resource controlled by the holder 
(in the role of a creditor) as a result of past exchanges.   
• A Recognized Liability is a present economic claim against the holder (in the 
role of a debtor) as a result of past exchanges.  
For example, ownership3 of an object is a permission to use and a power to transfer the 
object rights (the use protected from third parties by claim-rights and the transfer by 
immunity) in exchange for the right to receive economic benefits, subject to agreement 
of the counterparty. In a contract there is an economic resource and a claim – 
ownership and the right to receive value.  If ownership rights are transferred, the right 
to receive value is accrued, if the right to receive value is received first, then the claim 
to transfer ownership rights is enforced.  
Resources (Claims) are offered or consensual exchange future or actual action 
participants, while Assets (Liabilities) represent holder-specific effects and dispositions 
of exchange actions.  
The Underlying object or simply a Resource is a Physical or Social Object and is 
characterized by its Functionality, and:  
• Quantity (of collective objects, but the Amount of matter, time, or value) of 
underlying objects or a feature [of part] of the object, such as kWh for 
electricity, and is regarded as additive and holds some relation with the price;  
• Place or Container that denotes the [fiat] location at [and in] which the object 
is or will be available for control.  
Usual object classification in EA [17] precludes resource (claim) classification and 
includes ownership or rights of use of tangible objects: financial, i.e., present rights to 
receive cash or other resources (e.g., cash, securities, borrowing capacity), physical, i.e. 
has an opportunity to generate an inflow of cash or another resources (plant, equipment, 
land, mineral reserves), intangible objects: technology (patents, copyrights, trade 
secrets), reputation (e.g., brand, relationships; culture), and human skills.  
An economic relator itself can be an underlying object thus modeling situations of 
power, e.g., when a debt (a right to receive from a converse holder) is transferred from 
one holder to a counterparty, or e.g., a note payable in Government bonds (an 
underlying object) gives the note holder the right to receive and the holder of the 
                                                          
3  We assume that the relation between ownership and right to receive value from an unknown 
counterparty is material, because some exchange value (probably uncertain) of the ownership rights should 
exist in society which can be assessed, e.g., as the market value or as regulated price or as entry price or as 
accumulated labor [16] or determined by a court.   
Government bonds the obligation to transfer Government bonds. The converse holder 
of the bonds is the Government, but the underlying object is a cash. A chain of 
rights/obligations to receive, transfer/exchange resources (claims) is itself a resource 
(claim). 
Timing (Condition) denotes a [due] date or period, condition, and order of expected 
entitlement of rights.  E.g., a Financial guarantee is a right of the lender to receive cash 
from the guarantor, and a corresponding obligation of the guarantor to pay the lender, if 
the borrower defaults (a condition). 
The valuation of Resources (Claims) is based at the carrying amount (for use, or 
e.g. cost-plus contracts), transaction price, or market price. The Market Price (Fair 
Value [9]) is the value of receipt rights (transfer obligations) for a transferred resource 
(claim) in an orderly exchange between market participants at the measurement date 
and could be regarded as being in consensus with society. The Transaction Price is the 
price agreed on between the parties when a contract is made and is in consensus with 
the counterparty. 
The Resource (Claim) and its features concepts are consensual and correlative – 
agreed among the holders and converse holders, contract parties, and counterparties.  
Assets (Liabilities and Equity Claims) are holder specializations of controlled 
(indebted) and recognized Resources (Claims) depicting Intended exchange actions 
and the roles in these actions (within rights) and object roles, subject to the business 
model, restrictions and capabilities of the holder, Carrying amount (Cost), Uncertainty 
(Risk), Recovery (Settlement) pattern and other holder-specific qualities.  Cost is used 
as a base for a measure of the added value of enterprise performance. 
Some examples of economic relators with corresponding legal positions:  
• A holder is at permission to use or consume the object, having disposition to 
receive (produce) benefits, valued at the carrying amount.  
• A holder has the claim-right against another market participant to exclusive 
control of the object, i.e., other market participants would have an obligation 
not to use or consume the object in any way. The violation of this right has the 
disposition to produce an enforceable claim against others, valued at the 
carrying amount or market price.   
• A holder has the power to transfer all (or some) of the rights over the object to 
the counterparty, in exchange for an enforceable right to receive against the 
counterparty, valued at the transaction or market price.  
• A holder has the immunity from the involuntary expropriation of rights over 
the object by other market participants.  
Economic Resources that are immediately consumed as transferred, for example, 
services, or not capitalized, for example, office supplies, are called momentarily assets 
in [10, 12].  Our interpretation is that in the first case there is a use of the rights, but no 
transfer of rights, and thus no assets. Likewise, liabilities are not only the “obligations 
to transfer” [10], but also could be obligations to use rights.  
Economic Resources (Claims) play two major roles in economic exchanges, they 
are factors and products of some production processes. Production, while in many 
cases being trivial (i.e. consisting of property rights transfers plus transfers of transfer 
efforts transfers), is regarded here as a contracted or scheduled performance process 
where the Economic Resources (Claims) play the role of the factors to produce (or 
combine into) another Resource (Claim) – a product. As stated in e.g., Archimate® [17] 
a product represents [rights for] a coherent collection of services and/or passive 
structure elements [goods], accompanied by a contract/set of agreements which is 
offered as a whole to (internal or external) customers.   
3.3. Resources (Claims) in a Consensual Economic Exchange  
As for other information systems, e.g., [11] one can distinguish between the standard, 
intended and scheduled, and performed processes of economic exchanges. We regard 
standard processes, involving market participants as actors, and economic relator 
participation. The exchange processes containing economic events are standardized 
through law, accounting standards and enterprise policies. These processes are 
intended and scheduled: 
• by adapting standard processes;  
• by offerings of the parties (providers) to their counterparties (customers) 
which specify the performance obligations and rights, and 
• by contracts – accepted offerings by customers (see Fig. 5).  
Legally speaking, an offering transfers power on the offeree, who by accepting it, 
creates an obligation and a right to exchange – a contract, in the offeror. As depicted 
by reified exchange events in Fig. 5, we distinguish the following contract (economic 
exchange) phases: offered, lapsed, agreed, suspended, transferor breached, transferee 
breached, realized, settled.  
 
Figure 5. The economic exchange life and affected economic relator fulfillment levels.  
The Resources (Claims) and their exchange-affected Assets (Liabilities) in addition to 
the fulfillment phases, are also characterized by above-listed exchange phases, 
complementing FR, where only recognized assets (liabilities) are presented while 
others are disclosed, but not conceptualized in CF.  
Performed processes fulfil open or closed contract and performance obligations 
(POs) by transfer or use actions. A transfer action event conveys the role of the holder 
the economic relator from a transferor to a transferee and in return accrues a right to 
receive value – an Income Right against the transferee.  
If some PO is wholly fulfilled by the transfers or uses, the Performance (Revenue 
recognition) event accrues a Revenue Right.  
If all POs of one party are fulfilled, a Realization (Receivable recognition) event 
takes place that, brings the party’s Contract relator to the Consideration Resource 
phase and counterparty’s Contract relator to Contract Claim phase. The latter implies 
that all the remaining counterparty’s now enforceable obligations to transfer should be 
settled by transfers that would conclude the exchange process.  
In general, the results of several performance processes of transfer and use actions 
are combined in economic exchanges, in order to receive rights for results of other 
performance processes of equal value. Thus, for exchange process (contract fulfilment) 
we have provider and customer action plans, each comprising of three fulfillment levels: 
contract obligation realization (consideration settlement) of the whole contract, 
performance obligation fulfilment, and fulfilment of transfer and use obligations.  
A consensual price – a right to receive value is ascribed to each obligation and is 
specified directly or as dependent on other prices, or counterparty obligation prices, or 
market prices. Higher level prices are aggregates of lower level prices, including the 
transfer of a combination effort component and the time value of money. For the 
contract as a whole provider rights value is normally equal to customer rights value.  
Contract breaches can occur for each obligation type. As a general rule we argue 
for the following:   
• If contract is in breach for the reasons other than counterparty nonperformance, 
by the transferee, the transferor has an enforceable right for all income rights;  
• If contract is in breach for the reasons other than counterparty nonperformance, 
by the transferor, the transferor has an enforceable right for revenue rights of 
all performance obligations wholly fulfilled. 
The rationale for the first case is that transferor has lost value due to the transferee, and 
for the second that, while having not wholly fulfilled the contract, the transferor has 
created the contracted performance value for the transferee.  
4. Illustration  
Example 1. As a simple example let us regard a smart vending machine that 
transparently prepares different sorts of coffee drinks. The potential customer (a Person 
or an Enterprise that has installed the machine for its employees) is addressed by the 
vendor through a touchscreen offering. When choosing the options, she comes to an 
agreement to receive a coffee drink, e.g., cappuccino, in exchange for a money transfer 
at the listed price. Next, different ingredients (factors) of the product are transferred to 
the customer – a container (a cup), milk, foaming service and finally the coffee. Notice 
that some of the ingredients are prepared internally by the vendor such as the fresh-
grind of the coffee, while others are transferred to the customer and then used for 
production, the latter being of little separate use for the customer.   
The payment could be another “process” consisting of a cash payment and change, 
or payment by credit card. If the smart vending machine is connected to a shared 
Vendor’s (and Customer’s) Information System with shared ledgers of the supplier 
contracts, a VAT reporting system, and a Banking system, by some automatic tagging 
we can have all the information in consensus and in an immutable state for Financial 
Reporting. In addition, if the vendor is leasing the vending machine, or using some 
patent, the transaction can be shared with the lessor (patent holder) for pay per use 
accrual.  
If we imagine a situation, where payment takes place after the delivery (e.g., by 
initially providing credit card details, but the actual withdrawal occurring later), she 
may order three cups of coffee, but if the coffee machine is out of some ingredients 
after the first two and a half cups (a contract breach by the transferor), she would be 
charged for the two delivered cups, because each of them constitutes a product under 
standard conditions.  
Example 2. To depict the contracts and resource (claim) exchange instances in a more 
concise way we introduce an Event Table (see Fig.6) 
EID:11 ProviderAgreement 01.01.2018 CU: k€ k€ k€
Fulfil Obligation PO Timing Control Object Qty Value Place Debited Credited Amt Place Debited Credited Amt
Contract 2018-2019 Control Hospital 1 1000 Site 1 Receivable Contract Asset 1000 Site 2 Contract Liability Payable 1000
Performance 1 2018 Control Building 1 600 Income Revenue 600 Building Construction 600
Transfer 1 2018 Service Construction 120d 600 Contract Asset Income 600 Construction Contract Liability 600
Expenses Construction 500
Performance 2 2019 Control Equipment 1 400 Income Revenue 400 Equipment PPE in Process 400
Transfer 2 31.12.2018 Control Procurement 1 300 Contract Asset Income 300 PPE in Process Contract Liability 300
Expenses Procurement 200
Transfer 2 2019 Service Installation 20d 100 Contract Asset Income 100 PPE in Process Contract Liability 100
Expenses Labor 70
Consideration 31.12.2019 Control Cash in Bank 1000 IBAN 1Contract Liability Receivable 1000 IBAN 2 Payable Contract Asset 1000
Receipt 01.01.2018 Control Cash in Bank 400 Cash in bank Contract Liability 400 Contract Asset Cash in bank 400
Receipt 31.12.2019 Control Cash in Bank 600 Cash in bank Contract Liability 600 Contract Asset Cash in bank 600
EID:12 Customer Transfer 01.01.2018 CU: k€ k€ k€
Fulfil Obligation PO Timing Control Object Qty Value Place Debited Credited Amt Place Debited Credited Amt
11 Transfer 01.01.2019 Control Cash 400 IBAN 1 Cash in bank Contract Liability 400 IBAN 2 Contract Asset Cash in bank 400
EID:13 Provider Transfer 29.12.2018 CU: k€ k€ k€
Fulfil Obligation PO Timing Control Object Qty Value Place Debited Credited Amt Place Debited Credited Amt
Transfer 1 2018 Service Construction 120d 600 Contract Asset Income 600 Construction Contract Liability 600
Expenses Construction 500
Performance 1 2018 Control Building 1 600 Income Revenue 600 Building Construction 600
EID:14 Provider Transfer 29.12.2018 CU: k€ k€ k€
Fulfil Obligation PO Timing Control Object Qty Value Place Debited Credited Amt Place Debited Credited Amt
Transfer 2 31.12.2018 Control Procurement 1 300 Expenses Equipment 200 PPE in Process Contract Liability 300
Contract Asset Income 300
EID:15 Provider Transfer 31.12.2019 CU: k€ k€ k€
Fulfil Obligation PO Timing Control Object Qty Value Place Debited Credited Amt Place Debited Credited Amt
Transfer 2 2019 Service Installation 20d 100 Expenses Labor 70 PPE in Process Contract Liability 100
Contract Asset Income 100
Performance 2 2019 Control Equipment 1 400 Income Revenue 400 Equipment PPE in Process 400
Contract 2018-2019 Control Hospital 1 1000 Site 1 Receivable Contract Asset 1000 Site 2 Contract Liability Payable 1000
EID:16 Customer Transfer 01.01.2020 CU: k€ k€ k€
Fulfil Obligation PO Timing Control Object Qty Value Place Debited Credited Amt Place Debited Credited Amt
Transfer 31.12.2019 Control Cash in Bank 600 Cash in bank Contract Liability 400 Contract Asset Cash in bank 400


















Figure 6. Economic event table for Example 2. 
In the header (in dark blue) of an economic event, we have an Event identifier (EID), 
and a Transferor type – Provider or Customer, that specifies the context. Further 
header attributes are:  
• The Resource (Claim) Transfer Event type - Offer, Agreement, [Partial] 
Transfer or Use, Performance (Revenue Recognition), Realization or 
Settlement, or  
• Asset (Liability) Revaluation or Reclassification Event type.  
Date or Period, Transaction Currency Unit, Provider and Customer identification and 
their Local Currency Units with their spot exchange Rates, conclude the event header.  
Event detail lines depict events that fulfil the contract, performance (PO) or 
transfer/use obligations identified by the referenced event and PO number, by 
transferring or using a promised resource (claim) in exchange for accruing 
consideration, revenue or income rights. The Timing, Rights (Control), Object, Quantity 
(Qty), Price, and Place concepts are described in Section 3. The Provider and 
Customer have their specific columns (in light blue) that depict the involved 
Debited/Credited Accounts and Amounts. However, those accounts should be regarded 
in the context of consensual columns (in dark blue).  
Next, we describe the events of the example depicted in Fig. 6.  
• EID:11 - An enterprise P enters into a contract to build a hospital for a 
customer C, (to fulfil some offering with EID:10), whereby P obliges to 
provide construction as a separate performance (project) within 2018, but the 
equipment procurement and installation project in 2019. The consideration for 
the whole contract comprises of a prepayment on 01.01.2018 and a final 
payment at the completion of the contract. These rights/obligations are 
depicted in the agreement details, but the effect of their fulfillment is specified 
by the planned accounts and amounts of the provider and customer. 
• EID:12 C fulfils the obligation to transfer prepayment to P’s bank account and 
accrues income claim against P for this amount.  
• EID:13 P fulfils obligation by transferring goods and services for hospital 
construction promised in the EID:11 and accrues P’s income claim of PO:1, 
thus completing the PO:1 fulfillment and recognizing revenue claim.  
• EID:14 P transfers equipment.  
• EID:15 P, by transferring the installation services, completes the PO:2 of 
equipment project that leads to overall contract fulfillment and accrual of 
consideration rights. 
• EID:16 C completes the settlement and the whole exchange by cash payment 
to P’s bank account.  
5. IASB Conceptual Framework Resource Definition Analysis  
In March 2018 IASB finally released the revised version of the Conceptual Framework 
(CF) for Financial Reporting [10]. The revised framework contains several conceptual 
improvements, including new resource (as rights that have the potential to produce 
economic benefits), asset and liability definitions. Our goal is to be reasonably 
compliant with the framework in engineering COFRIS. Another goal is to see where 
the CF could benefit from our ontological analysis. We list the following suggestions:   
Firstly, Financial reporting should aggregate transaction-centric plus enterprise-
specific, but not enterprise effect-centric information. Thus, economic exchange should 
be introduced as a unifying concept. Aggregating consensual transactions for FR, 
instead of accounts, would provide additional opportunities for comparability with 
other enterprise processes, possibilities of application of process mining methods, and 
insights into the value co-creation processes. 
Secondly, competitive consensuality (meaning that among parties there is an 
agreed shared ledger of contracts and their fulfillment, including provider and customer 
resources (claims) and required asset (liability) information) should be a quality aspect, 
even within the old context of audit reconciliations. Consensuality should be added to 
comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understandability as qualitative 
characteristic that enhances the usefulness of information that both is relevant and 
provides a faithful representation of what it purports to represent and reduces reporting 
uncertainty.  
Thirdly, correlativity in economic relationships, should be a standard-setting 
principle. The important intermediate resources (claims) of contract realization, 
performance and transfer should be defined. When correlativeness and consensus are 
not regarded as a principle, deficiencies emerge in standards already discussed by us 
elsewhere, such as concerning leases [11], contract assets and revenue [3]. 
Fourthly, Assets (Liabilities) are conceptualized only as recognized, while the 
other phases of exchange (contract), depicted in disclosures, should be conceptualized.  
And fifthly, a unifying concept of an Economic relator should be introduced. A 
partial effort in the framework has been made by defining the concept of a Unit of 
Account as a group of related rights and/or obligations. The difference is that the 
economic relator is a more atomic building block that shows the value relationship, 
from which more complex units of account such as the contract (of three levels and 
phases of fulfillment, as shown in this paper), investment portfolio, cash-generating 
unit, and enterprise as complex economic relators can be built. 
6. Conclusion  
Financial reporting standard-setting, implementation and the corresponding information 
system development is at present a partially informal and long process and, as 
exemplified by other domains, may be improved using ontology-driven conceptual 
modeling approaches. Existing foundational and core ontologies, as shown by UFO 
ontology network usage, provide upper-level patterns from foundational UFO – A, B, 
C, and several UFO grounded ontologies, such as services, legal, transaction, 
enterprise, exchange, value and even software [11], for representing FR concepts and 
relationships. 
An Economic relationship as a disposition of economic exchange events, is a 
fundamental and reuse facilitating pattern of capturing economic phenomena for FR. 
By extending the general exchange pattern it is possible to build patterns for particular 
standards to facilitate reuse. An ontological analysis allows for the explication of the 
core contract creation and fulfillment phases, economic relators – resources (claims), 
assets (liabilities) to capture the full partition of the economic phenomena which can be 
used for FR. Aligning FR concepts with UFO allows for better understanding of the 
meaning of FR concepts and their classification in the enterprise domain, for instance, 
for OMG Standards for EA. Elaboration of correlative associations between the 
enterprise and the counterparty, based on the legal and economic relator concepts, may 
lay a foundation for consensus-based accounting in a shared ledger environment, where 
the conceptualization of assets (liabilities) will reveal holder-specific and potentially 
sensitive or shareable parts for contracts and FR.  
Our first suggestions are described in Section 5, furthermore, a full validation of 
Resource (Claim) concepts of COFRIS by modeling most IFRS standards is needed.  
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A Comparative Illustration of Foundational 
Ontologies: BORO and UFO 
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Abstract. This paper investigates the differences that exist between a 3D and a 4D 
ontology. We examine these differences by comparing both ontologies through the 
metaphysical choices each ontology makes and explore the composing 
characteristics that define them. More specifically, the differences between the 
ontologies were illustrated through several modeling fragments that were derived 
from a modeling case presented at the 5th OntoCom workshop. Each of these 
modeling fragments focused on the metaphysical choices that the ontologies make 
– Essence and Identity, Relationships and Time. These comparisons highlighted the 
different ontological approaches and structures that exist between the ontologies. 
Moreover, depending on the ontology, the resulting conceptual model could differ 
substantially, confirming the impact and importance of the choice of a certain 
ontology. The observed differences between both ontologies eventually led us to 
formulate three discussion points that question the applicability of certain 
metaphysical choices in certain circumstances, and that can serve as a basis for 
future discussion or future research studies in the domain of ODCM. 
Keywords. Foundational ontologies, metaphysical choices, 3D ontology, 4D 
ontology  
1. Introduction 
Ontology can be broadly defined as “the set of things whose existence is acknowledged 
by a particular theory or system of thought” [1]. Research on ontologies has become 
increasingly widespread in the computer science community, gaining importance in 
research fields such as Knowledge Engineering, Knowledge Representation  and 
Information Modeling [2]. More specifically in the field of Conceptual Modeling, 
ontologies provide a foundational theory that articulates and formalizes the conceptual 
modeling grammars needed to describe the structure and behavior of the modeled domain 
[3]. As defined by [4], conceptual modeling is the activity of representing aspects of the 
physical and social world for the purpose of communication, learning and problem 
solving among human users. The ontological foundation in conceptual modeling 
manifests itself by means of a formal specification of the semantics of models and 
describe precisely which modeling constructs represent which phenomena. In this paper 
we shall refer to all techniques where ontological theories are applied – e.g. evaluation, 
analysis or theoretical foundation – to improve either the quality of the conceptual 
modeling process or the quality of the conceptual model, as ontology-driven conceptual 
modeling (ODCM).  
Based upon their level of dependence of a particular task or point of view, different 
types of ontologies can be distinguished and applied in ODCM [5]. In this article 
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however, we will focus solely on foundational ontologies. Different kinds of 
foundational ontologies can be adopted in order to perform ODCM. For instance, based 
upon the endurantism-perdurantism paradigm, we can differentiate between 3D and 4D 
ontologies. 3D ontologies view individual objects as three-dimensional, having only 
spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. 4D ontologies on the 
other hand see individual objects as four-dimensional, having spatial and temporal parts, 
and existing immutably in space-time [6]. While most research in ODCM has been 
performed with 3D ontologies [7], 4D ontologies have gained more popularity in recent 
years [8]–[10]. Several studies [9], [11] have already demonstrated that applying 
different ontologies can lead to diverse kinds of conceptualizations. Furthermore, the 
application of a certain ontology can ultimately even influence the model comprehension 
of the resulting ontology-driven models on its users [12].  
In order to further explore and discover the differences between adopting different 
kinds of foundational ontologies, the 5th International Workshop on Ontologies and 
Conceptual Modeling (OntoCom) dedicated their full program on this topic at the 36th 
International Conference on Conceptual Modeling. Leading ontologists and conceptual 
modelers were invited to discuss and analyze the differences between 3D and 4D 
foundational ontologies. More specifically, the workshop provided a written modeling 
case to which participants of the workshop were invited to develop an ontology-driven 
conceptual model that faithfully represents the case according to the rules and constraints 
of either the 3D or 4D ontology. 
This paper builds further upon this workshop by comparing the differences between 
the models that were composed during this workshop using both 3D and 4D ontologies. 
By comparing these models, we aim to highlight the different ontological approaches 
and structures that exist between their underlying ontologies. Moreover, we will compare 
these ontologies by emphasizing their ontological commitments and exploring their main 
characteristics. More specifically, we will focus on the ontological differences that exist 
between the BORO ontology [13] and the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) [14]. 
By comparing these ontologies, we seek to clarify and determine the differences that 
arise in the resulting conceptual models when applying a 3D or 4D ontology. We would 
like to remark that the purpose of this article is not to determine the superiority of a 
particular ontology over another, but to simply increase awareness and transparency in 
applying different types of ontologies. 
In section 2 we will briefly discuss the UFO and BORO ontology. Section 3 will 
then compare these ontologies through the metaphysical choices they make and illustrate 
the differences of these choices with certain modeling fragments from the OntoCom 
modeling case. In section 4, we will discuss the impact of these metaphysical choices, 
and also compose several questions that arose from the comparison and which can serve 
as the basis for future research. Finally, in section 5 we summarize the findings of this 
paper.     
2. The BORO and UFO ontologies 
During the OntoCom workshop, two foundational ontologies – i.e. BORO and UFO – 
were emphasized and applied for the development of the ontology-driven conceptual 
models based upon the modeling case. Comparing these two ontologies makes sense 
since they are built upon completely different paradigms – i.e. BORO is a 4D ontology 
while UFO is a 3D ontology. Since they adopt different interpretations on real-world 
 3 
phenomena, it makes them quite interesting to compare. Moreover, they were also 
developed to fulfil entirely different purposes. On the one hand, UFO was developed to 
provide sound ontological foundations for various domains (domain appropriateness) 
and conceptual clarity (comprehensibility appropriateness) of modeling languages [15]. 
BORO on the other hand, was designed to support information systems re-engineering 
and integration in a transparent and straightforward manner [13].  
BORO distinguishes three main categories [16]: Elements, Types, and tuples. Every 
object belongs to one of these categories. Elements are individual objects whose identity 
is given by the element’s spatiotemporal extent i.e. the space and time it occupies. An 
example of an element would be the person John. Types are collections of any type of 
object (in other words, objects of any of the three categories). The identity of a type is 
determined by its extension, the collection of its instances or members. For example, the 
extension of the type Persons is the set of all people. Finally, Tuples are relations between 
objects. The identity of a tuple is defined by the places in the tuple. An example is (Mary, 
John) in which the elements Mary and John occupy places 1 and 2 in the tuple, 
respectively. Tuples can be collected into types, called tuple types. An example is 
parentOf, which is the collection of all relations between parents and their children.  
UFO is a much more complex ontology, being composed of three core modules, 
namely UFO-A, an ontology of endurants (objects) [14]; UFO-B, an ontology of 
perdurants (events) [17]; and UFO-C and ontology of social entities that specializes the 
former two [18]. UFO’s most fundamental distinction is between individuals and 
universals. Universals are abstract patterns of features that can be realized in a number 
of different individuals. In UFO, the identity of universals is separated from their 
extensions, allowing, for instance, that the extension of a universal changes through time, 
as well as that two universals have the same extension at a given moment.  
A second fundamental distinction in UFO is that between endurants and perdurants. 
Endurants are individuals that are wholly present whenever they are present (e.g a ball, 
a person), whilst perdurants are individuals extended in time, through which they 
accumulate temporal parts (e.g. a football match, a party). UFO further categories 
endurants into substantials and moments. Substantials are existentially-independent 
endurants (e.g., an animal, a table), whilst moments are individuals that necessarily 
inhere in others, their bearers, to which they are existentially-dependent on (e.g., the 
color of an object, the weight of a person). In UFO, endurants can be characterized by 
both essential and contingent properties, which means that they can genuinely change 
while keeping their identity [14]. For instance, being a mammal is an essential property 
for dogs, whilst being overweight is a contingent one. Thus, no dog can change in such 
a way that it ceases to be a mammal, whilst any dog can change its weight and remain 
the same individual. Perdurants, conversely, are exclusively characterized by essential 
properties, thus they cannot genuinely change ) [17]. 
Perhaps the main differentiation between both ontologies arrives through the 
different underlying paradigms on which they define and classify concepts and 
phenomena. While the UFO ontology adopts an endurantist approach (3D), the BORO 
ontology corresponds with a perdurantist view (4D). In endurantism an individual thing 
such as for example John Doe endures through time and is regarded as totally present at 
any moment in its lifetime. In a perdurantist ontology, an individual thing perdures 
through time and is extended in time, and so can be said to be only partially present at 
any moment in time – e.g. the whole of John extends over time from his birth to his death. 
Thus, while 3D ontologies view objects only from the present and assume that the same 
object can exist over time and may be fully identified at different points in time, the 4D 
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ontological view emphasizes the continuity of objects over space-time, where these 
objects exist immutably. These differences between endurants and perdurants determine 
whether and how objects exist in different ways in the past, present and future. Or in 
other words these differences determine how an ontology is formed. In the section below, 
we will discuss the different metaphysical choices that shape the fundamentals of an 
ontology through several illustrations that are based upon the case study of the OntoCom 
workshop. Finally, since we will not cover all the concepts of both ontologies in this 
paper, we like to refer the reader for a more detailed reading of the BORO ontology to 
[13], [19] and for the UFO ontology to [14], [15]. 
3. Metaphysical Choices  
In this section, we will focus on the different metaphysical choices the BORO and UFO 
ontology make, and illustrate these differences based upon modeling fragments of the 
modeling case that was given at the OntoCom 2017 workshop. We would like to 
emphasize that these models were based upon the same case. The case itself describes 
the University domain. This domain was chosen deliberately in order to exclude any 
advantages concerning specific domain knowledge. Since most of the participants at the 
workshop were professors themselves, the University domain and its structure were 
rather well known.  
3.1. Essence and Identity 
The notion of identity and essence-defining characteristics – better known as essential 
properties in 3D ontologies – regards how the ontology assigns a principle of identity to 
its concepts and dictates whether a certain phenomenon is represented through one or 
multiple objects. For instance, in the perdurantist view, where all individual objects are 
four-dimensional and have spatial and temporal parts, objects do not (explicitly) have 
properties such as weight, height etc. Instead, their features and characteristics are 
derived from the spatial and temporal parts that are formed with other objects. Another 
example of how the notion of identity is represented by 3D and 4D ontologies can be 
demonstrated through the representation of temporary conditions such as roles, states 
and phases of an element. In a 4D ontology, John as a child and John as an adult are 
separate elements (i.e. states), that become – temporarily – part of John as a whole. 
Conversely, in a 3D ontology, John as a child is the same as John as an adult since the 
essential properties of John do not change. In a 4D ontology, John is wholly present from 
his birth to his death. John as a child and John as an adult represent temporal parts of 
John as a whole. 
To demonstrate how these ontological distinctions impact conceptual models that 
follow them, we use a simple scenario in which a person, named John, is a student at a 
given moment in time, and a professor at another. The corresponding UFO-based and 
BORO-based models are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. In Figure 1, we 
can observe that the concept of PERSON is represented as a Kind and specialized into two 
subclasses, namely the STUDENT and a PROFESSOR Roles. Note that, at the instance level 
of this model fragment, an individual can simultaneously instantiate PERSON, STUDENT 
and/or PROFESSOR. In the figure, we represent that JOHN, an instance of PERSON, 
instantiates the STUDENT Role at time t1 and the PROFESSOR Role at time t2.  
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In UFO, a Kind is a rigid category that provides an identity principle to its instances. 
By rigid category, we mean that all individuals that instantiate a given Kind must do so 
in all possible worlds in which they exist. Thus, by modeling PERSON as a Kind and 
asserting that JOHN is an instantiation, it follows that JOHN cannot cease to be a PERSON 
while he exists. Conversely, UFO Roles are anti-rigid and relationally dependent 
categories. This means that individuals instantiate them “accidentally” and in virtue of a 
relational change. Thus, in our scenario, a STUDENT is a role that a PERSON plays 
(instantiates) when related to an EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION by means of a student 
ENROLLMENT (omitted from the figure). PROFESSOR is another role which is also 
relationally depends on an EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION, but by means of an 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT (also omitted from the figure). 
The BORO representation in Figure 2 follows a rather different approach. In the 
BORO ontology, STUDENT and PROFESSOR are specializations of PERSONSTATES, which 
is an Element. PERSONS and PERSONSTATES form a relation through the tuple 
PERSONTEMPORALWHOLEPART (i.e. PERSONTP). TEMPORALWHOLEPARTS is a 
tupleType that represents relations between objects that temporarily form a WHOLEPART 
relation with one another. It is important to realize that PERSONSTATES is a different 
object from PERSONS itself and is not existentially nor relationally dependent upon it. As 
such, in this approach, collections are more like sets, and the identity criteria of the 
collection-set can be its members. In the figure, JOHN, PROFESSOR JOHN, and STUDENT 
JOHN are instances. The element ‘(JOHN, STUDENT JOHN)’ also represents an instance, 
more specifically that of a TupleType.  
Additionally, we would like to remark that we have assigned colors to the different 
objects in these diagrams in order to emphasize the nature of these entities. More 
specifically, red represents endurants, green represents relationships or tuples while 
yellow corresponds to perdurants. This differentiation in colors immediately draws our 
attention for example to the fact that how an exact same case is completely represented 
by only Endurants in UFO, while in BORO the diagram is composed out of entities that 
are either Perdurants or Tuples. Moreover, note that instances are represented with 
slightly darker shades of the color assigned to the types they instantiate – relations which 
are represented in the figures through dotted lines with the ‘iof’ label. 
 
 
Figure 1: Roles in UFO 
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Figure 2: States in BORO, based upon [16]. 
3.2. Relationships 
Similarly to the notion of identity, the metaphysical choice of both ontologies concerning 
the formation of relationships defines the way entities can become part of each other or 
separate from one another. In UFO, relationships can be distinguished based upon a 
certain meaning that is derived from the kinds of entities they link together. One concept 
in the UFO ontology – the Relator – forms an important element in relating 
entities. Relators are moment universals that represent the objectification of a relational 
property, which are existentially dependent on a multitude of individuals, as such, 
mediating them. Relators are the truth makers of the so-called material relations [20]. In 
BORO, relationships are defined as tuples that aggregate any kinds of entities. The 
identity of a tuple is defined by the places in the tuple. A tuple (or tupleType) defines the 
types that the places of its instances must instantiate. Different kinds of tuples exist. For 
instance, the wholeParts tuple represents a relation between two elements in which the 
4D extent of one element is completely contained within that of another element for the 
entire existence of both. The example of John and his brain would fit this kind of tuple. 
TemporalWholeParts tuples are a subtype of the tuple type WholeParts, and represent 
relationships of two elements in which the 4D extent of one element is completely 
contained within that of another element, but only for a particular period of time.  
To illustrate the conceptual differences that rise between both ontologies, we 
represent the modeling fragment of John being enrolled at the UGent (University Ghent) 
by the UFO ontology in Figure 3 and by the BORO ontology in Figure 4. Similar to the 
example above, STUDENT is represented as a Role, which is derived from the Kind 
PERSON. This Role is then connected with a UNIVERSITY through a Relator which 
represents the ENROLLMENT relationship. A Relator idiosyncratically binds two elements 
with one material relation and two mediation relation. While the material relation is 
directly derived from the relator, the mediation relation is a formal relation – a specific 
type of existential dependence that takes place between a Relator and the element it 
mediates. Finally, JOHN, UGENT and JOHN'S ENROLLMENT AT UGENT represent the 
instances from the Kind, Role and Relator.  
Regarding the BORO fragment in Figure 4, the enrollment between a PERSON and a 
UNIVERSITY is represented through the tuple ENROLLEDAT. A tuple can consist of two 
or more ‘places’ that define the identity of the tuple. In this case, the tuple can be filled 
with two states, on the instance level being UGENT STUDENT JOHN and UGENT HOSTING 
JOHN. We would like to remark that the order of the places in the tuple carry meaning: 
JOHN (place 1) is enrolled at the UGENT (place 2). The opposite would have an entirely 




Figure 3: Student enrollment as represented by the UFO ontology 
 
Figure 4: Student enrollment as represented by the BORO ontology 
3.3. Time 
The metaphysical choice of an ontology concerning time determines how entities begin 
and cease to exist over time, and how they define events and changes. In a 4D ontology, 
objects and relationships are represented immutably in space-time while 3D ontologies 
represent these objects and relationships in the present, with their current traits and 
characteristics. In the UFO ontology, time-related elements are represented through 
Events, which are individuals composed of temporal parts. They happen in time in the 
sense that they extend in time accumulating temporal parts. The interactions between 
events and their relationships are derived from the base relations in Allen's interval 
algebra for temporal reasoning [21]. Events can be atomic or complex, depending on 
their mereological structure. Whilst atomic events have no proper parts, complex events 
are aggregations of at least two disjoint events. This composition implies that whenever 
an event is present, it is not necessarily the case that all its temporal parts are present. 
For instance, childhood and adulthood can be considered as Complex Events that are 
composed of a series of disjoint Atomic Events.  As stated above, an element in BORO 
is defined by its spatiotemporal extent – i.e. the space and time it occupies – where the 
element extends through time and is not fully present at any instant in time (excluding 
elements with a zero temporal extent). Moreover, different segments of space-time are 
elements themselves. Consequently, a temporal slice (e.g. a second, a day or a century) 
can therefore be seen as 4D extensions. In order to represent occurrences or time intervals, 
BORO applies upper-level patterns such as ‘happensIn’ in order to represent the 
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occurrence of an element in a specific time period or instant. In fact, these happensIn 
patterns are simple wholePart tuples. Similarly, in order to represent temporal 
sequencing, BORO provides the ‘before-after’ pattern to represent such changes, which 
is essentially just a tuple.  
To exemplify the concepts of both ontologies, we display a fragment that outlines 
the situation where a THESIS DEFENSE precedes GRADUATION for UFO in Figure 5 and 
for BORO in Figure 6. As can be seen in the UFO diagram, both DEFENSE and 
GRADUATION are depicted as Events. These Events can be either atomic or complex, 
depending on the interpretation of the modeler. The before-after relation represents the 
order of the Events in which they should take place. In the BORO fragment, DEFENSE 
and GRADUATION are separate Elements. To represent the temporal sequencing of both 
Elements, the before-after pattern is applied, which relates both instances JOHN’S 
DEFENSE and JOHN’S GRADUATION. Again, the order of the places in the tuple are 
important since they determine which Element precedes the other (before-after).  
 
 
Figure 5: Temporal concepts and sequencing in UFO 
 
 
Figure 6: Temporal concepts and sequencing in BORO 
4. Discussion 
Based upon the metaphysical choices discussed above, and the different conceptual 
representations that were created from the same case study, we will discuss both 
ontologies and list several questions that can serve as a basis for future discussion or 
future research studies.  
A first distinction we can make between both models is that their overall structure 
differs rather substantially. UFO distinguishes several principal identity-bearing 
concepts – e.g. Person and University – where other concepts can borrow their principle 
of identify from (e.g. STUDENT or PROFESSOR). Between these concepts relationships are 
formed that are either represented through Relators, specialization relationships or 
simple association relationships. In BORO, we can observe an overall rather different 
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structure. In the modeling fragments, all concepts are independent elements (i.e. 
PERSONS, PERSONSTATES, UNIVERSITIES) that interact with one another through 
WHOLEPART and TEMPORALPART relationships, which are represented through tuples. 
While UFO also allows the modeling of temporal parts of event [22], the frequent use of 
WHOLEPART and TEMPORALPART relationships in BORO emphasizes the perception and 
enduring of time concerning the concepts. Additionally, the common use of STATES (e.g. 
PERSONSTATES, UNIVERSITYSTATES) also accentuates the perduring and changing 
nature of several concepts. This observation is in line with the literature involving 4D 
ontologies, where Hales & Johnson (2003) affirm that since 4D ontologies emphasize 
the continuity of objects over space-time, they are more suitable to express time-related 
concepts. Therefore, the first question we can formulate based upon the modeling 
fragments and assumptions of existing literature is the following:  
 
➢ Does the BORO application of states, wholePart and temporalPart relationships 
allow of a more systematic representation of temporal aspects of concepts compared 
to the UFO ontology?  
 
Next, adopting the BORO and UFO ontology leads to quite different outcomes 
concerning the identity of certain entities. For instance, UFO assumes that STUDENT (a 
Role) is a specialization of PERSON (a Kind). Thus, an instance of STUDENT is also an 
instance of PERSON. In BORO however, these are different elements with their own 
identity – or spatio-temporal extents – a PERSON, and STUDENT as a personState. The 
main difference here is that these objects are not related through a specialization 
relationship, but through a temporalWholePart relationship. In other words, UFO builds 
upon the intuition that a Professor is a way of being while BORO sees them as different 
things. Moreover, according to the study of [9] this differentiation in identity criteria 
would even lead to a more difficult characterization of sub-roles with the UFO ontology 
compared to the BORO ontology. On the other hand, as mentioned by [23], this paradigm 
of viewing every entity as a separate element can lead to the disadvantage that the 
ontology feels rather counterintuitive, since objects and processes are not distinguished 
and thus things that are typically regarded as objects have temporal parts.  As such, our 
second question can be defined as following: 
 
➢ In which cases is the adoption of the BORO or UFO ontology concerning the 
ontological differentiation in identity preferred to form a representation? 
 
Finally, our last question involves a more philosophical distinction, namely the modeling 
of modality – both temporal modality as well as alethic modality (i.e. modality that 
connotes the estimation of the logical necessity, possibility or impossibility) – or how 
individual objects can possibly differ and how they are extended across many possible 
worlds. This is an important feature since modeling possible or future scenarios occurs 
often, for instance in the case of not knowing the time when two parties will agree to 
their contractual obligations. In UFO, individual objects are world-indexed, meaning that 
they are part of a snapshot that is world-bound (i.e. in a particular world at a particular 
time). These objects however are not ‘locked’ inside a particular world. In UFO, an 
instance of a Kind can exist in different possible worlds as long as they keep being 
instances of that Kind. The only way that they can be re-identified as the very same entity 
in different worlds is because of the principle of identity provided by that Kind. BORO 
on the opposite adopts Lewis’ (1986) theory of possible worlds and counterparts. In 
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BORO, all objects are separate elements, and they each have counterparts in other 
possible worlds to represent such scenarios. This different paradigm in modality between 
both ontologies has already given rise to several arguments favoring the modality of a 
particular ontology. For instance, one can question if the modality in BORO is not of a 
more fragile nature. In UFO endurants are the natural bearers of modal properties, there 
exists a cross-world identity between them. Endurants can change due to the distinction 
between essential and accidental properties [22]. In BORO however, objects are 
immutable, meaning that they cannot change and as such cannot be different in any way. 
Consequently, there is no cross-world identity between objects in BORO. Moreover, 
when one would ask the question ‘What kind of changes can something undergo and still 
be the same?’, the answer for the BORO ontology would be none due the immutability 
of objects. In UFO, this change would depend on the type of entity and its composing 
properties. These arguments give raise to the doubt if BORO can properly represent 
modality, and as such we formulate our last question as follows: 
 
➢ Does the UFO ontology allow for a more appropriate representation of modality 
compared to the BORO ontology? 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we compared the differences that exist between a 3D and a 4D ontology 
according to the metaphysical choices that they make and that defines the structure and 
composition of these ontologies. More specifically, we compared the BORO and the 
UFO ontology, and investigated the differences between them through several modeling 
fragments that were derived from a modeling case presented at the 5th OntoCom 
workshop. Each of these modeling fragments focused on the metaphysical choices that 
the ontologies make, i.e. Essence and Identity, Relationships and Time. By comparing 
these models, we could highlight the different ontological approaches and structures that 
exist between these ontologies. For instance, the modeling fragments illustrated the 
intensive use of the BORO ontology of wholePart and temporalWholeParts relationships 
between entities. Moreover, practically all entities in BORO are seen as separate 
elements, while UFO distinguishes several principal identity-bearing entities (Kinds) 
where other concepts can borrow their principle of identify from (Roles or Phases). The 
observed differences between both ontologies eventually led us to formulate three 
questions that challenge the applicability of certain metaphysical choices in certain 
circumstances, and that can serve as a basis for future discussion or future research 
studies in the domain of ODCM. Moreover, future research efforts could also focus on 
comparing different kinds of ontologies (e.g. not only 3D and 4D ontologies; or other 
specific ontologies rather than the BORO and UFO ontology) or could examine different 
metaphysical choices (for instance how ontologies deal with parthood, dependency and 
unity). Finally, we would like to emphasize that the purpose of this paper was to clarify 
and determine the differences of applying different kinds of ontologies and their 
influence on the resulting conceptual models. It was not our intention to advocate the 
superiority of a certain ontology, but rather to simply increase awareness and 
transparency in applying different types of ontologies. 
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What’s the Damage?
Abnormality in Solid Physical Objects
Yi RU and Michael GRU¨NINGER
Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, University of Toronto, Canada
Abstract. The representation of damage to solid physical objects is complex in
nature. Beginning with real world usecases of partially damaged used goods, we
derive the description of damage through the approach of representing partial ab-
normality. We propose four predicates for partial abnormality corresponding to the
fundamental characteristics and parthood relationships within solid physical ob-
jects: ab portion,ab piece,ab component, and ab containment. Such parthood re-
lations and mereological pluralism concepts are drawn from the Ontology of Solid
Physical Objects (SoPhOs), a general suite of upper ontology modules we pro-
posed and axiomatized in First Order Logic. This paper reviews the SoPhOs on-
tologies that axiomatize parthood, spatial parthood and parthood connection the-
ories and the foundational matter and shape characteristic ontologies that support
them. We map the foundational solid physical object ontology to solving the prob-
lem of representing damaged goods in various domains including manufacture and
e-commerce.
Keywords. Damage, Solid Physical Objects, Parthood, Mereology Pluralism,
Ontology, Domain Application, Used Good
1. Introduction
An interesting challenge in conceptual modelling is the representation of some notion
of ideal objects and their relationship to actual objects whose properties diverge from
the specification of the ideal. Such a distinction plays a role in a wide range of applica-
tions, from manufacturing quality to commonsense reasoning with everyday objects. As
such, the distinction between ideal and actual objects can refer to an object that is simply
created in a way that violates the specification of the ideal, or it may refer to objects
that have been changed in damaged through use. The notion of damage we present in
this paper concretely arises from the representation of used goods in The Social Needs
Marketplace (SNM)[9], which is an online marketplace exchange to offer and receive
used goods for people who live under the poverty line. The match between supply and
demand of used goods requires a detailed representation for damage of solid physical
objects. However, the terminology people use for these descriptions is rife with ambigu-
ity and always ad hoc and arbitrary. It is essential to derive an applicable approach for
representing damaged goods for SNM.
From the motivating scenarios listed in the second section, we narrow our scope
to the description of partially damaged goods. The specification of damage condition
requires a comprehensive description to parthood relationships beyond mereological
monism1. The relationship between the detachable leg of a table and the table itself is
fundamentally distinct from the relationship between the table and a portion of the table
that has been chipped off. In this paper we will focus on the representation of damage
from the approach of pluralism to abnormality of solid physical objects, based on the
multiple parthood relations raised from Ontology of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs).
SoPhOs is a general suite of upper ontology modules that support the specification of the
parthood relations for solid physical objects and used goods within the scope of SNM.
Our approach falls into what is often called the family of three-dimensional rep-
resentation of physical objects, in which all of an object’s parts exist at any point in
time. This approach can also be seen in the BFO [4] and DOLCE [16] upper ontologies,
although these upper ontologies are based on a time-indexed version of mereological
monism.
2. Motivating Scenarios
Below are some scenarios that happened in SNM, and served as the motivation for the
approach taken in this paper.
• Expectant parents are looking for children’s furniture for their soon to arrive baby.
They log into the SNM portal and search for a children’s bed with complete safety
measures. The supply of children’s beds on the portal is limited returning only
two partial matches to this family’s needs. A family whose children are now of
school age is offering a single child’s bed with headboard missing, while another
family is offering a bunk style bed for twins but it is convertible into a single bed.
• A furniture wholesale store is looking to relocate its warehouse due to the increas-
ing rent, the store owner decides to mark down the selling prices heavily on most
items stored in the warehouse to reduce the moving cost. However, some items
are damaged because of improper storage or transportation, some tables have the
corners cut out, some chairs have dents on the legs, and a sofa is also broken with
filling coming out. For these items with minor damage, the store owner requests
the warehouse manager to list them up on the SNM for donation.
• A retired couple is looking to clean up their garage and donate some of their old
time favorite tablewares. Among them are a ceramic coffee mug with a handle
broken but that has interesting pattern on it, a crystal wine decanter with the de-
tachable stand missing, an emptied cookie can that could be used as a daily con-
tainer, and a dish with a chipped corner. They log in the portal and listed these
items with detailed description.
3. Ontological Commitments
The ontological commitments are semantic requirements we recognized from the moti-
vating scenarios.
1. Damage to solid physical objects is determined comparing to the design.
1Mereological monism denotes that there is a single parthood relation. Approaches based on classical mere-
ology [24] tend to use a single parthood relation to specify parthood relationships.
2. A partially damaged object can be presented in precise ways in terms of charac-
teristics of solid physical objects.
3. There are multiple parthood relations of solid physical objects, and they are all
distinct relations, each of which is synonymous with a mereology theory. Fur-
thermore, there is no taxonomy of parthood relations.
4. There is different mereology for each part, and each mereology has different
spatial ontology (radical pluralism).
5. In the scope of solid physical objects, each parthood relation is independently
axiomatized with different characteristic module ontologies.
6. Each abnormality parthood relation is associated with a distinct parthood relation
of solid physical object.
4. Ontology of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs)
The seminal work of Winston et al. [25] identified multiple relations that capture intu-
itions about parts and wholes, we follow this approach of mereological pluralism and
propose each parthood relation corresponds to a generic module of upper ontologies. We
adopt the sideways approach to upper ontologies [12], and focus on those modules that
axiomatize intuitions about solid physical objects, which is organized into the Ontology
of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs).
The design of the Ontology of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs) follows the prin-
ciple that each module of SoPhOs axiomatizes necessary conditions for solid physical
objects. We define a solid physical object as an object that is made of some material,
has some shape, and occupies some space. SoPhOs is built to expand the definition with
two modules: matter module and shape module. Each module features a characteristic
ontology in the upper ontology and gives rise to corresponding parthood relations: [por-
tionOf, pieceOf, componentOf ] for parthood on solid physical objects, and [confinedIn,
containedIn] for spatial parthood, respectively. The current design of the Ontology of
Solid Physical Objects is shown below in Figure 1 and Figure 2. SoPhOs is fully axiom-
atized in First Order Logic2.
Figure 1. Structure of Relations within Ontology of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs)
2colore.oor.net/sophos/sophos.clif
Figure 2. Module Ontologies in Ontology of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs)
Our approach can be seen as a development along the lines mentioned in Artale’s
work [3]: ”The particular behaviour of the different part-whole relations may lie, among
other things, in the ontological nature of both the whole and the part”, namely, the on-
tological nature of the whole and part are captured by the generic modules of the upper
ontology.
Definition 4.1. Let R be a binary relation, and let MR be a class of structures with
signature hRi.
The relation R is a parthood relation iff Th(MR) is synonymous with a theory in the
Hmereology Hierarchy3.
All of the parthood relations are given conservative definitions in their respective
generic ontology modules, and hence are treated as defined relations. Real world physical
examples of some parthood relation are shown below in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Physical Examples of Parthood Relations of Objects
4.1. Matter Module
A solid physical object is a material object. Matter constitutes solid physical objects and
is one of the prime characteristics we determine for solid physical objects. Under the
matter module we have The Material Object Ontology, which axiomatizes the constitu-
tion relation constitutes between Mat (matter) and MaterialObject, and defines chunkOf
as the parthood relation within matter. The Portion Ontology contains the correspond-
ing continuous parthood relation portionOf for the material objects. An example of por-
tionOf a material object is a one person portion of pizza in a whole pizza, or a bite of
3colore.oor.net/mereology
an apple is a portion of the apple. The Attach Ontology features the connection relation
attach between material objects. Incorporating the spatial parthood relation region part
from Occupy Ontology[2], the Confinement Ontology defines confinedIn to denote the
parthood relationship between two material objects that the space occupied by one ma-
terial object is in the region of the space occupied by the other material object (e.g. a
chunk of pineapple is confined in the whole pineapple).
4.2. Shape Module
The shape module of SoPhOs starts from the Feature Ontology which is an extension to
the BoxWorld[10] with ShapeFeature and featureOf. ShapeFeature is a primitive class,
it can be individual non-enclosed basic shape in BoxWorld (point/edge/surface) or the
union of any adjacent non-enclosed shape or the box. Adjacent non-enclosed shapes
are defined to be connected by at least one lower dimensional shape, as from examples
in Figure 4, (i.e. two edges that meets at a point/vertex in i, two surfaces that meet at
one edge and two points in ii, one edge and one surface that meet at one point in iv).
featureOf is primitive parthood relation for ShapeFeature, it is a predicate between one
ShapeFeature and another ShapeFeature at a higher dimension or the same dimension.
Every ShapeFeature is a featureOf itself (including points).
Figure 4. Examples of ShapeFeature
The Bounds Ontology describes the relationship between the shaped object and the
shape feature that bounds it. For the multidimensional parthood of solid physical ob-
jects regarding shape, we have Piece Ontology and Component Ontology based on di-
mensionality. We use pieceOf for shaped objects in different dimensions below or at
three-dimension, and componentOf between three-dimensional shaped objects and a set
of three-dimensional shaped objects. For instance the mug example in Figure 5, if we say
the shape feature that bounds a non-detachable handle of a mug is the two dimensional
cylinder surface s1 and the whole mug is bounded by a three dimensional box b1, then
the handle of the mug is a piece of the mug in terms of shape. However, if we are talking
about the three dimensional box b2 bounded cap and the whole mug with cap which is
bounded by a poly4 p1, we use componentOf to define the parthood between the cap
and the whole mug with cap. The cube in Figure 5 shows three instances of featureOf :
f eatureO f ( f1,b1)^ f eatureO f ( f2,b1)^ f eatureO f ( f3,b1).
Figure 5. Distinguishing featureOf and componentOf
We use affix to denote the connection between pieces, and components are
joint together, where joint is synonymous with ec (external connection) from classic
mereotopology. Last but not least, we also have containedIn to describe the spatial part-
hood when the space occupied by the shape of one solid physical object is fully enclosed
in the convex space occupied by the shape of another solid physical object (e.g. an egg
is contained in the lunch box).
5. Abnormality of Solid Physical Objects
We find it is ambiguous to take ”ideal object” as the standard for determining abnormal-
ity. In real world, a chair can be designed in multiple different styles, it can have four
legs, three legs, no legs like sofa, or one leg with four to six wheeled arms like an office
chair; it is difficult and inaccurate to determine one specific design as a general ”ideal
chair”. In contrast, we define the abnormality in terms of the intended properties instead
of type or class, and differentiate abnormality with characteristics of the object.
Reiter [22] used AB to distinguish normal and abnormal conditions in diagnosis
reasoning systems with examples of faulty circuits. We follow this approach and ex-
tend its use to abnormal conditions on solid physical objects. We propose four predi-
cates in correspondence with four of our parthood relations for solid physical objects,
ab portion, ab piece, ab component and ab containment, to denote an abnormal por-
tion/piece/component/containment of the whole in terms of standard design. We don’t
represent an abnormal confinement since the definitive nature that confinement describes
the relationship that some matterM1 located inside the space occupied by another matter
4Poly is defined as the shape of a set of three dimensional physical objects, and is considered as one dimen-
sion higher than a three dimensional box.
M2, but in terms of solid physical objects, the spatial relationship between M1 and M2
cannot be changed unless the shape of M2 is altered. We use the notion ¬Ab to describe
the condition when an object coincides with its design, that is, it is not abnormal, or
”ideal”.
Of course, some change/abnormality of characteristics will lead to inevitable change
of other characteristics. The correlation between different characteristics are shown in
Table 1. From the table we can conclude that the occurrence of ab portion, ab component
or ab containment would all result in one or more ab piece, but an occurrence of
ab piece might not cause any other partial abnormalities. The occurrence of either
ab component or ab containment would result in both some ab portion and ab piece,
but the former two are isolated from any subsequent occurrences.
Table 1. Relativeness Chart of Change for Solid Physical Objects
Resulting Abnormality new ab portion new ab piece new ab component new ab containment Examples
ab portion - Y N N Add/Remove Material
ab piece N - N N Bent, Dent
ab component Y Y - N Replaced Component
Y Y - N Add/Remove Component
ab containment Y Y N - Add/Remove Containment
It is important to distinguish our use of abnormality predicates from their earlier use
in nonmonotonic reasoning. We are not using abnormality to represent typicality (e.g. a
typical chair has four legs, a typical dining room table is made of wood, a typical book-
shelf does not have wheels). Instead, we are using abnormality predicates to specify the
intended properties of an (ideal) object, so that any divergence from the specification of
these properties (e.g. missing or spurious parts) are indications of damage. If a particular
class of chairs is designed to have three legs, then it is not considered to be damaged
when an instance of this class has three legs, even if a typical chair has four legs. On the
other hand, if a class of chairs is designed to have four legs, then an instance of this class
is indeed damaged if it is missing a leg.
6. Damage of Solid Physical Objects
In the motivating scenarios from SNM specified in Section 2, we need to describe par-
tially damaged object (i.e. a bed with the headboard missing, a mug with the handle bro-
ken or a chipped dish), where the ”partially damaged” here might have different mean-
ings: partially missing, partially broken, or material partially removed. We apply ab-
normality to scenarios of damages. A standard design of My Chair with three legs is
represented in Axiom (1)-(3) as in Figure 6 below, showing the intended properties of
components, pieces and portions respectively.
Axiom (4)-(8) in Figure 7 below showed example representations of damaged chairs.
C1 denotes an replaced leg resulting an abnormal component;C2 denotes a dent in one leg
of a three-leg chair resulting an abnormal piece; C3 denotes one leg missing; C4 denotes
when there is an extra leg; last but not least, C5 denotes some additional matter is added
to the chair.
Each class of solid physical objects is axiomatized by sentences of the form seen
in Figure 6. By using the abnormality predicate Ab, we allow the existence of objects
MyChair(x)  (¬Ab(x)
⌘ (9y1,y2,y3)Leg(y1)^Leg(y2)^Leg(y3)^ (y1 6= y2)^ (y1 6= y3)^ (y2 6= y3)
^componentO f (y1,x)^ componentO f (y2,x)^ componentO f (y3,x)
^((8z)componentO f (z,x)  z= y1_ z= y2_ z= y3)) (1)
Leg(x)  (¬Ab(x)
⌘ (9y1,y2,y3)bottom(y1)^ side(y2)^ top(y3)^ (y1 6= y2)^ (y1 6= y3)^ (y2 6= y3)
^pieceO f (y1,x)^ pieceO f (y2,x)^ pieceO f (y3,x)
^((8z)pieceO f (z,x)  z= y1_ z= y2_ z= y3)) (2)
MyChair(x)  (¬Ab(x)
⌘ (9y)Mat(y)^ constitutes(y,x)^ ((8z)portionO f (z,x)⌘ chunkO f (z,y))) (3)
Figure 6. Tmychair: Representation of Standard MyChair Design
MyChair(C1)^Leg(L1)^Leg(L2)^Leg(L3)
^ab component(L1,C1)^ componentO f (L2,C1)^ componentO f (L3,C1)  Ab(C1) (4)
MyChair(C2)^Leg(L4)^Leg(L5)^Leg(L6)
^component(L4,C2)^ componentO f (L5,C2)^ componentO f (L6,C2)
^Dent(P1)^Bottom(P2)^Side(P3)^Top(P4)
^ab piece(P1,L4)^ pieceO f (P2,L4)^ pieceO f (P3,L4)^ pieceO f (P4,L4)  Ab(C2) (5)
MyChair(C3)^Leg(L7)^Leg(L8)^ componentO f (L7,C3)^ componentO f (L8,C3)
  Ab(C3) (6)
MyChair(C4)^Leg(L9)^Leg(L10)^Leg(L11)^Leg(L12)
^ab component(L9,C4)^ componentO f (L10,C4)^ componentO f (L11,C4)^ componentO f (L12,C4)
  Ab(C4) (7)
MyChair(C5)^ constitutes(M1,C5)^ chunkO f (M2,M1)^ab portion(M2,C5)  Ab(C5) (8)
Figure 7. Tchairexample: Representation of Damaged MyChair Examples
in a class even if they do not satisfy the conditions for the ideal object in that class;
inconsistency is avoided since such an object is simply an abnormal instance of the class.
Furthermore, we can use the parthood relations in SoPhOs to identify the nature of the
abnormality – missing matter vs. spurious matter, missing shape feature vs. unintended
shape features, missing components vs. extra components.
Recall the motivating scenarios mentioned in Section 2, we can now help the SNM
users to describe the damages in used goods (the actual terminology can be more user-
friendly and easier to interpret by daily users, depends on the wording selection of the
application designer):
• The expectant parents can eliminate the single children’s bed with missing
headboard by adding a filter to their request that map into the category with
¬ab components.
• The warehouse manager can list the tables with corners cut out and the chairs
with dents on the legs in the category of ab piece, and the sofa is broken with
some ab portion forms came out.
• The kind retired couple can donate the ceramic coffee mug with a handle broken
as an entry with ab piece, the crystal wine decanter with the detachable stand
missing as with ab component, the emptied cookie can as having ab containment,
and the dish with a chipped corner as havng either ab portion or ab piece.
7. Relationship between Previous Work and Our Work
Our representation of damage follows Reiter’s[22] approach of abnormality and applies
it to solid physical objects. There are limited previous studies that proposed a complete
representation of damage for solid physical objects, but there are a few approaches for
constructing an ontology of physical objects.
Many representations of solid physical objects involve time as a fourth dimen-
sion. Bennett[5] founds the representation to physical objects on a theory of the spatio-
temporal distribution of matter types and proposes a characterization of various de-
grees of physical damage based on this theory. In the book that proposed his Four-
dimensional Ontology of Physical Objects[14], Heller argues that physical objects are
four-dimensional hunks of matter and that objects like chairs do not exist. To realize the
application in SNM however, we need the existence of such physical entities of tables
and chairs to describe the motivation scenarios. We do not consider time as a charac-
teristic or dimension in SoPhOs at this stage, and consider all of an object’s parts exist
at any point in time. Other upper ontologies BFO [4] and DOLCE [16] also follow this
approach but they are based on a time-indexed version of mereological monism.
Some three-dimensional representations to physical objects define by matter and
space. In Borgo’s approach, the concrete existence of physical object is determined by
the material object that is a piece of matter and occupies a region of space. [7] One
could say that SoPhOs is following the definition of stratified ontology5 Borgo adopted,
where the distinct classes of parthood relations correspond to different identity criteria
of characteristics of solid physical objects, and the ontological dependencies among the
criteria of characteristics are explicit. However, resulting from the difference in scope,
SNM requires further mereological pluralism beyond matter and location.
Existing studies in mereology usually either have a single part-of relation to
summarize all parthood relations as mereological monism following the classical
mereology[24], or adopt a taxonomy of parthood relations that all other parthood rela-
tions are specializations or sub-relations of a general top level part-of relation. This is
5Stratified Ontology is denoted as ”an ontology where classes corresponding to different identity criteria are
kept carefully disjoint and represent the roots of separate hierarchies called strata, and where the ontological
dependencies among strata are made explicit.” [7]
not a viable approach if we are to support application domains such as damage represen-
tation in SNM. The earliest work in this area was by Winston [25], who presented a tax-
onomy of part-whole relations as specializations of a general part-of relation. Winston’s
approach was informal, and was based on a series of examples that motivated the types
of parthood relationships. Later, Odell[20] also proposes six parthood relationships. De-
spite the lack of axiomatization, these taxonomies are not specific to physical objects and
not suitable for our practice for SNM. Upper ontology SUMO [19] contains the relation
part as a spatial relation and a set of other relations that specialize it. In more recent
work, Keet [15] introduced a taxonomy as summarization of Odell’s approach to types
of part-whole relations, and also provided OWL axiomatizations of the taxonomy. How-
ever, to solve our problem in SNM, the taxonomy approach cannot adequately capture
the relationships between the different axiomatizations. Bittner and Donnelly [6] have
also presented an axiomatization that follows mereological pluralism, and which does
not strictly adhere to a taxonomy of parthood relations. Nevertheless, they still use a
general PP relation which does not itself correspond to any generic ontology for objects,
and the other two parthood relations are not grounded in a generic ontology.
This paper continues the approach of characteristic upper ontologies modules sup-
ported multiple distinct parthood relations from Ru and Gru¨ninger[23].
8. Future Research
Ideally, we want to incorporate the Process Specification Language[13] to describe the
process from before to after of a damage, and map the occurrence of damage to the re-
pairing process. Some further topics that would be interesting to look at is the determina-
tion of whether a damaged physical object is still functional at a certain degree, and if it
regains its full functionality after repair. One potential solution to this problem is a scale
of condition of damage in terms of functionality. Another direction of future research
would be water damage. Different types of water damage can lead to varies results, just
to name a few, matter can be changed due to chemical reaction, shape can be altered due
to resolving and liquidizing, or neither matter or shape is changed but the water damage
creates electronically malfunction from short circuit. Damages due to both environment
and time are also on future research. Hardening and color changing of form are mostly
due to wear out over time, rust on metallic items are also typically resulting from ex-
posure of oxygen and moisturizing environment over time. Future work on SoPhOs will
include a surface module ontology to capture color and surface damage such as stains
and scratches.
9. Conclusion
What’s the damage? We can now represent both the chair with a dent in one leg and
the mug with a handle broken with having abnormal pieces comparing to their intended
properties. Starting from the motivating scenarios of partially damaged furnitures from
Social Needs Marketplace, we have proposed a representation of damage deriving from
partial abnormality. We have described the abnormality of solid physical objects based
on the Ontology of Solid Physical Objects (SoPhOs), a general suite of upper ontol-
ogy modules we proposed and axiomatized in First Order Logic. SoPhOs is a com-
plete system of ontologies featuring the characteristic parthood, spatial parthood, part-
hood connection theories, and the foundational matter and shape characteristic ontolo-
gies that support them. We employ the approach of mereological pluralism, in which
each mereological relation corresponds to one characteristic of the solid physical ob-
ject, and the characteristics are formalized in different modules within an upper ontol-
ogy. Damage of used goods can be represented in terms of the partial abnormal char-
acteristics. We have introduced four predicates for partial abnormality corresponding to
the fundamental characteristics and parthood relationships within solid physical objects:
ab portion,ab piece,ab component, and ab containment.
The current framework presented in this paper is able to represent different condi-
tions of partially damaged objects and solve the scenarios raised in SNM. This domain
will also serve as a testbed for identifying new concepts in upper ontologies required for
the representation of damages in everyday objects.
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Towards an Ontology of
Categories and Relations
Frank LOEBE 1,2
Computer Science Institute, University of Leipzig, Germany
Abstract. Categorization and association are fundamental for our understanding
of the world, for which reason notions such as category, individual and relation
are of major importance, for applied and formal ontology as well as for concep-
tual modeling. Several of the available foundational ontologies consider those no-
tions at the meta level (only) and focus on individuals as their overall domain. This
notwithstanding, we see a need for establishing well-founded ontological theories
of categories and relations within the field of applied ontology, not at least as a
foundation for conceptual modeling.
In this paper we report on our work on an ontology of categories and relations
(and cognate notions), abbreviated CR, which is intended to serve as a module for
foundational ontologies. The approach has its background in the development of
the General Formal Ontology (GFO) as well as in ontological semantics, a novel
account of establishing semantics for representation or modeling languages on the
basis of ontologies. The conceptual foundations of the ontology are introduced and
we present initial axiomatization efforts.
Keywords. ontology, foundational ontology, top-level ontology, meta ontology,
category, relation, relator
1. Introduction
Ontologies continue to be on the advance in many areas. Creating ontologies means to
analyze a certain domain of interest in terms of the conceptual constituents by means of
which the ontology is going to be formed. The major basic constituents of most ontolo-
gies today are categories and relations.3 This is not surprising, as categorization / clas-
sification4 and association are fundamental for our understanding of the world. Accor-
1Correspondence Address: Augustusplatz 10, 04109 Leipzig, Germany
Email: frank.loebe@informatik.uni-leipzig.de
2Parts of this submission are based on sections of [1] that have not been presented nor published elsewhere.
3Especially at this point, we assume only a rather weak semantic import of the words ‘category’ and ‘rela-
tion’. There are various alternative words / denominations in the literature that may be used for what we intend
to refer to by those two, while one must be aware that all those denominations come with several more speci-
alized readings in distinct contexts. Examples, ordered alphabetically, of alternatives for category are ‘class’,
‘concept’, ‘kind’, ‘notion’, ‘term’ (in a semantic reading), ‘type’ and ‘universal’. For relation, there are ‘as-
sociation’, ‘property’ and ‘role’, among others. However, note already that ‘role’ is used to refer to another
important notion herein, which is most closely related with relations.
4We use the word ‘categorization’ as a synonym of ‘classification’ herein. However, we employ only ‘ca-
tegory’ for a broadly conceived notion of instantiable entities. ‘Class’ is reserved for several notions that
dingly, they rank equally important in formal and applied ontology. We see it as a (if not
the) central task of ontological analysis of any subject to address the questions of “Which
(categories of) entities are there?” and “How are those entities interrelated?”.
Basically the same questions – we claim – are likewise present, at least implicitly,
in almost all modeling enterprises. They are thus of similarly central nature for concep-
tual modeling, in particular, and for modeling in computer and information sciences in
general. There the notions of category and relation frequently appear together among
the very basic concepts of modeling approaches – of course, with varying terminology.
For example, John Mylopoulos [3] reports that one novelty in M. Ross Quillian’s pro-
posal of semantic networks [4] was to organize the information base in terms of ‘con-
cepts’ and ‘associations’ [3, p. 131]. He further points out the distinction of ‘entities’
and ‘relationships’ in Peter P. Chen’s Entity-Relationship (ER) model [5]. From both,
semantic networks and ER models, it seems to be only a short step in this regard to the
Ontology Definition Metamodel (ODM) [6,7] and its meta model foundation, the Meta
Object Facility (MOF) [8,9], which includes ‘classes’ and ‘associations’. Altogether, we
see strong evidence for the fundamental importance of categories and relations, such that
a well-founded theory of these notions appears desirable.
Categories and relations are further two highly generic/abstract notions, which leads
us to top-level ontologies (TLOs) as well as to meta ontologies. TLOs are ontologies
concerned with notions of very high generality, typically aiming at entities that appear
in a large number of domain-specific areas. A meta ontology should provide notions that
serve to characterize the constituents of an ontology and their interplay, which frequently
also relates to language constructs that are employed in representing ontologies. The
preceding considerations that categories and relations account for basic constituents of
ontologies may thus suggest a meta-ontological nature of themselves, cf. also [1, sect.
2.3.3] and [10]. Indeed, for a number of the available TLOs the choice was made to focus
solely on individuals/particulars5 as entities that are subject to categorization and to being
interrelated. But thereby categories and relations are used in many cases without a well-
founded ontological understanding, which, we argue, should be developed. Especially
if one aims at TLOs that are capable of classifying / covering all entities whatsoever,6
analyzing category and relation as such remains an immediate (top-level) ontological
problem, the solution of which may affect meta-ontological investigations nevertheless.
The overall goal of our work is to establish an ontology of categories and relations,
which involves further cognate notions resulting from the analysis. There is a direct con-
nection to the field of top-level ontologies, on the one hand, and to meta-ontological and
semantic considerations, on the other hand. First of all, the project has emerged in the
much wider context of constructing the General Formal Ontology (GFO) [11,12,13], see
also [1, sect. 1.1.5]. GFO includes category and relation in its taxonomy, but that part
still lacks an elaborate axiomatization yet. Hence we aim at proposing a corresponding
ontology as a module for GFO. Due to the high degree of abstraction, it will be rather
independent of other GFO specificities and may therefore be considered (1) in combi-
arise in specific contexts in information and computer sciences, e.g. concerning the Semantic Web [2], object-
orientation, and mathematical set or class theory.
5These two words are used interchangeably herein, albeit in-depth philosophical analyses may allow for dis-
tinguishing differing understandings. The term logical individual, however, leads to formal logic and Tarskian
model theory, where it refers to a member of the universe of a formal model / interpretation structure.
6Surely, limitations based on the current state of science and knowledge apply.
nation with further TLOs and (2) as an ontological foundation for, primarily, meta mo-
deling. The latter point has yet another intimate connection, namely to a novel semantic
account that we propose in [1], called ontological semantics.7 In a first step, such a se-
mantics is intended to be defined for languages for ontology representation, before it can
be extended to representations in general via translations. That first step requires itself an
ontology to start from, which leads back to meta-ontological and meta-modeling issues.
In this paper we report on preliminary work in progress towards an ontology of cate-
gories and relations, named/abbreviated CR. The conceptual foundations of the ontology
are elaborated in sect. 2. Sect. 3 first summarizes a partial formalization which utilizes
description logic / OWL2, which covers primarily a taxonomic fragment of the ontology.
Secondly, a short preview on an axiomatization in first-order logic (FOL) is included. A
discussion, also comprising some pointers to related work, is given in sect. 4 before the
paper concludes with sect. 5.
2. Basic conceptions of categories and relations
2.1. Preliminary considerations and desiderata
Before expounding the view of categories and relations as it constitutes CR, let us high-
light some aspects that have an impact on developing the ontology. First of all, for both
notions there is a large amount of material available in philosophy, cognitive science,
computer and information sciences as well as in further areas that aims at defining or
characterizing these notions. The amount becomes vast if we broaden the scope to lite-
rature which uses one or both notions or which is otherwise closely linked to them or
just to aspects that one could consider in order to develop an ontology of categories and
relations. Surveying even a fragment of this body of work deserves its own publication
and cannot be accomplished herein. Therefore we present the subsequent theory of ca-
tegories and relations without delivering a prior state of the art, while we shall mention
connections to a very focused set of approaches in sect. 4.
That variety of literature comes along with an actual variety of differing views and
understandings of categories and relations, e.g., cf. the analysis in [15] of seven of the
many positions on the ontological status of categories within the philosophical literature.
One intention that we should stress at this point is that especially for categories we are
rather interested in a weak theory, such that various more specialized notions can fit
under the CR notion of category. For relations we adopt a more specific account which
involves relation instances (called relators) that are composed of roles. This approach is
already present in very early versions of GFO, where it was limited to so-called material
relations. Besides finding the overall approach of role-based relations with relators very
flexible and powerful, cf. e.g. [16, sect. 3.3], we drop that limitation and extend the
approach to all relations.
Another guiding aspect is the desideratum of establishing a theory capable of self-
reflection / self-analysis. More precisely, categorizing and interrelating the constituents
of CR should not require additional notions that are not already covered by CR. That
desideratum results from the more influential aim to eventually utilize the ontology in
7It is not in any form closer related to the Ontological Semantics by Sergei Nirenburg, Victor Raskin and
others [14], an approach for meaning extraction and representation from natural language texts.
the kind of “bootstrapping account” of semantics that is presented as ontological seman-
tics in [1, ch. 4]8. We cannot sufficiently sketch ontological semantics here, given the
spatial limitations. But such a self-reflective ontology can serve as a starting point for an
ontological semantics, where certain notions of the ontology would serve as primitives
in defining the semantics. This is not only another motivation for a clarified account of
categories and relations, but it likewise yields a connection to meta-ontological matters,
which is briefly reconsidered in sect. 4, with CR already available. Yet, for all subse-
quent sections one should keep in mind that all constituents of CR are also subject to the
intended domain of discourse of that theory.
As a final note, we admit that the phrase “ontology of categories and relations” may
cause expectations to find an in-depth classification or taxonomy of kinds of categories,
relations or further constituents of the theory. To counteract such expectation, let us state
already that this is not the case, although occasionally we draw inspiration from having
special cases in mind. But first of all, herein we are interested in the notions (which
we deem relevant) in themselves and an axiomatic characterization of them. A limited
taxonomy emerges on that basis nevertheless, yet substantial extensions, e.g. analyzing
different kinds of categories, remain future tasks.
2.2. Entities, categories, individuals and instantiation
In the domain “surrounding” the term ‘category’, we first identify four principal notions,
namely entity, category, individual, and instantiation, depicted together with major inter-
dependencies in Fig. 1.9 As a kind of minimal consensus for categorieswemerely require
that they are subject to being instantiated10, hence to the instantiation / categorization
relation in a specific way. This relation, in Fig. 1 shown as the UML association named
by the double colon :: (as in the FOL formalization of CR), links entities to the categories
that they instantiate. In this connection an entity is called an instance11 of a category. Re-
membering the intent to constrain categories as weakly as possible, no assumptions are
made regarding the degree of generality of categories. Insofar they can be very specific,
e.g., (for another ontology than CR) as determined by the phrase “female lion that lived
in South Africa between 1994 and 1999”, or they can be highly abstract categories as in
top-level ontologies.
Indeed, entity is the category that is instantiated by anything as soon as that any-
thing exists. Existence is thereby understood in the broadest conceivable sense, following
GFO’s recourse to, a.o., Roman Ingarden and different modes of existence [19]. Conse-
quently, literally everything is an instance of entity, i.e., entity is a universal category.
8Alternatively, [17] outlines the general approach much more compactly, with core ideas already present in
that earlier state of development.
9We employ class diagrams of the Unified Modeling Language version 2 (UML2) [18] solely for visualiza-
tion purposes, assuming that the constraints so specified can be easily grasped by the reader. However, at the
latest with hindsight of the overall conception of CR, we interpret the diagrams within CR itself.
10Note here already that “being subject to” does neither imply that every category is instantiated, nor even
that it can possibly be instantiated, because neither non-instantiated categories are to be excluded, nor such
that cannot be instantiated at all, like ‘round square’.
11The UML rolenames (following the terminology as in [18, p. 576 ff.], although ‘association end name’ is
official for UML2) can better or only be explained after some parts of sect. 2.3. Besides the mnemonic parts
of the role names, it may suffice here that the suffix ‘RL’ stands for ‘role’ itself and the difference between
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Figure 1. Entities, Categories and Individuals in CR.
Thus categories cannot only be instantiated, but they are instances themselves. Not
at least, any category instantiates the category Category (indicating a technical CR name
by this font), which may be in conflict with one or another TLO. In line with many TLOs,
however, CR includes (also) individuals / particulars, i.e., entities that are instances of
categories, but are not subject to being instantiated themselves. Entity is partitioned into
categories and individuals, which entails that every entity instantiates either Category or
Individual. In contrast, it is not enforced that categories must have any instances.
Considering instantiation anew, the above paragraphs imply that CR yields no stra-
tified nor well-founded account of instantiation. Without further restrictions, there may
be instantiation chains of arbitrary length, as well as instantiation cycles. For example,
we subscribe to the facts that Entity instantiates Entity (cycle of length 1), and that Entity
instantiates Category and Category instantiates Entity (length 2). This is not too uncom-
mon in applied ontology and possibly even more accepted in knowledge representation
and the Semantic Web, cf. e.g. the notion of Resource in the Resource Description Fra-
mework (RDF) [2, ch. 2–3]. Without room for going into details (cf. [1, sect. 2.4.2.3]
for a bit more), this affects relationships between CR and set theory, for instance, if the
notion of the extension of a category is considered, defined as the set of all and exactly
the instances of this category. Then, relying on a wellfounded set theory, not every cate-
gory may be equipped with a proper extension, or one adopts an alternative set-theoretic
approach, such as non-wellfounded set theory [20].
A related and here final aspect is that of comprehension axioms for categories, which
may easily lead to inconsistency of the theory, e.g., in analogy to Russell’s paradox [21].
At the present stage we expect to circumvent corresponding problems by not adopting
any axioms for category comprehension for CR.
2.3. Relations, relators, roles and non-relating entities
As already indicated in sect. 2.1, the part of CR on relations is more specifically de-
termined than the deliberately weak theory of categories. The basic view on relations
combines a positionalist account12 with one of individualized properties. More precisely,
relations in CR are categories which are instantiated by individuals, called relators, that
are composed of roles and that have the power of relating / mediating between / gluing
together arbitrary entities. Relators establish the relation that they instantiate between the
entities / arguments / relata that they connect. At the categorial level, one may consider
different kinds of relator categories, but relations are special insofar that they capture the
connecting character of their instances among the entities related.
12See [22, esp. sect. 3.2] for a condensed exposition of that stance within conceptual modeling, with pointers
















Figure 2. Relations with role base notions and corresponding categories of individuals. A C at the end of a
name stands for category. Instantiation applies at the categorial level here, e.g., relators instantiate relations.
To discuss a concrete example and at the same time to demonstrate a case that is
commonly seen as a formal relation (which holds immediately as soon as the relata are
given), we consider in the domain of natural numbers that 1 is less than 2, commonly
written 1 < 2. Analyzing this fact in CR, we can first distinguish four entities, namely
the numbers 1 and 2, the less-than relation <, and a particular relator r< instantiating <
and mediating particularly between 1 and 2. With just that relator available, it is not clear
in which – potentially distinct – ways 1 and 2 participate in the relation.
This is accounted for by roles (and so-called base role categories at the level of ca-
tegories / relations), of which there is one per argument. Roles are individuals that can
be seen as parts of relators, although within CR we name that relation role of, symbo-
lized by ￿ in the FOL formalization, or has role, denoted by ￿, in inverse reading.13
In the example, r< is composed of two roles, say, qg and ql. However, (grasping) the
“semantics” / “nature” of the two regarding < relies on specific role categories that they
instantiate. Indeed, the overall semantics of < depends on determining role categories
such that relators composed of roles of those categories adequately reflect in which way
each single argument participates in the relator (and thereby / loosely speaking, “in the
relation”). We say in such cases that a role category is a base role category for a relation.
For < let us name its base role categories less and greater.
Another connection is required to / from a role w.r.t. the corresponding argument
of the relator, e.g., from ql to 1. This connection is called plays / plays role / fills role,
with the FOL predicate symbol ￿ (or ￿, if read reversely). To conclude our example
coherently, we need 1 ￿ ql and 2 ￿ qg . Overall, the role analysis of 1 < 2 yields
the subsequent formula, where all #· denote constant symbols with the same intended
meaning of categories or relations as the predicate symbols without the prescript, thus
reifying the latter (cf. also sect. 3).
r< :: #< ^ ql :: #less ^ qg :: #greater ^ 1 ￿ ql ^ ql ￿ r< ^ r< ￿ qg ^ qg ￿ 2
Meanwhile, not only are the three fundamental relations for CR introduced, namely
instantiation, role-playing and role-having, but the bottom layer of Fig. 2 is already cove-
13Importantly, this inversion is merely one of expressing the relation in a linear language, while ‘role of’ and
‘has role’ refer to the very same relation, from a positionalist stance. Cf. also [23, esp. sect. 4.1] on this aspect.
red by the preceding paragraphs. Even base role categories are mentioned above, yet they
deserve further consideration. They capture the different ways / kinds in which entities
may be involved in the specific relation, contributing to the comprehensibility of a rela-
tion. Their name originates from the notion of a role base for a relation, which comprises
not only the base role categories, but possibly further constraints, cf. [1, sect. 2.4.3.3].
Here we restrict ourselves to considering the additional categories BasePlayerC and
BasePlayerAbleC in Fig. 2, which should be less common (even under different names),
but are likewise informative w.r.t. relations as well as useful in expressing certain con-
nections. All three kinds of categories result from a trichotomy derivable from understan-
ding role notions. Take ‘instance’ as an example, already introduced above, and observe
that the role name near Entity in Fig. 1 is instanceRL, where RL abbreviates ‘role’. First,
‘instance’ may be said to be a role / base role category itself (and thus an appropriate
UML rolename). If CR is applied to instantiation itself, indeed, there is an instance role
within any instantiation relator, which is played by the entity that instantiates something
in virtue of that relator. Secondly, in r< :: #< we would say that r< is the instance. From
this point of view ‘instance’ is rather a category of (primarily) non-role entities that actu-
ally stand in the instantiation relation (to other entities). This categorization is one from
the point of view of the relation. For that reason we use instanceRL for the role category,
reserving ‘instance’ for the players of that role / base role category. Thirdly and associa-
ted with common domain and range specifications for relations, there is the question of
which entities are at all subject to playing a role of a relation. That question can typi-
cally be given an answer from the point of view of the relation or the role. For example,
all entities that can be instances are ‘categorizable’. Everything that can be instantiated
is ‘instantiable’. These are cases of BasePlayerAbleC. Note that those are always role-
or relation-based categories, in contrast to categories of role- and relation-independent
entities. Claiming that Instantiable is equivalent to Category then yields that all and only
categories are subject to being Instantiated, i.e., to playing the InstantiatedRL. Table 1
accounts for key components of the role bases of the three fundamental CR relations.
Relation BaseRoleC BasePlayerC BasePlayerAbleC Category
:: InstanceRL Instance Categorizable Entity
:: InstantiatedRL Instantiated Instantiable Category￿ PlayerRL Player PlayerAble Entity￿ PlayedRL Played Playable Role￿ RoleRL RoleRole RoleBeAble Role￿ ContextRL Context RoleHaveAble Relator
Table 1. Role base notions of instantiation (::), plays role (￿) and role of (￿), following Fig. 2. The suffix C
in three column heads stands for ‘category’, RL in the base role column originates from ‘role’.
3. Towards formalizing the theory CR
Our primary aim in formalizing CR is to develop its axiomatization in first-order logic
(FOL). Beforehand, we started with a partial axiomatization in description logic (DL).
For the purposes of this paper, all formalizations are solely considered under standard
set-theoretic semantics.
3.1. Taxonomic fragment in OWL
The informal exposition of CR involves a number of14 categories in intertwined ways.
Therefore we focused on the taxonomy first, limited to DL and by utilizing Protégé [25]
as OWL2 editor equipped with the HermiT reasoner [26,27] in version 1.3.8, for a first
check for potentially unexpected effects.
The corresponding theory in DL is presented in [1, App. B, p. 281–283], such that
we do not include specific DL axioms here. Moreover, this version of the ontology is
available as an OWL2 file, see [24]. It is worth noting that this DL version does not
include any self-reflection of CR, for example, no DL individuals intended to reify CR
categories and/or relations. A corresponding extension is a future task for further testing,
while the present version may be more amenable for reuse in other ontologies.
Still, some observations about this version of CR appear to be of interest. First of all,
the reasoner succeeded in classifying the ontology file without reporting inconsistency of
the overall file, and without detecting incoherent, i.e., unsatisfiable DL concepts. A larger
fragment of the resulting classified taxonomy of CR is depicted in Fig. 3. It still includes
some auxiliary notions that turned out useful in the course of the axiomatization. In
particular, we expect that the categories Relating (orange; the union of Role and Relator)
and NonRelating (blue; the complement of Relating relative to Entity / OWL Thing) are
widely usable, e.g., as NonRelating is silently assumed in many cases of referring to
Individual. Two major partitionings of Entity are (1) that into categories and individuals
as in Fig. 1 and (2) that into non-relating entities, roles and relators.
14Indeed, not all categories discussed in [1, sect. 2.4 and 6.1] or contained in the OWL file cr-dl.owl


















Figure 3. Taxonomy fragment of selected CR categories, as classified by HermiT [26]. Bold-face labels are
representatives of groups of equivalent named categories. Colors provide only a vaguely defined grouping.
Overall, Fig. 3 corresponds well to our expectations. Yet there is one result that was
not immediately obvious from the DL axioms, because it grows out of the domain and
range constraints of CR relations and some axioms about the notions introduced as role
bases of those relations, cf. Table 1. In summary, the reasoner concludes the subsequent
(extensional) equivalences among CR categories. Each line corresponds to one of those
nodes in Fig. 3 labeled in bold face. Although this high number of equivalent categories
may seem awkward for an ontology in general, inspection shows that all of them are (in
the light of CR) reasonable cases of intensionally distinct, but coextensional categories.
Entity ⌘ Categorizable ⌘ Instance ⌘ PlayerAble ⌘ Player (1)
Category ⌘ Instantiable (2)
Relator ⌘ Context ⌘ RoleHaveAble (3)
Role ⌘ Playable ⌘ Played ⌘ RoleRole ⌘ RoleBeAble (4)
3.2. Signature ⌃CR and preview on axioms in FOL
The axiomatization in first-order logic (FOL) is still in a preliminary stage, first of all.
It follows the ideas of ontological semantics [1, ch. 4–5], which implies some metho-
dological specialties. Nevertheless, all formulas specified in this section can properly be
considered under classical set-theoretic semantics. We consider three binary relations of
CR as fundamental relations, which are the only ones that are solely axiomatically cha-
racterized. These relations are instantiation (::), role playing (￿) and role having (￿),
where those symbols are binary predicate symbols that are used in infix notation.
Every other CR notion is first reified by a logical constant symbol and thus subject
to the domain of discourse.15 Moreover, predicate symbols are typically introduced for
convenience, but all of them must be “explained” by being equipped with a so-called
predication definition, intended to fix the “semantics” of atomic formulas with that pre-
dicate. Notationally, like in sect. 2.3, we adopt the convention to let reifying constants
be preceded by # . For example, if Ent is a unary predicate symbol intended to denote
the CR category Entity, then #Ent is a logical constant for which there is the same intent.
Pred(·) denotes all predicates of / in the argument, Const(·) all constant symbols, ar(·)
the arity of its argument.
Subsequently we specify a very limited, selective preview on the FOL axiomatiza-
tion over the signature ⌃CR. Formulas that are / were intended as axioms, but are already
shown to be entailed by others, are kept in the list of “axioms” / formulas, yet numbered
with prefix C (with references to entailing formulas in their description), whereas the




P (x)$df x :: #P | P 2 Pred(⌃CR), ar(P ) = 1
 
(uniform predication definitions for all unary predicates)
D2. Ent(x)$df 9y . y = x (x is an entity :iff x exists)




#P 6= #Q | #P, #Q 2 Const(⌃CR) (any two constants refer to distinct entities)
A2.
 9x . P (x) | P 2 Pred(⌃CR), ar(P ) = 1 (all ⌃CR categories are instantiated)
C1.
 
Cat(#P ) | P 2 Pred(⌃CR), ar(P ) = 1 
(categorization of constants as categories [A2, D1, A4])
C2. Ent(x) (everything is an entity [D2])
A3. ¬9x . Role(x) ^ Relator(x) (role and relator are disjoint categories)
A4. x :: y ! Ent(x) ^ Cat(y) (instantiation relates entities with categories)
A5. x :: y ^ Relation(y)! Relator(x) (instantiation of relations yields relators)
A6. x :: y ^ RoleCat(y)! Role(x) (instantiation of role categories yields roles)
A7. x ￿ y ! Ent(x) ^ Role(y) (plays relates entities with roles)
A8. x￿ y ! Role(x) ^ Relator(y) (role-of relates roles with relators)
A9. Relator(x)! 9y . Relation(y) ^ x :: y (every relator instantiates   1 relation)
A10. x￿ y ^ x￿ z ! y = z (the relator of a role is uniquely determined)
C3. x￿ y ! (¬9u u￿ x) ^ (¬9v v ￿ y) (role-of is a single-step relation [A3])
C4. (9y . y :: x)! Cat(x) (if an entity is instantiated, it is a category [A4])
C5. Ent(x)$ 9y . Cat(y) ^ x :: y
(every entity instantiates a category [C2, D1 for Ent, A4])
Admittedly, this is just a minimal selection of axioms, primarily demonstrating some
axioms resulting from the reification aspect and then focusing on constraints of the fun-
damental relations. One can observe that some assumptions on the reifying constants
have already effects on those relations. More of that can already be found in [1, sect.
6.1.2], e.g., where most of the common properties of orderings turn out not to be satisfied
by instantiation, based on few axioms, a.o., having entity as a universal category.
The full theory is still under development. This goes in tandem with working on a
consistency proof for the FOL theory.
4. Discussion and related work
With CR we aim at a theory of categories and relations that is well-suited as a foundation
for the semantics of languages as well as for other ontologies. The latter aspect concerns
meta-ontological capabilities of CR, i.e., CR notions lend themselves to an ontological
analysis of the constituents of ontologies. That aim of serving as a foundation for other
ontologies is as broad as to cover arbitrary ontologies, including CR itself. It is therefore
pursued by proposing a self-contained / self-analytic theory. As may be clear from the
sections above, all notions of CR are themselves considered to be in the intended domain
of discourse of the theory, such that, for example, all CR constituents can be categorized
by CR categories. Moreover, literally all relations of CR are subject to the same analytic
account based on relators composed of roles. This applies even to the three fundamental
binary relations, cf. the discussion of that aspect in [1, sect. 2.4.4.3 and near the end of
sect. 6.1.2]. A price to be paid for this is that CR is subject to infinite regresses, which
lead not only to infinite (logical) models of the full theory, but which are often considered
as harmful, if not necessary to be avoided. Unfortunately, we lack the space herein to
argue in detail against necessarily seeing a problem with the particular regresses that
occur, on philosophical, but also logical grounds. At least, we accept them in favor of
the – for us – very attractive feature that CR does not rely on any additional assumptions
nor on any kinds of entities that are considered solely external to the theory or that are
declared to be not analyzable.
A few words remain to be devoted to related work. Focusing on applied ontology
and existing ontologies first, we mention the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) [28]
as the TLO with the most elaborate accounts of categories and relations that we are
aware of. Therefore, UFO is the prime candidate for an in-depth comparison after CR is
fully established. A few other TLOs cover notions that CR deals with, as well, e.g., the
Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) [29].
In the domain of conceptual modeling, we see two closely related lines of research.
Admittedly, only recently having become much more clearly aware of the abundance of
modeling and meta modeling approaches involving a positionalist account of relations
(and thus roles), see e.g. [22, esp. sect. 3.2], one may consider to what extent CR might
yield novel contributions conceptually, for instance, remembering the discussion of base
role, base player and base playerable categories, and / or whether it may serve as a foun-
dation for ontology-driven conceptual (meta) modeling, e.g., in the sense of [22]. Simi-
larly, we see a connection to fairly recent work on multi-level modeling such as [30], as
CR allows for complex categorization levels.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we argue for the striking importance of well-developed accounts of catego-
ries and relations and the remaining need to establish formal ontological theories for this
subject matter. We are in the process of working on one candidate theory, abbreviated as
CR. Primarily its conceptual approach is elaborated herein to some extent, following [1],
accompanied by reports on the status of our formalization efforts.
Not surprisingly, we consider CR as a promising approach, while that largely re-
mains a claim herein. Our next steps comprise of completing the first-order axiomatiza-
tion and its meta-theoretic analysis. Afterwards or possibly starting in parallel, it will be
instructive to apply and relate CR not only to itself, but to other ontologies as well as in
the foundation of conceptual modeling.
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Three Facets of Roles
in Foundational Ontologies
Fumiaki TOYOSHIMA 1
Graduate School of Advanced Science and Technology, JAIST, Japan
Abstract. Roles remain such a nebulous concept notwithstanding its ubiquity in a
wide variety of domains, including conceptual modeling, that no clear consensus
exists over the nature of roles in the foundational ontology research. In this paper I
argue that there are three closely intertwined, but conceptually separate role-related
notions: a role specification, a role position, and a role performance. I further con-
tend that different accounts of roles might depend on which of the three concepts
takes priority over the other two. Additionally I propose that there be three possi-
ble interpretations of the ontological nature of roles, each of which requires care-
ful cost-benefit analysis: a family resemblance concept, a functionally definable
concept, and a practically unifiable concept.
Keywords. role, foundational ontology, grounding, specification, family resemblance
1. Introduction
The notion of role is present in a number of different domains, ranging from knowl-
edge representation [1] and conceptual modeling [2] to cognitive science and linguistics.
Accordingly there is a high demand for a common definition of role that would helps
us address the problem of semantic interoperability among information systems [3]. To
meet this need, roles have been extensively researched in formal ontology for the last
few decades and virtually all foundational ontologies nowadays have the role category.
The role concept nonetheless remains so elusive that the understanding of role can vary
greatly from one foundational ontology to another.2
Intimately connected to this topic is the extant issue of whether a single definition
of role is possible [3]. Despite some attempts to define roles explicitly (e.g., [2,6]), for
instance, Loebe [7, p. 144] says: “there is no single kind of roles, and no unique kind of
entities on which roles depend.” If the answer to this question is no, then the challenge
to be met is (how to build a model for specifying) how roles are to be individuated or
1Corresponding Address: Graduate School of Advanced Science and Technology, Japan Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST), 1-1 Asahidai, Nomi, 923-1292, Japan; E-mail:
fumiaki.toyoshima@jaist.ac.jp, fumiakit@buffalo.edu.
2For instance, Guarino [4, p. 14] says: “I have been always fascinated by the subtle aspects of this notion
[role], and by its ubiquitous relevance for practical applications. (...) It is not a surprise therefore to see roles
appearing in BFO [Basic Formal Ontology [5]], but their characterization as realizable specifically-dependent
continuants reflects a very peculiar understanding of the role notion which, although useful, would require a
broader framework.” Note that we will later look at the BFO conception of role.
classified. Some noteworthy related studies (e.g., [8]) notwithstanding, it is still largely
unexplored how a certain theory of role is connected to the meta-ontological choices [9]
behind the general ontological background against which the theory is constructed.
In this paper I endeavor to investigate the nature of role from the perspective of
foundational ontology. To do so, I leverage the notion of grounding that has been re-
cently developed in the field of philosophical ontology. As we will see below, ground-
ing is supposed to specify how some phenomena (e.g., a table exists) hold in virtue of
more fundamental phenomena (e.g., subatomic particles are ‘arranged table-wise’) and,
quite importantly, to be closely linked to the notion of explanation (which may be called
‘ontological explanation’) in philosophical ontology.3
More specifically, I consider what grounds the concept of role-playing that is central
to the general discussion on role. This work amounts to an attempt to seek an adequate
explanation of role-playing, thus leading to a better understanding of role. It is found on
close examination that there are three notions (which I call the ‘role triad’) that ground
role-playing: a role specification, a role position, and a role performance. Defying easy
analysis, each of the role triad is to be elucidated by analogy and with examples.
Then I hypothesize that different accounts of role might hinge on which of the role
triad is ontologically prior to the other two concepts. To illustrate this, I explore three
theories of roles and which element of the role triad each theory take to be primary. I
further clarify that and how each theory’s ‘role choice’ is conceptually firmly glued to
the (meta-ontological choices of) foundational ontology on which the theory is based.
I finally suggest that there be three possible interpretations of the nature of role: a
family resemblance concept, a functionally definable concept, and a practically unifiable
concept. As will be detailed below, each of them has both advantages and disadvantages.
For instance, a family resemblance conception of role lacks practical virtue while it is
arguably most theoretically tenable. All these findings will contribute to bridging the gulf
between foundational investigation into the nature of role and and modeling processes
associated with roles in various application domains.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers some preliminary knowledge on
basic ontological assumptions and grounding. Section 3 presents and elucidates each of
the role triad. Section 4 illustrates, with three selected accounts of roles, the relationship
between meta-ontological choices in foundational ontologies and their ‘role choices’.
Section 5 proposes three possible understandings of the nature of role. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper with some brief remarks on future directions of research.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basic Ontological Assumptions
Since this paper is partly devoted to comparative analysis of foundational ontologies, I
assume only the basic categories and relations that are relatively widespread in founda-
tional ontologies. Concrete individuals (which exist in space and/or time) fall into two
types: continuants (aka endurants) such as objects and occurrents (aka perdurants). Char-
acteristically, continuants can persist, whereas occurrents extend through time. Continu-
ants (e.g., a stone) can participate in occurrents (e.g., a fall of the stone).
3I borrow the expression of the form ‘arranged X-wise’ from van Inwagen [10].
I stipulate throughout the paper that roles are continuants, since roles are most fre-
quently take to be a special kind of properties (in the broad sense of the term) in the
relevant literature on role (e.g., [6,11]). I also assume that a role is a continuant to be
played by something (player), since the notion of role-playing is generally thought to be
a key to a deeper understanding of the nature of role.4
2.2. Grounding as a Conceptual Tool
As a conceptual tool for my investigation, I exploit the notion of grounding that is sup-
posed to provide ontological explanation.5 In particular, I employ its most standard ver-
sion: fact-grounding [16,17]. According to this doctrine, grounding is a relation between
the more fundamental fact and the less fundamental fact. For instance, the fact that a
table exists is grounded in the fact that some subatomic particles are arranged table-wise.
This theory is typically coupled with the claim that the notion of grounding is (a kind
of) ontological explanation (e.g., [17]). In the example of the table, the latter fact grounds,
and ipso facto explains ontologically, the former fact.6 In addition, the grounding relation
is strict partial ordering (i.e. irreflexive and transitive), as the received view [18] goes.
To be concrete, I will examine which fact grounds the fact that Mary is a student,
given that a student is paradigmatic example of a role. For the sake of simplicity I intro-
duce the notation ‘<>’ to refer to facts: e.g., <Mary is a student>. More specifically, I
will consider which fact grounds <Mary plays a student role>, which is plausibly taken
to ground<Mary is a student>. The gist of my argument is that there are three candidate
facts which correspond to the role triad and which ground <Mary plays a student role>
and, by the transitivity of grounding, <Mary is a student>.
3. Three Facets of Roles
3.1. Role Specification
What grounds <Mary plays a student role>? In order to be a student, Mary must gain
admission to the university (say ‘ABC-U’) of her choice. To attain this goal, she needs
to read and understand the admission policy and then make an effort to satisfy all its
requirements. Mary’s role-playing has, in this respect, a deontic or normative dimension.
This observation may lead us to interpret role-playing as meeting the constraints or
conditions that are ‘embedded’ in the role. In my terminology, role-playing in this sense
is meeting a role specification, or the specification that is determined by the role. There-
fore <Mary plays a student role> is grounded in <Mary meets a role specification>.
I appeal to the notion of specification to capture the above-mentioned normative fea-
ture of role. The ontological nature of a specification remains obscure, but Turner [19]
argues that a specification is something that has “correctness jurisdiction over an arte-
4As we will see in Section 4, however, Basic Formal Ontology [5] exceptionally specifies the role-having
relation, but not the role-playing one [12, p. 58].
5For an introduction to the general notion of grounding, see e.g., Schneider and Correia [13], Trogden [14],
and Raven [15].
6The proponent of this view might argue that, just as some kind of causal explanation is given merely by
stating the causal relation (what causes what), so some kind of ontological explanation is given merely by
stating the grounding relation (what grounds what) [15].
fact” [19, p. 147]. By ‘correctness jurisdiction’ Turner means that the specification places
“empirical demands on the physical device” [19, p. 144]. If an artifact is not built to a
specification, then the artifact is defective with respect to that specification.7
A role specification is thus well understood with an analogy with artifacts (cf. [21]).
In the U.S., for instance, an aircraft has to satisfy the strict specifications laid down by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This means that an aircraft-like aggregate
of mechanical parts is not an aircraft unless it is built exactly to the FAA specifications.
Similarly, Mary fails to play a student role (and to be a student) unless she meets the role
specification (admission requirements) given by ABC-U.
Not surprisingly, the specification view of role-playing fits well with the notion of
social role (e.g., president) because a specification is determined by our intentionality.8
To paraphrase in my framework, <Mary plays a student role> is grounded in <Mary
meets a role specification>, which is in turn grounded (via a complex chain of grounding
relations) in some relevant social facts: e.g., <ABC-U is nationally authorized>.
3.2. Role Position
There is nevertheless another candidate for what grounds <Mary plays a student role>.
As an ABC-U student, Mary can use various facilities and enjoy educational opportuni-
ties (e.g., taking classes). Seen from another perspective, she locates herself, in playing
a student role, in a specific situation where she can do something role-related.
Following this intuition, one may think that Mary’s role-playing consist in her oc-
cupying the kind of special place (which I call a ‘role position’) that allows her to do
something that is associated with the role. For this reason one may say that<Mary plays
a student role> is grounded in <Mary occupies a student role position>.
A role position can be elucidated by an analogy with a relative place [22]. Given
the Newtonian conception of absolute space, both absolute places and relative places
persist and may be occupied by various (material) objects at various times. Unlike abso-
lute places (which are parts of absolute space that are independent of objects), relative
places stands in fixed spatial relations with one or more objects (reference objects [22]).
Examples include places in and around a ship whose reference object is the ship.
A role position is like a relative place. Role positions stand in a fixed conceptual
relation towards one or more entities (which I call ‘role reference entities’ and which
are sometimes called ‘context’ in the literature [7,23]).9 In playing a student role, Mary
occupies the student role position that exists relative to ABC-U.
The analogy between role positions and relative places offers an interesting inter-
pretation of the alleged relational nature of roles [3,6,11]. One salient feature of relative
places is that they may move relative to one another when their reference objects move
relative to one another. Using Donnelly’s [22] example, when a ship moves relative to the
7Duncan [20, pp. 16-17] illustrates this point: “For example, if I build a physical implementation of a stack
and the device does not allow me to add and remove items from the top of the device, my device is defective
relative to the specification of a stack.” It is also well worth noting his ontological interpretation (which I do
not present owing to spatial limitations) of Turner’s conception of specification based on some categories taken
from Basic Formal Ontology [5].
8Turner [19, p. 147] says: “Our intentional stance determines what we take to be the specification: something
is a specification if we give it normal force over the construction of an artefact.”
9I am using the term ‘conceptual’ in the very broad sense of the term. It may be argued that the partisan of
role positions is responsible for clarifying the relationship between them and their role reference entities.
earth, places with the ship as their reference object (e.g. the ship’s hold) move relative to
places with the earth as their reference object.
Similarly, role positions may ‘conceptually move’ (e.g., changes their related func-
tions) relative to one another when their role reference entities ‘conceptually move’ rel-
ative to one another, although the notion of conceptual movement is currently a place-
holder and it is to be further clarified. For instance, when a human resource department
changes its importance with respect to its company, personnel director role positions
(whose role reference entity is the human resource department) change their relationship
with executive role positions (whose role reference entity is the company).
The positional view of role-playing has two characteristics. First, it would lead to a
classification of roles according to what role reference entities are and what the ‘occu-
piers’ of role positions are (e.g., [24]). Second, and reasonably, it meshes with the notion
of relational role (e.g., the lover and the lovee in a love relationship). This is supported
by the observation that an ontological commitment to relational roles presupposes posi-
tionalism, according to which “the distinction between the claims made in, for example,
‘Abelard loves Eloise’ and ‘Eloise loves Abelard’ is explained by differences in the roles
(or positions) attributed to the relata” [25, p. 80, my emphasis added].10
3.3. Role Performance
There is yet another possibility for what grounds <Mary plays a student role>. As said
above, Mary can do many things (e.g., getting a student discount) because she is an
ABC-U student. A clearly visible difference between Mary and non-ABC-U students is,
for instance, that she is able to acquire a degree from ABC-U, whereas they are not.
This consideration may result in the idea that Mary’s role-playing resides essentially
in her role-related performance, or rather her ‘power’ to do something role-related.11 I
say that, generally speaking, role-playing in this sense is giving a role performance. Thus
<Mary plays a student role> is grounded in <Mary gives a student role performance>.
It is important to note that a player of a role (performance) has only to possess the
role-related ‘power’ instead of actually demonstrating it, although I use the phrase ‘give a
role performance’ for the sake of simplicity. In playing a student role, Mary does not need
to use any facility or take any class; she only needs to be able to do them.12 In this sense,
the notion of a role performance may be intimately related to deontic powers [28,29] in
the context of social ontology.
On the one hand, the performance view of role-playing would be easier to under-
stand than the other two approaches discussed above, since it is explicable in terms of an
analogy with the intuitively less complicated notion of ‘power’ than a specification or a
relative place. On the other hand, the onus is on the proponent of this view to pin down
10See Marmodoro and Yates [26] for an introduction to ontology of relations. See Fine [27] for a critique of
positionalism (which he formulates). See also Donnelly [25] for a revised version of positionalism.
11Boella, Torre and Verhagen [3, p. 5] say: “(...) behavior should not be disregarded as a main feature of
roles.”
12Strictly speaking, Mary would have to comply with the rules and regulations imposed by ABC-U in order
to play a student role. It could be therefore argued that, in general, a player of a role needs to give some sort of
role performance, however trivial it may be.
precisely the interrelationship between a role performance and its intimately related con-
cepts: e.g., dispositions, functions, and capabilities.13
4. Case Studies
4.1. A Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE)
Masolo et al. [6] propose a general formal framework for social roles in compliance with
a Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) [37]. The
basic idea is that social roles are (social) concepts which are defined by descriptions and
which, in virtue of those descriptions, classify in a time-relative way continuants (other
than concepts; which I will henceforth omit to mention). In other words, a social role is
a concept that classifies continuants at time t in such a way that they satisfy at t ‘all the
constraints stated in the description’ of that concept.
A concept and a description both fall into the DOLCE category of non-agentive
social concept: “an endurant that: (i) is not directly located in space and, in general,
has no direct spatial qualities; (ii) has no intentionality; (iii) depends on a community of
intentional agents, e.g., a law, an economic system, a currency, an asset ...” [6, p. 272].
Furthermore, some basic features of descriptions are offered as follows [6, p. 271]:
• descriptions are created by (communities of) intentional agents at the time of their
first encoding in an expression of a ‘public’ (formal or informal) language
• different expressions (possibly in different languages) can be associated to the
same description, provided they have the same semantic content. I.e., descriptions
have a unique semantic content
• descriptions must be encoded on (possibly multiple) physical supports [Origi-
nal footnote: “Printed or recorded texts obviously count as physical support, but
memory or other cognitive processes should probably be considered as well (think
of orally transmitted tales, rules and contracts)”]
• descriptions are usually accepted (adopted) by (communities of) intentional
agents, but a description can exist even if no one accepts it, as long as it remains
encoded; acceptation can change in time
• descriptions cease to exist when their last physical support ceases to exist
It is not hard to see that the approach by Masolo et al. to social roles pivots around
a role specification in the role triad. My notion of role specification coincides with the
DOLCE notion of description. Both of them are based on agents’ intentionality and aim
to specify how continuants should be like by satisfying the constraints provided by the
role specifications and the descriptions, respectively.
On my view, the choice by Masolo et al. of a role specification is not only because
they focus primarily on social roles but also because they take DOLCE as a general
13On dispositions: see e.g., Mumford [30] and Molnar [31] for a general introduction to dispositions. See
Ro¨hl and Jansen [32] for a formal application of dispositions to the (biomedical) ontology research. On func-
tions: see Ro¨hl and Jansen [33] for a survey of theories of functions in philosophy as well as in formal ontology.
On capabilities: see Daniel [34] and Smith [35] for an ontological (dispositional) approach to capabilities in
accordance with Basic Formal Ontology [5]. It is interesting to note Wahlberg’s [36] claim that deontic powers
may be sometimes mistakenly identified with dispositions (causal powers).
ontological setting. DOLCE claims to represent the categories with a clear cognitive bias
that are associated with, e.g., human cognition and socio-cultural artifacts.14 In the role
triad, a role specification is arguably the most cognitive and linguistic element.
4.2. General Formal Ontology (GFO)
Loebe [7] provides a general account of roles in alignment with General Formal Ontol-
ogy (GFO) [38]. According to his basic role model, an entity (player) plays a role such
that that role bears the role-of relation with a context. This view of role centers on a role
position in the role triad, as evidenced by his explicit reference to the notion of context,
which I take to be a role reference entity as a key term for a role position.
Loebe also offers a classification of roles according to the kinds of the player, role-
playing relation, the role-of relation, and the context. This is, as said above, characteristic
of the positional view of role-playing. Roles fall into social roles and abstract roles, the
latter being in turn classified into relational roles and processual roles.15 Processual roles
are, roughly, roles that are participated in (played) by objects and that bear the parthood
(role-of) relation with occurrents (context).16 For instance: “When John moves his pen,
he and the pen form participants of that process, and the processual role which John plays
captures what John does in that participation” [7, p. 135].
The GFO theory of role would deal better with abstract roles than social roles.17 This
can be seen as a consequence of GFO’s choice of a role position in the role triad. As was
above pointed out, relational roles are well treated with a role position, whereas social
roles with a role specification.18 Processual roles are sufficiently characterized in terms
of a role position because they consist in having occurrents as role reference entities.
Finally, part of the reason why the GFO account of role is committed to a role po-
sition may lie in GFO’s meta-ontological choice of what it calls ‘integrative realism’.
14“Regarding the content of the ontology, the aim of DOLCE is to capture the intuitive and cognitive bias un-
derlying common-sense while recognizing standard considerations and examples of linguistic nature. DOLCE
does not commit to a strong referentialist metaphysics (it does not make claims on the intrinsic nature of the
world) and does not take a scientific perspective (it is not an ontology of, say, physics or of social sciences).
Rather, it looks at reality from the mesoscopic and conceptual level aiming at a formal description of a partic-
ular, yet fairly natural, conceptualization of the world” [37, pp. 279-280].
15Loebe [7, p. 137] explains abstract roles as follows: “Due to their similarity, relational and processual
roles are subsumed by a role type called abstract roles which is contrasted with social roles. Abstract roles can
be functionally characterized in a uniform manner, namely as a mechanism of viewing some entity - namely
the player - in a defined context, i.e., in a more complex entity with interrelated other “notional components”.
Put differently, players of abstract roles are looked at in an external manner in contrast to viewing them as
self-contained entities focusing on their internals like their properties or parts.”
16I am using the word ‘roughly’ because, assuming the type level, a player of a processual role is the GFO
notion of persistant and its context is the GFO notion of process. See Herre [38] for details on those GFO
categories. This does not have much bearing on my argument, however.
17Loebe [7, p. 136] says: “Social roles appear to be the least understood role type in our model. For instance,
switching to role-of, we must admit that contexts remain fairly obscure for social roles.”
18Loebe [7, pp. 137-138] says: “(...) encouraged by the diverging ontological categories of contexts, we
believe that it will be hard to find further commonalities, especially between abstract and social roles. It may
thus be difficult to add much more to a general theory of roles, at least as long as a similarly broad range
of examples is to be covered.” Loebe [7, p. 154] also says: “In our opinion, it turns out that the aspects of
abstract and social roles are intermingled in the literature, especially concerning relational and social roles.” I
would submit that the same roles (e.g., student roles and professor roles) are interpretable in terms of a role
specification as well as in terms of a role position.
Herre [38, pp. 303-304] elucidates this doctrine by comparing it with what he calls
‘Smithian realism’ [40] (which I will below discuss): “No definition for reality represen-
tation is provided. This fundamental gap can never be closed without the use of concepts,
i.e. there is no representation of reality without concepts.”19 By my lights, one advantage
of a role position would be to afford us a moderate stance on ontology, disentangling us
from a forced choice between pure conceptualism (cf. [39]), which would lead to a role
specification, and robust realism, which would lead to a role performance.
4.3. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) defines a role as follows: “A realizable entity that (1) ex-
ists because the bearer is in some special physical, social, or institutional set of circum-
stances in which the bearer does not have to be, and (2) is not such that, if this realizable
entity ceases to exist, then the physical make-up of the bearer is thereby changed. A role
is thus always optional” [5, p. 184].
A realizable entity is: “A specifically dependent continuant entity that has at least
one independent continuant as its bearer, and whose instances can be realized (mani-
fested, actualized, executed) in associated processes of specific correlated types in which
the bearer participates” [5, p. 183]. A specifically dependent continuant is then: “A con-
tinuant entity that depends on precisely one independent continuant for its existence. The
former is dependent on the latter in the sense that, if the latter ceases to exist, then the
former will as a matter of necessity cease to exist also” [5, p. 185].
The BFO conception of role clearly focuses on a role performance in the role triad.
An entity a plays a role because, for an external reason, a has a BFO-role which is unique
to a and which can be realized in the kind of occurrents (typically a’s behaviors) in which
a participates. For instance, Mary is a student in virtue of her student role that can be
realized in, for instance, her behavior of taking classes.
BFO’s ‘role choice’ would be primarily motivated by its meta-ontological adoption
of ontological realism: “The realist methodology is based on the idea that the most effec-
tive way to ensure mutual consistency of ontologies over time and to ensure that ontolo-
gies are maintained in such a way as to keep pace with advances in empirical research
is to view ontologies as representations of the reality that is described by science. This
is the fundamental principle of ontological realism” [40, p. 139]. In the role triad, a role
performance is arguably most likely to be the object of empirically scientific inquiry.
I make two further comments on BFO-roles that would help us understand better
the relationship between meta-ontological choices and their related ‘role choices’. First,
BFO specifies the role-having relation, but not the role-playing relation: “An entity is
sometimes said to play a role, as when a passenger plays the role of a pilot on a commer-
cial plane in an emergency, or a pyramidal neuron plays the role occupied by a damaged
19Herre [38, p. 305] further elucidates integrative realism as follows: “the nodes in an ontology are labeled
by terms that denote concepts. Some of these concepts, notably natural concepts, are related to invariants of
material reality. Concepts are represented in individual minds and are founded in society. The same is true for
individuals to which individual concepts correspond. The interrelations between universals, concepts, symbols
and society are realized by various relations, including the relation of correspondence (between concepts and
universals, and individual concepts and real individuals), the relation of representation (between concept and
individual mind), the relation of foundedness (between concept and society), and the instantiation relation. We
summarize that the restricted view of Smithian realism cannot be an ontological-philosophical foundation for
the field of conceptual modeling and, in particular, for computer-science ontologies.”
stellar neuron in the brain; but neither the person nor the pyramidal neuron have those
roles. BFO 2.0 only specifies the has role relation” [12, p. 58].
Seen from the viewpoint of grounding, the former ‘pilot-role fact’ and the latter
‘neuron-role fact’ are better grounded in <A passenger meets the pilot role specifica-
tion> and <A pyramidal neuron occupies the stellar neuron role position> than <A
passenger gives the pilot role performance> and <A pyramidal neuron gives the stellar
neuron role performance>, respectively.
BFO’s specification of the role-having (but not role-playing) relation implies that
BFO-roles focus primarily on a role performance, but neither a role specification nor a
role position. Using theMary-student example,<Mary plays a student role> is grounded
in<Mary gives a student role performance>, which is in turn grounded, within the BFO
framework, in <Mary’s student role is (can be, more precisely) realized>.
Second, it is suggested that some usages of the term ‘role’ be covered in another way
than BFO-roles: “The term “role” can, however, be used in a different sense in contexts
such as Jane’s being the seventh person to fill the role of director of this institute, or Joe’s
being the third person to play a particular role in a play. “Role” in this sense is being
used to designate what BFO calls a generically dependent continuant” [5, pp. 100-101].
A generically dependent continuant is: “A continuant that is dependent on one or
other independent continuants and can migrate from one bearer to another through a pro-
cess of copying. We can think of generically dependent continuants as complex contin-
uant patterns either of the sort created by authors or designers or (in the case of DNA
sequences) brought into being through the processes of evolution” [5, p. 179].
It is not hard to see a close conceptual affinity between the BFO notion of gener-
ically dependent continuant and the DOLCE notion of description. It could be argued
that a DOLCE-description is the sort of BFO-generically dependent continuant that is
connected to agents’ intentionality. In this respect, BFO attempts to ground, e.g., <Jane
fills the role of director of this institute> and <Joe play a particular role in a play> in
<Jane meets the director role specification provided by this institute> and <Joe meets a
role specification provided in a play>, respectively.
5. Three Conceptions of Roles
5.1. Family Resemblance Concept
All the arguments given above would reveal the ontological nature of role: roles are
family resemblance concepts [41, Section 3]. As shown above, there are equally plausible
facts in which <Mary plays a student role> could be grounded. This means that there
is no single privileged concept of role; the role notion is merely partly unified by the
role triad. Moreover, different meta-ontological choices in foundational ontologies lead
to different choices in the role triad. Granted that those meta-ontological choices are
equally reasonable from a theoretical perspective, so are the associated ‘role choices’.
The family resemblance view of role is a direct consequence of the present work
and it is arguably most convincing. It lacks practical virtue, however. As said, there is
considerable need for formalizing this cross-disciplinary notion in order to conceptualize
the world coherently. However theoretically tenable it may be, it would be of little help
for actual modeling processes to say just that roles are family resemblance concepts.
5.2. Functionally Definable Concept
I said that <Mary plays a student role> is grounded in either <Mary meets a student
role specification>, <Mary occupies a student role position>, or <Mary gives a student
role performance>. Instead of taking a family resemblance view of role, one may then
attempt to offer a functional definition [42] of the role-playing concept.
The core part of my argument over role can be simplified as follows:
For any an (individual) entity x, if x plays a role, then either x meets a specification
determined by that role; x occupies a position determined by that role; or x gives a
performance determined by that role.20
Replace the term ‘role’ with a variable R, and then existentially quantify it, as follows:
9R (if x plays R, then either x meets a specification determined by R; x occupies a
position determined by R; or x gives a performance determined by R).
Then define the role-playing notion as follows:
x plays a role =def. 9R [(if x plays R, then either x meets a specification determined
by R; x occupies a position determined by R; or x gives a performance determined by
R) and x plays R].
The view of role as a functionally definable concept may be a practical advance from
its family resemblance conception. Even if there may some room for improvement in
the formalization of the term ‘specification’ (e.g., [43]) and perhaps other relevant terms,
however, it does not seem that the functional definition of role will be practically usable
enough to help domain-specific modeling processes.
5.3. Practically Unifiable Concept
One may still wish to provide a unified concept or definition of role even at the price
of theoretical rigor. This task requires considering carefully which ‘role choice’ is prac-
tically appropriate. For instance, one may choose a role specification, based on the in-
tuition that <Mary meets a student role specification> grounds <Mary gives a student
role performance>. For another example, one may take a role position because it fits
well with an apparently widely acceptable, moderate stance on ontology. This line of
investigation is to be pursued together with careful cost-benefit analysis.
6. Conclusion
I have argued for three claims. First, there are three role-related concepts (the role triad):
a role specification, a role position, and a role performance. Second, different accounts
of role might depend which notion in the role triad is ontologically prior to the other
two, as illustrated with close examination of three theories of role which are based on
(the meta-ontological choices of) DOLCE, GFO, and BFO, respectively. Third, there are
20To simplify matters, I am setting aside the issue of whether logical entailment fully captures the notion of
grounding that I have exploited so far.
three possible understandings of the ontological nature of role: a family resemblance
concept, a functionally definable concept, and a practically unifiable concept.
This work on role will bring us to many future directions of research and, in partic-
ular, there are many thorny questions to be answered regarding various associated mod-
eling processes. For instance, the topic of qua-individuals [44] (e.g., Mary-qua-student)
has wide implications for a representation of roles.21 The idea of the role triad will shed
light on qua-individuals, contributing possibly to a novel approach to them.22
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Abstract. This paper describes a number of design techniques employed in the Financial 
Industry Business Ontology (FIBO) series of standards. These are compared to the notion 
of a conceptual ontology as a computationally independent artefact. An example is given in 
the applications of the Interest Rate Swaps (IR Swaps) FIBO ontology, where some 
ontology elements may be re-used to represent different concepts in different kinds of 
ontology application. Some proposals are outlined for the use of a higher-level industry 
concept ontology to provide disambiguation between the concepts referred to in different 
ontology applications. This paper is intended to promote discussion on possible cross-
domain and upper ontology components for use across these different kinds of ontology 
application. 
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1. Introduction 
The Financial Industry Business Ontology (FIBO) [1] is an industry initiative with the 
original stated intent to standardize the terms used in the financial services industry.  
The notion of a ‘term’ as used in the financial industry is only loosely defined and 
the original work on what was to become FIBO took the approach that what was 
needed was a model of the concepts represented by words or ‘terms’ in industry data 
and communications. That is, the objective pursued by this author in the original 
development of FIBO was to provide a reference model for semantic interoperability 
across a range of technologies by providing conceptual clarification and 
disambiguation of concepts and by defining the formal real-world semantics of 
concepts in the financial domain. This style of ontology is referred to in this paper as a 
‘conceptual ontology’. Elsewhere, terms like ‘business concept model’ are used to 
avoid confusion with other uses of the word ‘conceptual’ among IT practitioners.  
FIBO as published is intended to provide a number of ontologies in the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) [2] that may be used in a range of inference processing and 
semantic querying applications. This represents a different requirement to that against 
which FIBO was originally developed, with implications that are explored in this 
paper.  
1.1. Industry Appetite for Conceptual Ontology 
There is a growing awareness in the financial industry of the need for a more concept-
focused kind of ontology to provide formal semantics for industry terms. For example 
in ISO TC68 SC9 Working Group 1 [3], the working group tasked with considering the 
application of semantics to the ISO 20022 financial industry messaging standard [4], 
there has been informal discussion of the need for a future ‘New Work Item Proposal’ 
(the ISO term for potential new standardization work), to cover what is referred to there 
as an ‘Upper’ ontology [5]. It has also been suggested that the proposed NWIP could 
form a possible contribution to the ISO 28138 Top Level Ontologies emerging standard 
[6].  
The use of the term ‘Upper Ontology’ in these business contexts should be 
interpreted as referring to a combination of top level and cross domain ontologies, the 
purpose of which is to provide a computationally independent representation of the 
semantics of the domain of discourse, in this case the domain of finance and 
commerce. This would be a ‘conceptual ontology’ in the sense that that term is used in 
this paper. 
1.2. Aims of This Paper 
This paper looks at the balance of concerns between conceptual (computationally 
independent) ontologies and those ontologies design for a specific purpose or range of 
purposes (informally, ‘operational ontologies’). Some distinctions observed between 
conceptual and operational ontologies in the FIBO ecosystem are given as an 
illustration of the kinds of issues that arise in determining how instance data 
(individuals) are to be populated in applications of the latter. Here we have chosen one 
aspect of these differences, namely the way in which certain classes of the operational 
ontology appear to be intended to be used for more than one kind of thing in the 
domain of discourse. The assertion explored here is that a conceptual ontology needs to 
have a good set of upper and cross-domain ontologies in order to provide the kind of 
information needed by implementers of operational ontologies (including implementers 
of the published FIBO standards material) in order to correctly assign data to classes 
and properties. 
This paper explores the implications of these design arrangements and proposes 
the use of computationally independent conceptual ontologies including the framing of 
their concepts within a set of top level ontology partitions, as a means to provide 
management and oversight of these applications. 
Taking a specific example observed in these ontologies during some proof of 
concept work for Blockchain applications [7], we explore the dangers inherent in the 
existing approach. The aim of this paper is to consider how the principled use of 
conceptual ontology would either avoid operational ontology designs that would cause 
issues when populating such ontologies with ABox data for individuals, or would allow 
for traceability of the intended business semantics of such applications without the 
need to overload the application itself with these considerations.  
1.3. How This Paper Is Structured 
Section 2 gives an overview of the FIBO standard, describing the evolution of FIBO 
from a computationally independent conceptual ontology to a set of ontologies 
intended for use in OWL based applications.  
Section 3 introduces the design conventions followed in the released OWL 
components of FIBO, based on observations of the differences between FIBO as a 
released standard and the original conceptual ontologies developed for the industry.  
Section 4 goes on to focus on one specific design convention, whereby certain 
classes and properties are seen to be conflate concepts, presumably by design. This is 
illustrated by an example from the financial instrument class of Interest Rate Swaps, 
where the re-usability or under-specification of some classes was observed during a 
proof of concept activity. The weaknesses of this design convention are explored, in 
particular the way that the precise semantics of these concepts are left to the 
implementers of future applications.  
The need for a conceptual ontology is asserted, and in Section 5 a number of 
application contexts are given for the financial industry and beyond, that would need to 
be taken into account in understanding how operational ontologies are likely to be 
deployed in industry applications.  
Section 6 sets out a minimum requirement for set of upper and cross domain 
ontologies to be used in business ontologies and suggests how these would address the 
weaknesses described in Section 4.  
Section 7 sets out the core proposition of this paper, that industry should work 
towards a consensus set of re-usable cross domain ontologies integrated within a 
suitable simple upper ontology partitioning layer.  
Section 8 sets out the conclusions of the paper and aims to frame further discussion 
on these topics.  
2. FIBO Development and Evolution 
FIBO was originally conceived as a computationally independent conceptual ontology, 
but was modeled using the basic constructs of the OWL language within a business-
facing presentation format. This was known as the ‘Semantic Repository’ [8].  
During initial socialization of this work it was challenging to explain to the 
potential users of these models that what was being proposed was not in fact a data 
model. A number of potential arrangements were explored during 2007 and 2008 for 
the modeling of formal semantics of concepts in the financial services domain. One 
additional instruction given to the author was to ‘Keep the philosophy out of sight’ 
(private correspondence with the author); it was not practicable to simply represent the 
industry concepts in formal logic, there needed to be tool support for presentation and 
business validation of the model content.  
As described in [9] the project selected the OWL language partly because 
something was needed that had the necessary tooling support, and partly because the 
use of OWL and in particular the class of ‘Thing’ made it possible to explain that what 
was being proposed was not a data model. OWL was not a direct match for the 
requirements of this initiative but was selected as the most immediately usable 
alternative available at that time.  
One challenge in using OWL for computationally independent ontologies is the 
expressive power of the language: not everything that needs to be said about the 
business problem domain can be said in the sub-set of logic that OWL represents. The 
initial FIBO conceptual ontologies were therefore considered as being a sort of 
conceptual core around which other kinds of assertion might be made.  
Another potential issue with the use of OWL was the lack of any methodological 
support for concept representation, leaving it the individual modeler to find the best 
ways to represent things in the problem domain. This was not considered to be a 
weakness but rather an absence: for the early conceptual work on what was to become 
FIBO, the beginnings of a conceptual modeling framework were drafted to address 
these matters, although as noted above these were of no interest to the end users of the 
models. OWL itself was simply considered as one syntax in which model content could 
be represented.  
Although OWL was considered as the underlying language for the model content, 
even the existing OWL tooling was considered to be inadequate for a ‘technology free’ 
business presentation and so the OWL constructs were rendered in UML tooling using 
the Ontology Definition Metamodel (ODM) [10] from the Object Management Group 
(OMG) [11]. 
The FIBO ontology was originally conceived as a computationally independent 
reference ontology. The concepts were framed within a fairly basic set of upper 
ontology partitions, based on the top layer of John F Sowa’s ‘Knowledge 
Representation” lattice of theories [12]. These included among other things the 
distinction between independently defined things and contextually-dependent concepts 
such as entities playing roles or entities defined by their function. Similarly, the 
distinction between ‘Continuant’ and ‘Occurrent’ was employed to mark out the 
distinction between things that persist over time and event and process concepts such as 
corporate actions, transaction events and securities issuance processes.  
The documented basis for most of the concepts in the initial parts of FIBO is that 
these represent the commitments enshrined in the terms and conditions of contracts. 
This forms the basis for the definition of financial instruments, as these are all contracts 
of one sort or another. Other components of FIBO deal with corporate actions, 
securities issuance processes and securities transactions. The intent with these is to 
provide a comparable real-world grounding of the concepts in terms of events and 
activities.  
The FIBO standard ontologies that are made available via the OMG in contrast 
provide a set of ontology design artefacts for use in inference processing. These may be 
considered as designed artifacts comparable with logical designs in other technologies 
and are sometimes referred to as ‘operational’ ontologies, though this term is not used 
within the FIBO ecosystem itself. A more detailed treatment of the distinctions 
between these kinds of ontologies is given in [13]. 
Certain design decisions have been made for this FIBO standards content which 
distinguish them from a computationally independent model of the subject matter as 
originally envisioned. According to some recent statements these design decisions 
include the use of certain classes to represent more than one set of things in the domain 
of discourse1. This stated design approach has implications for the management of 
application ontologies and their data.  
3. FIBO Standards Design Conventions 
As part of the process of submitting FIBO to the OMG as a series of standards, the 
focus of FIBO has shifted from the use of OWL as a means to frame conceptual 
meaning, to the application of design rules suitable for OWL-based ontologies for 
inference processing and reasoning.  
The design conventions for this style of OWL in FIBO have not been formally 
documented but may be discerned by considering the changes made from the original 
conceptual framing of FIBO to the style of ontology considered suitable for release as 
an OWL-based standard. These design changes include but are not limited to:  
 
1. Removal of references to upper ontology material 
2. Removal of domains and ranges from many object properties 
3. Object properties whose domain is a union of unrelated classes 
4. Substitution of ontological representations of information constructs such as 
names, for simple datatype properties with ‘string’ as their range 
5. Substitution of social constructs (where these give the business semantics of a 
concept) for data elements that may provide evidence of the existence of such 
constructs 
6. Conflation of similar concepts, for example combining into one class the 
notion of a clearing house as a functionally defined entity and the role of that 
clearing house in some securities transaction.  
 
It is not the intent of this paper to critique those design decisions. For the most part 
we assume that these decisions are reasonable for the perceived range of competency 
questions and usages to which these ontologies are to be put. We also note that these 
design decisions are a principled application of the computational constraints of the 
design of an OWL based solution or set of solutions.  
These are therefore not computationally independent models. Rather they are 
derived from the earlier computationally independent models that made up the initial 
conceptual FIBO material. 
4. Reusability in FIBO 
One of the design conventions observed in the published FIBO OWL standards is the 
apparent intention that certain classes and properties may be considered to be 
polysemic.  
An example of reusable concepts occurs in the area of Interest Rate Swaps (IR 
Swaps) [14]. An IR Swap is a bilateral agreement in which two parties agree to 
exchange a series of cashflows that are based on the interest payments streams of some 
                                                         
1 Subsequent to writing the initial draft of this paper some of the specific examples of this practice, which 
was explicitly justified by one of the OWL modelers at the time, have been backed out in the model 
content.  
loan. For example one party may have a loan on which they are paying variable interest 
and wish to exchange this payment stream with another party that has a comparable 
loan with fixed interest payments, such that both parties end up paying interest on 
terms more in line with their preferred balance of risk and returns, hedging against 
changes in the underlying interest rate against which the variable amounts are pegged. 
The loan principal itself is generally not exchanged, unless these are in different 
currencies.  
IR Swaps are effectively transactions and like most transactions these have a 
corresponding contract, usually made up of an over-arching master agreement plus 
transaction-specific terms in a separate message that is deemed to have contractual 
standing. There are terms for interest rates, interest amount accruals and payments, 
these rates and accrued amounts being accrued and paid down on a periodic basis. In 
FIBO the semantics of contracts is focused around the notion of a ‘commitment’ and 
draws upon the REA Ontology [15]. For a similar but distinct treatment of contractual 
elements in the context of service agreements see also [16]. 
In FIBO the definitions of the terms for IR Swaps, being the terms of a contract, 
are definitions of the commitments made by each party to the other.  
Meanwhile there is a business requirement for reporting on the interest accruals 
and payments that happen during the life of the swap [17]. These are very similar in 
form to the descriptions of the commitments made, since these events are the actual 
occurrences of the promised payments of accrued amounts.  
In the released FIBO as currently designed, it is seemingly possible to take the 
same ontology and populate it with data (OWL Individuals) representing different 
semantics, specifically terms definitional of the contract and terms for reporting of 
individual transactions.  
Assuming this practice persists, one can reasonably ask why an ontology is used at 
all and not simply a data model? Given the current practice, users need to be aware that 
wherever classes are or might be populated with different data in different usage 
contexts, data from one such application cannot be interoperable with data from the 
other. This need not be an issue as long as users of the standard are aware of this 
feature. However, the use of the same namespace for a multiplicity of incompatible 
applications’ data clearly represents a risk for data management, reporting and 
compliance.  
Ontologically there are two distinct kinds of ‘things that happen’ that are both of 
relevance to IR Swaps. As conceptualized in the original FIBO conceptual modeling, 
there are things that should happen (prescriptive) as in a business process workflow 
description or in this case the required payments, accrued obligations and so on as 
prescribed in the terms and conditions of the contract. Then there are the things that do 
or will happen: the actual occurrences whether past, present or anticipated in the future. 
These are events or activities with dates, specific amounts of interest accrued at specific 
calculated rates, monies owed or accrued as of a given date and so on. For a separate 
but comparable treatment of these considerations see also [18]. 
In the published Interest Rate Swaps FIBO ontologies the same classes appear to 
be intended to be used for both. There are at the time of writing some inconsistencies in 
the concepts that are ancestral to these concepts in IR Swaps, but there is also (by 
design) no use of upper ontology and consequently no means to distinguish between 
intended and actual occurrents, although there are the concepts of ‘Occurrence’ and 
‘Occurrence Kind’ that partially allow this distinction to be made. It is assumed that 
these questions are left to implementers of ontology-based applications that would re-
use FIBO components. 
The intended occurrents modeled here would be framed in some upper ontologies 
not as occurrents at all but as dispositional notions (commitments being dispositions, 
along with beliefs, tendencies etc.). Other upper ontologies, including the prior FIBO 
conceptual work would define these commitments as kinds of social construct, with a 
relationship to the concept of an event that ‘should’ happen. There is a range of valid 
ways to frame these concepts but the published FIBO standards, being intended to 
operationalize OWL, leave these distinctions to the end user. The intended semantics of 
a given class therefore depend on the context in which data is assigned to these classes 
and their related properties. 
Given that FIBO has the stated policy not to use upper ontology or cross-domain 
abstractions (particularly social constructs and most things that are not materialized as 
data), it is recommended that operational ontologies like FIBO and those derived from 
it should have some traceability to an explicitly conceptual ontology. This would 
address not only the above observed example of polysemy but also other common 
design patterns seen in OWL ontologies used for applications, such as the reduced use 
of property domains and ranges, the use of data surrogates for real world social 
constructs, and others as noted previously. 
While some examples of such polysemy have been removed from the FIBO 
models since this example was uncovered, the design justification for doing so has 
been clearly stated in correspondence with the author, though not formally 
documented. Other examples have been identified in the area of ‘values’, where a given 
class may be taken to represent the prescription of a value or an actual occurrence or 
measurement having such a value. It should be noted that these distinctions were not 
made in the original conceptual models, where these were simply regarded as the 
concept of a value or other such matter without reference to context or usage. 
Subsequent research and feedback, in particular with reference to the proposed 
Semantics for Information Modeling and Federation (SMIF) standard  [19] at the OMG 
has led this author to the conclusion that these distinctions should be clearly 
demarcated in conceptual ontologies.  
The reusability of ontologies is not the same thing as the reusability of classes and 
properties to mean different things in different contexts as indicated by the example 
explored in this paper, and should not require this. Clearer guidance and design 
conventions are clearly needed for end user developers in order for these operational 
ontologies to be reusable in different contexts. The use of a separate conceptual 
ontology should therefore enable re-use of operational OWL ontologies such as those 
published as parts of FIBO. 
5. Identifying Conceptual Requirements from Context 
In order to identify the range of possible concepts needed in the proposed upper and 
cross-domain ontologies, the first step would be to catalog the range of ways in which a 
given set of operational ontologies may be used. The relevant high-level concepts can 
be identified from these. For example in the IR Swaps case one would identify the need 
for prescriptive and descriptive occurrent partitions.  
The kinds of contexts required for financial applications would include:  
 
1. Reporting, including trade reporting 
2. Transaction processing (straight through processing) and associated messaging 
3. Risk management and reporting 
4. Regulatory compliance 
5. Integration of new and existing data feeds, applications etc. across different 
systems (middle, front and back office).  
6. Mergers and acquisitions 
7. Customer relationships management, cross-selling and up-selling 
8. Know your customer (KYC) compliance and reporting 
9. General Data Protection (GDPR) and the privacy of individuals’ data 
10. Loan applications, other applications and proposals 
11. Product management (including retail financial products) 
 
Each of these and others will determine the concepts that need to be stood up in the 
cross-domain ontologies in order to provide the contexts needed to distinguish between 
separate concepts that may use the same words in data models or reports, for example, 
a loan as a product versus a loan as a contract between parties.  
The polysemic application of such words or terms in language should not be taken 
as a reason to create ontology classes and properties that correspond to words and are 
overloaded in a similar way. Inspection of some part of FIBO suggests (perhaps 
incorrectly) that this has sometimes been the approach taken by model designers, which 
if it were the case would call into question why ontology is being used at all. Instead of 
focusing on words, any operational ontology should focus on concepts, ideally framed 
with reference to some conceptual ontology.  
Some of these contextual distinctions are clearly demarcated within FIBO and 
comparable ontologies while others may not be. Relevant contexts would include 
process contexts (such as loan applications, transaction workflows), data usage 
contexts, risk versus real events, planning and scheduling and so on.  
6. Industry Core Ontology Requirements 
The distinction between conceptual and operational ontologies is explored in [20]. One 
of the recommendations in that paper is that conceptual (reference) ontologies and 
operational (application) ontologies be given separate namespaces.  
It should be possible to apply this approach to the deployment of FIBO ontologies 
that have overloaded semantics and other design features. In this case, an operational 
ontology would be stood up in its own namespace, using a localized copy of the 
relevant FIBO ontology supplemented by a suitable core ontology consisting of cross-
domain ontologies integrated within a set of top level ontology partitions.  
To support such arrangements, the industry needs to be able to refer to a core 
ontology that integrates and distinguishes between different contextually sensitive 
material. In the example given for Interest Rate Swaps, these would include 
distinctions between:  
 
1. Prescriptive Occurrents: definitions of things that are prescribed as needing to 
happen, or as being mandated by some party or committed to by some party;  
2. Descriptive Occurrents: definitions of things that actually happen, on some 
given dates in the past, present or some projected future, and having specific 
values for interest rates, accrued monetary amounts, netted payments and so 
on, as of those dates. 
 
Similar sets of upper ontology material would be needed in other places where 
FIBO consciously conflates concepts, such as the observed conflation of parties in roles 
and functional entities for participants in the securities transaction lifecycle.  
6.1. Candidate Terms 
One proposed solution to the IR Swaps example can be found in work carried out 
within the FIBO Foundations Content Team, in which the class of ‘Occurrent’ was sub-
classified into several sets of pairwise disjoint facets, including those of Prescriptive 
Occurrent versus Descriptive Occurrent, described briefly in the submission to [21]. 
These facets were arrived at following a detailed analysis of the DOLCE [22] partitions 
in this area, where it was determined that some of the DOLCE concepts combined 
more than one primitive semantic. These concepts were not and will not be part of the 
formal FIBO release, as the policy whereby ‘conceptual’ and ‘upper ontology’ material 
are ruled out of scope is extended to sub-partitions of ‘Occurrent’.  
Other sub-partitioning of the Occurrent partition of a suitable top-level ontology 
would also be suitable for this requirement. 
7. Proposition 
It should be realistic to come up with a definitive set of core ontologies for use across 
business, finance and commerce, including for example insurance, logistics, real estate 
and financial services. Given the nature of business concerns (profit and loss, risk, legal 
interactions, regulatory conformance, supply chain management, customer relations 
and so on), as compared with the diversity of theories that underpin physics for 
example, it is this author’s contention that this undertaking would be simpler than 
trying to achieve this across the realms of physics, chemistry or biology.  
Such a core ontology should focus explicitly on the notion of the ‘concept’, since 
many of the concerns of business relate to planning, risk, strategy, commitment and 
other management concerns in which the enterprise must necessarily form the concept 
of some matter whether or not that matter is ever present in some real or imagined 
world.  
It should be feasible to integrate the best of breed of the concepts across the 
available top level ontologies. The pre-existing ‘conceptual’ work carried out during 
the earlier part of the development of FIBO may also inform the process of selecting 
from and integrating between these concepts. Available cross-domain ontologies are 
also of value and could ideally be integrated within a common set of top level ontology 
partitions, in particular REA [15], LKIF [23] PSL [24] and would be integrated as seen 
in OntoUML [25]. Ongoing work from the VMBO series of conferences such as [26] 
(in draft) also provides comparable material for the definition of concepts for value, 
risk and others. 
It is recommended that solutions that make use of operational or design ontologies 
be framed within a broader conceptual ontology framework, without the contents of 
such a framework needing to be included within the assertions that any such 
application will refer to. The conceptual ontologies referred to would exist in a separate 
namespace from the operational or application ontologies, so that conceptual assertions 
are not imported into the application.  
This approach would enable operational ontologies to be re-usable and also help to 
identify when a given operational ontology should not be used in a given context, or 
should only be used with careful isolation of the resulting data, that is, not treating the 
data itself as reusable across more business contexts than the semantics of those data 
elements would support.  
Ideally, application-specific (operational) ontologies would be derived from the 
conceptual ontology in such a way that the design is fully traceable and the data from 
any one application can be maintained separately to the data from any other application 
even when the same operational ontologies are employed. Suitable metadata 
relationships can be derived to represent something similar to the ‘trace’ relationship in 
UML (for example ‘implemented as’) relationships.  
For many of the design conventions employed in FIBO released ontologies and 
other comparable ontologies, it should be feasible to come up with a number of 
repeatable heuristics for deriving suitable design patterns from the conceptual 
representations of things in the world. Specific examples are out of the scope of this 
paper but could include for example deriving end user context-specific, simple sets of 
classes and relationships from concepts defined ‘in the round’ with reference to 
‘relative things’, ‘role mixins’ or other conceptual patterns. Some of the design patterns 
observed in the FIBO released standards, including the polysemic use of some classes 
and properties, may turn out to have been mistakes; some principled application of the 
relationships between conceptual and operational ontologies would provide some 
guidance and design auditability that would avoid or expose the possible unintended 
consequences of this approach.  
8. Conclusions 
The specific design approaches taken for FIBO standards are not in question. These 
ontologies are intended to provide a set of ontologies that may be re-used across a 
range of financial industry applications that make use of Semantic Web technology. 
However the particular example whereby certain classes are observed as being able to 
be used to frame similar concepts in different application contexts is considered risky at 
best and this author would recommend that this be avoided. 
The creation and use of a common, cross-industry core ontology is recommended 
as the next component in enabling industry to roll out a range of compliance and 
reporting applications that make use of semantic technology and that are able to 
leverage the in some cases under-specified elements of the FIBO standards as well as 
to support re-use where this is appropriate and to signal when it is not.  
This approach is also indicated for other design patterns such as properties with no 
domain and/or range, the use of data surrogates in place of the truth makers of a given 
concept and so on. In this way, designers of ontology-based applications may take 
account of the technical limitations imposed by any solution architecture without losing 
the ability to trace classes and individuals and their properties to the original business 
meanings of the concepts concerned. Failure to do this may in some cases result in 
ontology-based data that is not as reusable as they might appear from a casual 
inspection of the content. 
There is considerable scope for further investigation and research in these areas as 
well as in the potential for providing practical methodological support for ontologies 
across the engineering development lifecycle. 
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 Vaiśesịka Graph Grammar (VGG) System 
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Abstract. ​Graph grammars, being a natural extension of string grammars as well            
as tree grammars, are highly expressive as well as powerful enough to capture the              
generative structure of a wide variety of scenarios - both simple and complex. But,              
unfortunately, we do not find many instances which leverage this power graph            
grammars provide us. Most of the graph grammars available so far are either toy              
grammars or limited to addressing highly specialized problems. In this paper, we            
present Vaiśesịka Graph Grammar (VGG) system, which is as wide as any graph             
grammar can get i.e., a grammar for reality as theorized in Vaiśesịka - the              
foundational ontology found in Indian analytic tradition. This paper extends the           
work presented in [1]. In [1], the generative as well as the interpretation rules of               
this system were presented. Here, apart from briefly discussing some of these            
rules, we also present a parser for such a system which makes it extremely              
powerful in terms of its ability to classify an input graph as a valid Vaiśesịka graph                
or an invalid one which, in itself, is an immensely significant breakthrough for any              
ontological application. Apart from that, we also present a verification mechanism           
to verify the interpretations of graphs generated by the generative rules. This is             
done, at least statistically, if not formally, to give a statistical proof of the              
soundness of the system (that every generated graph has at least one Vaiśesịka             
interpretation, and no useless graphs are generated.)  
Keywords:​ Vaiśesịka, Graph Grammar, Generative Ontology, Parser 
1. Introduction 
The notion of a grammar in itself is quite intriguing. It is a finite number of rules which                  
can generate a (potentially) infinite number of sentences. It is something which brings             
parsimony into the system. A grammar captures the repeating patterns in a system and              
encodes them into a finite set of rules. It is extremely simple and yet highly powerful.  
Graph grammars, compared to string and tree grammars, are more powerful,           
expressive and intuitive. Yet, there are very few instances of uses of graph grammars in               
real world. In this paper, we present the parser for Vaiśesịka Graph Grammar (VGG)              
system whose generation rules (GRs) and interpretation rules (IRs) were already           2
presented in [1]. This is a grammar for reality itself based on Vaiśesịka - the               
foundational ontology found in Indian analytic tradition.  
1Corresponding author, Center for Exact Humanities, IIIT-Hyderabad, Gachibowli, Hyderabad,         
Telangana, India; E-mail: vrktavva@research.iiit.ac.in 
2 One can find a working prototype of this system here: http://ceh.iiit.ac.in/vgg 
 In ontology engineering, a fairly recent discipline, one of the fundamental           
questions is how to construct ontologies as well as how to analyze a given scenario or                
state-of-affairs (SOAs) in terms of known ontological categories. Currently these          
problems are addressed mostly manually or, even if done automatically, involve a lot of              
human intervention at various stages. Hence there are various problems like           
interoperability issues, internal contradictions within the systems etc. One way to           
overcome these problems is to minimise human intervention as much as possible, and             
what better way can be there to do it than to construct grammars for such systems                
where the human intervention is minimal, and is required only at the beginning of              
building the grammar. Once the generation or parsing process is set in motion, the              
system is on its own and requires no human intervention in between.  
We presented one such system, a novel idea called Generative Ontology, based on             
Vaiśesịka in [1] in which the GRs and IRs of the system are presented. But they only                 
enable one to generate graph structures as well as interpret them according to Vaiśesịka              
system. There is still one crucial step left to complete the system i.e., to give it an                 
ability to decide whether any given graph is derivable within the system or not. This               
eliminates the burden of generating every possible graph and matching it with the input              
graph to decide upon its derivability. It is similar to the role which a parser plays in                 
compilers in programming languages. It parses a program in a particular language and             
identifies syntax errors in it saving a lot of resources to the system. In that sense, a                 
parser is an immensely useful and necessary tool and it gives enormous power to the               
existing system.  
In this paper, we present the parser for VGG as well as give a statistical proof for                 
the soundness of VGG. Since this is an extension of the work done in [1], we will                 
provide a brief overview of it in Section 2, and then move on to present the parser in                  
Section 3, and then present the results and conclusion in Section 4.  
2. Overview 
2.1. Vaiśesịka System 
Since a significant portion of the system (Vaiśesịka categories, Generative Rules and            
Interpretation Rules) are formally presented in [1] already, we give a brief overview of              
them here in a more informal manner for the comprehension of the rest of the paper. 
Vaiśesịka system is a foundational ontology which classifies all the entities in            
reality into 6 categories : (1) Substance (e.g: material entities like ball, car as well as               3
non-material entities like soul, space and time) (2) Quality (e.g: color, size) (3) Action              
(e.g: rising up, falling down, motion) (4) Universal (e.g: car-ness, ball-ness, red-ness)            
(5) Ultimate Differentiator (located in each ultimate substance (explained below) and           
differentiates one from the other) and (6) Inherence (explained below). 
Before comprehending any of the Vaiśesịka categories, the first category we need            
to understand is ‘inherence’. Inherence is one of the primary relations of Vaiśesịka             
3 It is actually a six-plus-one category system. The seventh category i.e., absence is considered to be                 
added later to the list of fundamental categories. The complete list of Vaiśesịka categories and subcategories                
can be found in [13]. 
 system. It is the second most prevalent relation in reality after self-linking relation .             4
Some instances of inhering can be color inhering in a rose, treeness inhering in all the                
trees, a whole inhering in its parts etc., (inherence needs to be understood as something               
located in something, but in an aspatial manner).  
Substance, philosophically speaking, is that ​which stands below i.e., all other           
categories ride on it or are dependent on it while this doesn’t ride on anything else.                
Similarly, an ultimate substance, in Vaiśesịka, is that category which ​stands below            
everything else - even other substances. It needs to be understood in terms of inherence               
- as something inhering in something. In Vaiśesịka, qualities and actions inhere in             
substances; universals inhere in qualities, actions and substances; while some          
substances (wholes) inhere in other substances (parts). These latter substances in which            
other things can inhere, but they don’t inhere anywhere else, are called ultimate             
substances (USs).  
Among USs, there are two types: ubiquitous ultimate substances (UUSs) and           
mobile ultimate substance (MUSs). UUSs are those which are either in contact or in              
disjunct with all other substances. MUSs are those which are in contact with some              
while in disjunct with other substances. These are formal definitions of UUS and MUS              
provided in [1]. Not only these, but all the fundamental categories as well as some               
subcategories of Vaiśesịka are defined formally, in terms of inherence, in [1]. For             
instance, ​universal (U) is something which inheres in 2 or more entities, but nothing              
inheres in it. In this way, many categories and subcategories of Vaiśesịka are defined              
formally, purely using the idea of inherence, conjunct (contact) and disjunct - i.e., how              
many entities inhere in a given entity, what is the configuration of contacts, disjuncts              
etc.   5
The Interpretation Rules (IRs) of VGG can be considered to be a visualization of              
the formal definitions of Vaiśesịka categories and subcategories. So a quick look at             
them can enable us to understand these definitions easily. They are presented in Section              
3.2 of [1]. 
Like in [1], this paper’s focus is not on defending Vaiśesịka description of reality              
or the rationale behind its categorial system. One can refer to [5] and [14] for that. The                 
idea of this paper is to show the possibility of an ontological system in which the SOAs                 
can be generated, interpreted and also parsed. 
2.2. Generation and Interpretation Rules of Vaisesika 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, many Vaiśesịka categories and subcategories can be            
defined formally in terms of inherence, contact and disjunct. Actually these also form             
the fundamental relations in the system apart from the self-linking relation. Their            
formal definitions can be found in Section 2 of [1].  
A punctuator is a boundary which separates as well as brings two entities into              
some relationship. Its structure is like <x|y,R> where x and y are the entities being               
punctuated, and ​R is the relational context in which they are punctuated. Here ​R              
4 Self-linking relation is not a Vaiśesịka category since it is not an entity. In other words, it requires no                    
other relational entity to bring together the two relata. It is both the relata themselves put together. For the                   
structure of self-linking relation, see [1]. 
5 Refer to Section 2 of [1] for all the formal definitions of Vaiśesịka categories and subcategories. 
 constitutes the entire rest of the universe which itself is a set of all the chains of entities                  
and punctuators between x and y. So a punctuator has a recursive structure. 
Given the recursive structure of punctuator and the complex nature of its relational             
context as a web of entities and punctuators, it is best imagined as a graph (made up of                  
nodes and edges) which can also be understood as a state-of-affair (SOA). It is shown               
in [1] that the three simple punctuators - (1) self-linking (2) inherence and (3)              
conjunct-disjunct punctuators - constitute the building blocks for all the complex           
punctuators (SOAs) in Vaiśesịka. It is also shown how these complex punctuators can             
be generated from the simple punctuators (alphabet) using generative rules (GRs), and            
then interpreted with Vaiśesịka categories using interpretation rules (IRs). 
GRs can be considered as the syntactic portion of reality whereas IRs can be              
considered the semantic portion of it. GRs generate pure structures with no inherent             
meaning whereas IRs give meaning to them by labeling them with Vaiśesịka categories.             
In [1], it is shown that all the graphs generated by GRs could be interpreted using IRs                 
with Vaiśesịka categories, but the validity of those interpretations is provided here, in             
this paper, in Section 4. VGG uses Single Pushout (SPO) approach [8] for graph              
transformations. 
A screenshot of an interpreted graph in VGG system is provided in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. A graph generated in VGG followed by interpretation with Vaiśesịka categories. Here the following                
categories are depicted - UD (Ultimate Differentiator), Q (Quality), SW (Substantial Whole), UUS             
(Ubiquitous Ultimate Substance), U (Universal). And the edges ‘in’ and ‘con’ stand for inherence and contact                
respectively. 
 
In this paper, we present the parser for VGG which completes the system and gives it                
real power in terms of recognizing an input graph to be derivable or non-derivable              
within the system using the GRs of the system. 
 3. Parser 
While building a system like VGG, one needs to distinguish two questions here: 
● Whether a graph is derivable within the system or not? 
● Whether all the graphs derivable within the system are Vaiśesịka graphs or            
not? 
Both the questions are independent of each other and hence require different            
approaches to address them. The first one is purely a structural or a syntactic question               
whereas the second one is a semantic one. The first one is a question of decidability                
whereas the second one is a question of soundness. The first one is answered by               
constructing a parser which parses the structure of a given graph to decide if it belongs                
to the language (the set of graphs generated) of the system. The second one is answered                
by verifying whether all the generated graphs (using the generative rules of VGG) are              
interpretable (using the interpretation rules of VGG) i.e., is there a correlation between             
the generation rules and the interpretation rules. This can be done by verifying if there               
is a consistency in the generative labels (intermediate labels used in generative            
grammars) and the interpretation labels (the Vaiśesịka labels used to categorize nodes            
after interpretation). If there is a consistency, then the insight used while generating the              
graphs matches with the insight while interpreting them though both are starting from             
completely different directions. We show that, at least statistically, the system has            
soundness since there is a consistent mapping between the generative labels and the             
interpretation labels. 
The parser, like generative as well as interpretation grammars, is a grammar, and             
hence consists of a set of graph transformation rules which apply on the input graph               
and stop after all the rules are exhausted. The parser, as mentioned above, addresses a               
decidability problem and hence is supposed to recognize a graph as belonging to the              
system or not based purely on its structure and not its labels. The rules of the parser are                  
arrived at, broadly, by reversing the generative rules of VGG as well as the LHS and                
RHS of each rule, though not mechanically. One has to add/delete some NACs in the               6
generative grammar to formulate the parser rules. An input graph to a parser is said to                
belong to the generative grammar of VGG if the process of parsing ends at the start                
graph of the generative grammar of VGG. If not, the input graph to the parser is a                 
non-derivable graph i.e., such a structure will never be generated by the generative             
grammar of VGG. 
We claim that the parser identifies only the right graphs with the right combination              
of labels as valid graphs generated by the generative rules of VGG. It would reject both                
(1) graphs with wrong structures as well as (2) graphs with right structures but wrong               
combination of labels - as non-derivable graphs.  
In our grammar, the node-labels are Ω ​V = {g, C, D, h, i, p, q, r, s, u, v, e} and                     
edge-labels are Ω ​E = {in, con, dis}. Each of the node-labels stands for the following: g                
– start node (this is the only node in the start graph of generative grammar of VGG, but                  
6 An NAC is a Negative Application Condition which is also a graph. If an NAC matches with the graph                    
in question along with its LHS, then the rule cannot be applied. So one should check for this condition as well                     
before applying a rule. 
 this should become the end graph in the parser if the parsing is done successfully), C –                 
conjunct entity, D – disjunct entity, h, i, p, q, r, s, u, v – are all various node labels used                     
in the process of parsing. These are taken from generation grammar itself and their              
corresponding Vaiśesịka categories which they are intended to stand for, is also kept             
intact. The node labels used during generation (or pre-interpretation) stage are supposed            
to map to the following Vaiśesịka categories after interpretation (post-interpretation)          
stage, as shown in Table 1. 
 
 








g (start node) not applicable not applicable 
h not applicable not applicable 
i not applicable not applicable 
p MUS Mobile Ultimate Substance 
q SW Substantial Whole 
r UUS Ubiquitous Ultimate Substance 
s U Universal 
u Q Quality 
v UD Ultimate Differentiator 
 
At the end of the generation all the (pre-interpretation) labels were replaced by a              
common label, e, to show that the nodes they were labeling can be interpreted later               
based purely on their structures and not on their labels. Now we will use the same ‘e’ to                  
start the process of parsing! And the edge labels stand for the following: in – inherence                
relation, con – conjunct relation, dis – disjunct relation. But in the rules below we have                
differentiated edges based on their arrows instead of their labels for aesthetic purposes.             
An inherence relation has one arrow (since it is an asymmetric relation), conjunct             
relation has two arrows and a thick line whereas disjunct relation has two arrows and a                
dashed line (both are symmetric relations). 
No two entities have more than one edge (of any type) between them. That is a                
default NAC for every rule and hence not being specified with each rule.  
Since we are interested in only the structure of the input graph, we can assume all                
the nodes of the input graph are either anonymous or uniformly labeled (except those of               
C and D since they, anyway, are revealed by their corresponding edges and cannot be               
otherwise). We will assume all the nodes (except that of C and D) are labeled               
uniformly, with the label ‘e’ (the same label with which we homogenized all the nodes               
at the end of generation. From here, we will try to backtrack the generation process               
 with the hope of reaching the start graph of generation grammar of VGG. For this, we                
will apply the generation rules in reverse, though, with some changes in their NACs. So               
the first layer of parser rules will be the last layer of generative rules and so on. We will                   
look at the parser rules (PRs) now. 
The concept of layers is such that once we reach layer ‘n’, we cannot apply rules of                 
layers 1 to n-1. A layer can have one or more rules. The rules in a given layer can be                    
applied in any order.  
The first layer consists of six rules corresponding to the six labels that the nodes               
can take during the generation mechanism in VGG. These six can be applied in any               
order to give us all possible graphs with all possible combinations of node-labels. Here              
we combine all these six rules into a single rule for optimizing the space. The square                
bracket in the below rule indicates ‘or’ i.e., the label ‘e’ in LHS can be replaced with                 
any one of the labels listed between the square brackets in the RHS. 




An important point to note here is that the parser, like any graph transformational              
system, can take multiple paths in the process of transformation. Even if one of these               
paths ends at the start graph of generative grammar of VGG, the parsed graph is said to                 
be derivable in our system i.e., it would be generated by the generative rules of VGG.  
The second layer is about ultimate differentiator (v). Wherever it is found, we will              
just delete it. This layer has two rules which are applied on the TGs of first layer.                 7
Again, representing both these rules together for parsimony purposes. 




The above rule states whenever a ‘v’ is found in a ‘p’ (or ‘r’), just delete it. Its edges                   
get deleted with it automatically since the grammar does not allow the possibility of              
dangling edges. 
There are 3 NACs associated with this rule: 
1. v should not inhere in any other node (when we say ‘v should not inhere’, we                
mean ‘v like structure should not inhere’. The parser makes sure of that!) 
7 TGs (Terminal Graphs) of a given layer are those graphs on which the rules of that particular layer are                    
no more applicable. NTGs (Non-Terminal Graphs) of a given layer are those on which the rules of that                  
particular layer can still apply. 
 2. No other v should inhere in this p (or r) in which this v is inhering. 
3. Nothing should inhere in this v.  
The anonymous nodes in NAC​1 and NAC​3 stand for any node, like in interpretation              
rules of VGG.  
Table 4.​ PRs Layer 2, NACs of Rules 1 and 2 
NAC​1 NAC​2 NAC​3 
   
 
The next few layers (3 to 8) are about universals (s). We will look for the nodes                 
corresponding to universals and remove them.  
Layer 3 has only one rule. It checks if ‘s’ inheres in all Cs, and if yes, deletes ‘s’                   
directly. This rule has two NACs. 
1. Nothing should inhere in this s. 
2. It should inhere in every C i.e., there should be no C in which it is not                 
inhering. 
Table 5.​ PRs Layer 3, Rule 1 with NACs 





The exclamation mark (!) in NAC​2 indicates ‘not’ operator. So NAC​2 reads as ‘1:s not               
inhering in C’. So if NAC​2 is true i.e., if there is a C in which 1:s does not inhere, then                     
the rule will not be applicable. 
The layers 4 to 8 are quite similar to layer 3, except that ‘C’ is replaced by ‘D’ (for                   
disjunct), ‘p’ (for MUS), ‘q’ (for SW), ‘r’ (for UUS), ‘u’ (for Q) respectively in each                
layer. So not listing those layers separately here. 
Layer 9 deals with the deletion of quality (u) from a substantial whole (q). It has                
only one rule which says that while a quality (u) is inhering in a MUS (p), and another                  
quality (u) inhering in a substantial whole (q), remove the quality from SW under the               
condition that this quality (u) does not inhere anywhere else (this condition constitutes             
the unique NAC of this rule). 
 
  
Table 6.​ PRs Layer 9, Rule 1 with NAC 








Layer 10 deals with the deletion of quality (u) from MUS (p) and UUS (r). Actually                
both these are separate rules, but combined into one for parsimony purpose. The             
combined rule is presented below. 
Table 7.​ PRs Layer 10, Rules 1 and 2 with NAC 




So the rule in layer 10 states that remove quality (u) from MUS (p) or UUS (r) under                  
the condition that it does not inhere anywhere else (the condition that constitutes the              
unique NAC of this rule). 
The next layer i.e., layer 11 has two rules which deal with deleting the contacts               
among MUSs (p) and UUSs (r). Since UUSs (r) should be in contact (or in disjunct,                
which will be handled in the next layer) with ALL the MUSs (p) we need to check if                  
that condition is satisfied or not. But since we are not using logical quantifiers like               
universal quantifier or existential quantifier, we need to rely on some other technique to              
verify that condition. One simple method we would use is to rename ‘r’ to ‘ar’ if it is in                   
contact with all the ‘p’s. Then we would delete the contacts among ‘ar’s and ‘p’s one                
by one. At the end, we would rename ‘ar’ back to ‘r’ to accommodate the rest of the                  
rules based on ‘r’ (this rule would be part of layer 13). 
The first rule of this layer renames ‘r’ to ‘ar’ if ‘r’ is in contact with all the ‘p’s.                   
One way to do this is to make sure that there is no ‘p’ with which it is not in contact                     
(this condition constitutes the unique NAC of this rule). 
 Table 8.​ PRs Layer 11, Rule 1 with NAC 




Please note that the ‘p’ in RHS is mapped to the ‘p’ in LHS (with the number ‘2’)                  
whereas the ‘p’ in NAC​1 is not mapped to the ‘p’ in LHS (with any number). This is to                   
indicate that the ‘r’ in LHS should not be in non-contact with ​any ‘p’, not just the                 
particular ‘p’ which is under consideration in the LHS. Hence it is not restricted by               
mapping it to the ‘p’ in LHS with a number. 
While the first rule of this layer is mostly a verification condition, the second rule               
is where the actual action happens. This rule states that the contact between ‘ar’ and ‘p’                
should be deleted one by one. This rule is run till the end, until there are no more                  
contacts between any pair of ‘ar’ and ‘p’. It has no NACs associated with it. 




Layer 12 is very similar to layer 11 except that contact should be replaced by               
disjunct here everywhere in the rules. The way contacts between ‘r’s and ‘p’s are              
removed in layer 11, in the same way disjuncts will be removed between ‘r’s and ‘p’s                
in layer 12. Other than that, everything is same in both the layers. So not listing layer                 
12 and its rules separately, and moving on to layer 13 directly. 
Layer 13 has only one rule - to rename all ‘ar’s back to ‘r’s to continue with the                  
process of parsing and enabling the application of rules based on the label ‘r’. This will                
be applicable only on the TGs of layer 12. It has no NACs. 




The remaining rules are not being presented here due to space constraints. For the full               
list of PRs, one can refer to [15]. 
 4. Results and Conclusion 
Using this parser, we tested around 100k graphs (98,634 to be precise) generated by the               
generative rules of VGG and found that every single one of them is a derivable graph                
(because the parser could parse each one of them and found at least one path where it                 
landed up at the start graph). We then manually gave some graphs as input to the parser                 
which, we know, are not generated by the GRs of VGG. As expected, they are               
classified as non-derivable graphs by this parser. This shows that the parser is powerful              
enough to differentiate the graphs generated by the GRs of VGG from those not              
generated by it.  
But our goal is something bigger. We need to also ensure that these graphs              
generated by GRs are actually Vaiśesịka graphs and not some arbitrary graphs. In other              
words, are they interpretable in terms of Vaiśesịka categories, and if yes, how to verify               
that.  
We interpreted each of these 100k graphs using our IRs and found that every single               
node of it being labeled with one of the Vaiśesịka categories. Around 4 million nodes               
(3,886,374 nodes, to be precise) are labeled. To validate this labeling, we checked for              
the correspondence between the generative labels (like p,q,r etc.) and the interpretation            
labels (like UD, MUS, UUS etc.) and found that there is a one-to-one correspondence              
between the labels presented in the following pairs: (p, MUS), (q, SW), (r, UUS), (s,               
U), (u, Q), (v, UD). This is a resounding (statistical) proof of the soundness of the                
system - that every graph generated by the GRs of VGG is a valid Vaiśesịka graph!  
Using both the above results - (1) Given an input graph, with its structure alone,               
the parser can classify if it is derivable i.e., generated by the GRs of the system or not,                  
and (2) All the graphs generated by the system are valid Vaiśesịka graphs - one can                
actually verify whether an input graph is a valid Vaiśesịka graph or not. This, in itself,                
is a significant result from an ontology engineering perspective since distinction of            
valid state-of-affairs from invalid ones is immensely useful for many rich applications            
like semantic search, machine translation, object recognition, text summarization etc.  
But we have a long way to go before we build such applications. The work               
presented here formalizes a very small, but foundational, portion of reality, and we             
need to formalize much larger portions of reality to make such complex applications             
possible. We are working in that direction, and hope this work also encourages others              
to look at the possibility of generative ontology more seriously. 
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